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Al-Kindi's Treatise on First Philosophy: Translation, Introduction and Notes with a Glossary

Abstract

It is the purpose of this dissertation to contribute in a modest way to this primary work of translation as well as to the equally important task of philosophic analysis. The major part of the present work consists of a translation of al-Kindi's "Treatise on First Philosophy" which is, as far as we know, the first Metaphysics written by a Muslim philosopher.

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AL-KINDI'S TREATISE ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY

Translation, Introduction and Notes

with a Glossary

By

Fuad N. Nucho

A dissertation

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The Dropsie College

for Hebrew and Cognate Learning

Philadelphia

1969

A P P R O V A L

This dissertation, entitled

AL-KINDI'S TREATISE ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY

(Translation, Introduction and Notes)

by

Fuad N. Nucho

Candidate for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

has been read and approved by

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Date _____

Date April 23, 1969

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P R E F A C E

The new interest in Islamic Philosophy, which began about a century ago, has gained momentum in our times. This field of study has attracted scholars in a number of disciplines. The Orientalist seeks to ascertain the original contribution of Islamic philosophy and the nature and extent of its influence on Western thinking. The Classicist searches this rather unexploited philosophical mine in the hope of finding material that would add to his knowledge of the heritage of Greece, and his efforts have not been in vain. The Medievalist studies Islamic philosophy in an attempt to shed more light on the impact of hellenistic thought upon the monotheistic religions as well as on the interaction that took place between these religions. Contemporary Muslim thinkers also have increasingly been devoting their energies to research in Islamic philosophy and have made significant contributions. Numerous works that were neglected or lost for centuries are being rediscovered in libraries of the Middle East, northwestern Africa and Europe. Unfortunately, much of this new material cannot be studied immediately as it has to be first edited and translated.

It is the purpose of this dissertation to contribute in a modest way to this primary work of translation as well as to the equally important task of philosophic analysis. The major part of the present

work consists of a translation of al-Kindi's "Treatise on First Philosophy" which is, as far as we know, the first Metaphysics written by a Muslim philosopher. The Treatise is one of a collection of philosophic essays by al-Kindi which was discovered in Istanbul four decades ago. The bracketed subtitles in the translation were added by the present writer for the sake of clarity. In the left margin, the numbers 97-162 refer to the pages, and the numbers 5, 10, 15 and 20 to the lines, in the Arabic text which was edited and published in Cairo in 1950 and a copy of which has been placed at the end of this dissertation for the convenience of the reader. The translation is introduced by an account of the philosophical and theological situation in the early part of the Ninth Century A.D., a biographical sketch of al-Kindi and a discussion of the content of this metaphysical work. The Introduction is concluded with an evaluation of the Treatise and al-Kindi's philosophic position. Documentation takes the form of extensive notes which are followed by a glossary of philosophical terms used in the Treatise.

I wish to express my deep gratitude to The Dropsie College for the teaching fellowship that was granted me and the opportunity to study at this outstanding Graduate School. Special thanks are extended to Dr. Federico Corriente, Dr. Israel Efros and Dr. Theodor H. Gaster who read this dissertation and whose suggestions were most helpful. The inspiration and assistance received from Dr. Lawrence V. Berman, under whom the present work was begun when he was on the

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Fuad N. Nucho

INTRODUCTION

1. The Philosophical and Theological Background

a. The Impact of Greek Thought

The culture in the countries conquered by Islam in the Seventh Century was essentially hellenistic. The military victories of Alexander the Great some thousand years earlier had paved the way for the spread of Greek ideas and ideals in the Mediterranean world and the Middle East. The process of hellenization was particularly enhanced by the Greek centers that were established in Egypt, Syria and Persia. The great cosmopolitan city of Alexandria played a leading role in stimulating widespread interest in, and preoccupation with, Greek philosophy and science. It was here that the Hellenic or purely Greek culture interacted and became infused with Eastern thought and the resultant Hellenistic civilization emerged. Greek became the language of learning and was most instrumental in molding the world of that day into a wider cultural unity. Under the aegis of the Roman and Byzantine empires, the influence of Hellenism continued to color the thinking and life of the inhabitants of Western Asia and the Mediterranean countries.

Beginning with the Third Century A.D., a new version of

hellenistic thought, Neo-Platonism, made its appearance. This powerful philosophic system was destined to dominate the speculative arena of the Middle Ages. Plotinus (205? - 270 A.D.), the founder of Neo-Platonism, revived the ancient Greek philosophy but gave it a religious bent. His fundamental doctrine consists of the derivation of the world from One supreme entity through a process of emanation. In the words of Dr. Richard Kroner, Plotinus "out-Platonized Plato" and "dared to fulfill the highest task of all speculation: to understand the plurality of being out of its unity, to derive all the contents of thought out of their primary ground."¹ In the Enneads, Plotinus wrote: "The One is not absent from anything, and yet it is separated from all things, so that it is present and yet not present with them."²

Because of its philosophic or rather metaphysical monotheism and its epistemological mysticism, Neo-Platonism found positive response in Christianity and, later on, also in Islam. It was instrumental in the conversion of Augustine to the Christian faith and influential in the shaping of his theology. The Neo-Platonic system attracted also the minds of pagan thinkers who discovered in it a religious mood that satisfied their deep spiritual longing.

For our purposes in the present study, we shall follow hellenistic philosophy as it was taken up by the Syrian Christians

because it is this stream which eventually leads into Islamic thought. The general bent of philosophy among the Syrian Christians was Neo-Platonic. This was due to the influence of the Syrian disciples of Plotinus, namely, Porphyry and Jamblichus. While Porphyry (230 - 300 A.D.) helped popularize Neo-Platonism by stressing and developing its religious elements, Jamblichus (? - 330 A.D.) cast it into polytheistic theological forms.³ The transplanting of Neo-Platonism in Syria did not find any opposition because Hellenism had been naturalized in that region. As Bertold Spuler has pointed out, the christological controversies in the Eastern Church, which eventually led to its division into Orthodox State and Monophysite (Jacobites) and Nestorian churches, indirectly encouraged the further cultivation of Greek philosophy.⁴ Particularly the Monophysites and Nestorians sought in Greek philosophy logical proofs for their theological self-defence against the Byzantine Church. Especially in the Aristotelian writings, which they translated into Syriac, they found the necessary logical ammunition to hold their own theological ground.

The type of philosophy cultivated by the Syrian Christians was a Neo-Platonic version of Aristotelianism. Hardly any attention was devoted to Plato. Two of the outstanding Aristotelian commentators were the Nestorian Ammonius and the Jacobite John Philoponus. The books of the Organon and the Metaphysics of the Greek master

were translated into Syriac. For some time, part of the Enneads of Plotinus were thought to be the work of Aristotle and was known as "The Theology of Aristotle." Porphyry's Isagogue was also attributed to Aristotle.

The Greek heritage, moreover, found an agreeable home in Persia. Political intolerance and religious persecution in the Fifth and Sixth Centuries forced the Monophysites and, more so, the Nestorians to move deeper into the Middle East. They established themselves in Mesopotamia and Persia where they continued their theological and philosophical activities under the tolerant Sassanid rule. The persecution of the Emperor Justinian of all non-Christians led to the closing down in 529 A.D. of the Athenian philosophical school.⁵ Its scholars, among whom were Aristotelian commentators and Neo-Platonists, found refuge in Persia where they were patronized by the Sassanid King Chosroes (Anu-Shirwān, 531-579 A.D.). Although most of them returned to Greece after several years when conditions improved, during their stay in Persia they helped lay down the ground work for continued philosophic development. Translations of Greek philosophic and medical works into Persian were encouraged and financed by King Chosroes. A Persian philosophic terminology was coined. The Syrian scholar Uranius, who was attached to the royal court, translated considerable works of both Plato and Aristotle into Persian.⁶ The Nestorians on the whole excelled in medicine. The

reputation that some of them gained was due to their medical rather than philosophical achievements. The works of Galen and Hippocrates also appeared in Persian.

b. The Abbāsid Cultural Renaissance

At the beginning of the Ninth Century A.D., Baghdad was basking in the limelight of a Golden Age under the reputable Abbāsid caliphate of Hārūn al-Rashīd (786-809 A.D.). The Byzantine rulers had been subdued. Peace and order had been established in North Africa. Through Hārūn's political and military skill, the Arab Empire enjoyed a large measure of internal tranquility. Through his ingenious administrative ability, the legendary caliph stimulated economic activity and encouraged foreign trade. Baghdad developed into a vital shipping center. Wealth poured into it from numerous provinces of the Empire as well as from foreign lands.

Through the wise leadership of Hārūn, himself an educated man, economic prosperity was made to serve constructive ends. An era of culture and learning was ushered in and a magnificent civilization began to flourish. Architecture experienced a great boom. Being himself well-versed in religion and literature, Hārūn made his court the center of culture and scholarship. He initiated discussion and debate on a high intellectual level. Medicine,

in these fields were entertained at the court where they engaged in discussion, debate and exchange of ideas. Being himself gifted in, and addicted to, poetry, al-Ma'mūn generously patronized the leading poets and stimulated a literary output that was soon to become a permanent part of Arab heritage.

Al-Ma'mūn's reign also marked the appearance of the great collectors of tradition (ḥadīth), notably al-Bukhārī, as well as a host of grammarians, philosophers, historians and theologians. An institute for advanced study and research and a large library (bayt al-ḥikmah) were founded in Baghdad. An observatory was also constructed in the plains of Tadmur.⁸

Increasingly, al-Ma'mūn became fascinated by Greek philosophy and science. Agents were sent out into all directions to search for and collect the writings of Greek philosophers, physicians, historians and geometricians. A competent staff of translators, under the leadership of the Nestorian Christian Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq (807-877 A.D.) was subsidized by the public treasury for the task of translating the whole corpus of Greek knowledge into Arabic. This valuable undertaking was carried out chiefly by Christians, Jews and Persians. At times, when the Greek original was not available, the translation was made from the Syriac version. Special interest was cultivated in mathematics and astronomy. The works of Euclid and Ptolemy were translated by al-Ḥajjāj Ibn Yūsuf Ibn Maṭar for al-Ma'mūn, who had

an understanding for the practical application of astronomy.⁹ Supplementary material was borrowed from Indian sources. The Indian astronomical book, Sindhind, had been translated for al-Mansūr by Ibrāhīm al-Fazāri.¹⁰ At the request of al-Ma'mūn, Muhammad al-Khawārizmī prepared the first independent book in algebra.¹¹

The most striking feature of the first half of the Ninth Century was a spirit of intellectual freedom and tolerance which encouraged philosophic curiosity and scientific objectivity. Freedom of inquiry and discussion aroused the pursuit of every kind of knowledge. Through this open-minded attitude and ideal atmosphere for learning, the frontiers of investigation and research were extended into many directions. In this climate of tolerance and objectivity, as Dr. S. D. Goitein has indicated, the deep-seated interest in religion gave birth to the new science of Comparative Religion, as exemplified in al-Shahrastānī's work, The Religions and Philosophic Schools (al-Milal wa'l-Nihāl).¹² This "broad tolerance within its community," in the words of H. A. R. Gibb, grew out of "the character of Islam as a strong, self-confident, conquering faith."¹³

The Abbāsīd cultural renaissance, which began in Baghdad, spread to many parts of the Arab Empire. Older centers of learning such as the rival cities of al-Kūfa and al-Baṣra continued to flourish. New centers were established at strategic points throughout the empire. Outstanding poets like Abū Nuwās, Abū-'l-ʿAtāhiya

and al-Mutanabbi added luster of magnificent poetry to this Golden Age. A flood of writings in history, geography, biography, lexicography, rhetoric, zoology, botany and other fields of knowledge made its appearance.

Al-Ma'mūn's brother and successor, al-Mu'tasim (833-842), showed special enthusiasm for architecture. He built a new palace outside Baghdad and surrounded it with elaborate gardens and called it "surra man ra'a" (he will be delighted who beholds 'it'). He also built new canals and erected numerous magnificent structures including some magnificent mosques. Al-Mu'tasim's reign, however, marks the beginning of the political decline of Abbāsīd glory.

c. Faith and Reason in Early Islam

The conflict between faith and reason in early Islam revolved around the problem of predestination and free will. The influence of Christianity and Hellenistic thought were, no doubt, important factors in the development of the controversy. However, the initial differences of opinion as to whether man's decisions and actions were predestined or were the product of his own free will were aroused by contradictory statements in the Koran itself regarding this matter. Both the advocates of predestination and the defenders of the freedom of the will were able to claim scriptural bases for

their views. Metaphysical determinism is unequivocally expressed, for instance, in the following passages:

Allah will open the heart of him whom He intends to guide in the right path, and close the heart of him whom He intends to lead to err.¹⁴

It is not for a soul to believe except by the permission of Allah.¹⁵

He leadeth astray whomever He pleaseth and guideth unto Himself whomever He pleaseth.¹⁶

Man's freedom of choice and action, on the other hand, is indicated in utterances as

We showed them the right way, but they chose error above guidance.¹⁷

Truth is from your Lord, so let him who pleases believe, and let him who pleases disbelieve.¹⁸

We vouchsafed them also guidance, but to guidance did they prefer blindness.¹⁹

These contradictory views are most probably the result of Muhammad's own position which underwent a change from a belief in free will during his Meccan period to that of predestination after the Hegira.²⁰

As A. J. Wensinck has pointed out, "the debates on predestination inaugurated rationalism in Islam."²¹ The earliest defenders of reason and free will were the Kharijites, whose thinking found expression in their political doctrine concerning the khilāfah (succession). They upheld the democratic principle of election on the basis of qualifi-

cation rather than by automatic hereditary succession. Any Muslim, who possessed the necessary qualifications, the Kharijites insisted, should be eligible for election to the role of leadership in the Muslim community. They maintained that the free choice of the whole community serves as a channel to God's will.²²

The Kharijite political theory soon led to theological debates as the Muslim community was compelled to define its stand on matters concerning who is a Muslim, who is saved or damned and what is the role of faith and works in the divine act of salvation. The liberalism of the Kharijites was vigorously opposed by the Murji'ites who stressed the supremacy of faith and predestination over against reason and free will. The Murji'ites refused to pass judgment on behavior and left this matter exclusively to God.²³ This sect advanced a static conception of faith. It was of the opinion that the faith of the Muslim cannot be impaired by evil acts and declared conduct and practice as secondary, but not essential, to faith.

The controversy over the primacy of faith or works took a strictly theological direction as soon as the ontological question was raised whether the Muslim's faith and works were the creation of God or the product of man's free will. The conflict was now taken up by the Qadarites and the Jabarites. The former restricted 'qadar' (God's decree, predestination) and asserted that man is the author of his own decisions and actions and, consequently, is respon-

sible for his conduct.²⁴ The Jabarites, on the other hand, persisted in the belief that divine predestination encompasses also the choices and acts of man's will. Their position was in line with that of the Orthodox traditionalists (ahl al-Sunna), who did not hesitate to condemn the rational method in religion as innovation (bid'ah) and, hence, as a dangerous and misleading approach to religious knowledge.

The Qadarites did not survive for long as a sect, but their ideas were adopted and elaborated by their immediate followers, the Mu'tazilites, who seceded from the Orthodox Muslims and worked out a type of speculative theology. This new movement started out, as H. A. R. Gibb has shown, as a reaction against the extremism of both Kharijites and Murji'ites.²⁵ It advocated the conviction that the Muslim who commits a grave sin does not completely lose his status and becomes an unbeliever, as the Kharijites said, nor does he remain a believer, as the Murji'ites thought. Instead, the Mu'tazilites designated for the sinful Muslim an "Intermediate Position" (al-manzilah bayn al-manzilatayn).²⁶ This description applied also to their own theological position as being intermediate between the Kharijites and the Murji'ites. They did not accept the former's stress on "works" and the latter's emphasis on "faith" and, instead, underscored the importance of both works and faith.

The Mu'tazilites became the champions of human freedom and

responsibility in Islam. Thereby they sought to safeguard the nature of God as Infinite Justice. They argued that the determinism of predestination violates Divine Justice, for it would mean that God holds man accountable for decisions and actions which he performs by Divine decree. The Mu'tazilites reasoned that God would not punish man for deeds he is predestined to carry out. The fact that Divine rewards and punishments are inevitable implies that man is the author of his decisions and acts. In their defence of God's Justice and in their proclamation of a theology that would not accept any relation between God and evil, the Mu'tazilites referred to the frequent use of the epithets "the Compassionate, the Merciful" in the Koran and quoted scriptural passages to support their assertion:

God will not burden any soul beyond its power. It shall enjoy the good which it hath acquired, and it shall bear the evil for the acquirement of which it laboured.²⁷

God is not unjust towards His servants.²⁸

The Mu'tazilites did not restrict the all-embracing power of God by their stress on Divine Justice. It is God who gives man the power and the freedom of choice, but the nature of the choice itself between good and evil is entirely left to man's will. However, man must face the necessary consequences of his responsible freedom.

The Orthodox Muslims reacted vehemently to the Mu'tazilite doctrine of free will. In the first place, letting man have 'power'

over his own actions, they believed, would make him the 'creator' of his own acts and this would mean a theological dualism that encroaches on God's almighty power. Moreover, the Orthodox Muslims interpreted the Mu'tazilite emphasis on free will as implying a restriction on Divine freedom and power. For them, God is an absolute Monarch whose freedom cannot be limited by any external agency.²⁹ The Mu'tazilites were also accused of making reason (al-'aql), rather than revelation (wahy), the highest norm. To quote al-Shahrastānī,

The principle of the Mu'tazilites is justice in accordance with what reason postulates from wisdom, that is, producing acts in the way of what is right and salutary. There is no decree from eternity; God has ordered and prohibited and promised and menaced by non-eternal speech. Accordingly, he who is saved deserves reward on account of his own acts. This is postulated by reason as applied to Wisdom.³⁰

In their epistemology, the Mu'tazilites vested reason with the supervisory prerogative over all objects of knowledge and derived the necessity of moral behavior from rational insight rather than revealed truth.³¹

The question of human freedom and Divine Justice led also to that of Divine Essence and Attributes. The Mu'tazilites were not only advocates of Divine Justice but also of Divine Unity. Hence, they called themselves 'the People of Unity and Justice' (ahl al-tawhīd a'l-'adl). Their defence of the Unity of God was

first directed against the metaphysical dualism of the Manichaeans and the trinitarian doctrine of the Christians. It was quite probably their struggle on these two fronts that the Mu'tazilites were first brought into contact with Greek logic and philosophy, a contact that was soon to usher the cultural renaissance of the Abbāsids spearheaded by the translation of Greek works into Arabic.

Within Islam, the Mu'tazilite emphasis on God's Unity took the form of ridding the concept of God from the anthropomorphism of the Orthodox believers. The Mu'tazilites vigorously rejected the belief that God will be literally seen by the faithful Muslims in heaven and so made every effort to explain away scriptural passages that speak of God's face, eyes, hands and throne. This anthropomorphism, they argued, would mean that God is limited to one place and this implies that He is finite. The Mu'tazilite conviction that God is pure Spirit made them oppose the Orthodox belief in the divine attributes which, in their view, constitutes a plurality and, therefore, is a violation of Divine Unity. They radically denied that God possesses any personal qualities (ṣifāt dhātiyyah, shakhsīyyah) except eternity. Al-Shahrastānī writes:

The common belief of the sect of the Mu'tazilites is, that Allah is eternal (qadīm) and that eternity is the most peculiar description of His essence. They absolutely reject all other eternal qualities, saying: It is by virtue of His essence that He has knowledge, power and life; not because they are eternal qualities or ideas inherent in Him. For if the qualities should

partake of His eternity, which is His most peculiar description, they would partake of His divinity ... and they agree upon this, that will and hearing and sight are not ideas inherent in His essence.³²

A logical consequence of the Mu'tazilite rejection of the eternity of the divine attributes was their denial of the eternity of the Koran. Orthodox Islam believed that the Koran, as the speech (kalām) of God, was uncreated and eternal. It is "a glorious Koran in a preserved tablet" (lawḥ mahfūz).³³ The Koran received and communicated by Muhammad was believed to be a copy of the original tablet preserved in heaven from eternity. The Mu'tazilites saw in the doctrine of the eternity of the Koran the ontological implication of something other than God co-existing with Him before creation. This meant, in their view, a dualism that violates the absolute Oneness of God. To guard the Divine Unity, the Mu'tazilites argued strongly that the Koran was created. They referred to the Koranic verse "We have made it (ja'alnāhu) an Arabic Koran"³⁴ in support of their assertion, but the core of their argument rested heavily on the logic and dialectic (kalām) of Greek philosophy.

The rationalism of the Mu'tazilites and their theo-philosophical position, particularly their dogma that the Koran was created in time, were enthusiastically adopted and popularized by the Abbāsīd chaliph al-Ma'mūn. The doctrine of the non-eternity of the Koran

was decreed by him as an article of faith in 833 and leading theologians were forced to subscribe to it. A period of fanatical inquisition followed. The movement that began in liberalism ended in intolerance. However, it was the adoption of the Mu'tazilite creed by al-Ma'mūn and his brother and successor al-Mu'tasim that encouraged the translation and study of Greek science and philosophy. The Mu'tazilites' influence and power began to wane during the rule of al-Mutawakkil (847-861 A.D.), who reversed the policy of his predecessors and upheld the theological position of Orthodox Islam. Though the set-back of the Mu'tazilites ultimately led to their final defeat, the movement succeeded in laying its rationalistic imprint on Islamic theology.

2. The Treatise on First Philosophy

a. Al-Kindi's Life and Work

Al-Kindi was born around 801 A.D. in al-Kūfah,³⁵ where his father, Ishāq ibn al-Ṣabbah, was governor under Hārūn al-Rashīd. His family belonged to, and provided leadership for, the influential Arabian tribe Kindah. Al-Ash'ath ibn Qais, one of al-Kindi's ancestors, along with a delegation from his tribe, had adopted Islam and pledged allegiance in person to the prophet Muhammad.³⁶ During the caliphate of 'Umar, the tribe of Kindah moved from

Arabia and resettled in the newly founded city of al-Kūfah in southern Iraq.

In the source material that is at our disposal at the present, there is little information about al-Kindi's boyhood and early upbringing. Orphaned when he was still a child, he was reared in the intellectual atmosphere of al-Kūfah. As is commonly known, al-Kūfah and its rival city al-Basrah were the great centers of Islamic learning and culture. It is quite possible that al-Kindi acquired part of his formal education in al-Basrah.³⁷ The curriculum at the time consisted chiefly of memorization of the Koran and mastery of Arabic grammar and literature. Soon al-Kindi began to devote himself to the study of Islamic law (fiqh) and the new discipline of dialectical theology (kalām). His maturing years, however, brought about a passionate interest in the natural sciences, medicine and philosophy.

In order to pursue these fields of learning, al-Kindi went to Baghdad, where Greek and Persian studies were beginning to attract brilliant minds and where the atmosphere of religious and intellectual freedom stimulated scientific inquiry and research. We do not know the teachers under whom al-Kindi studied. There is no evidence that he acquired a knowledge of the Greek language, but it is very likely that he became proficient in Syriac. T. J.

de Boer's statement that in Baghdad, al-Kindi "came to put a higher value upon Persian civilization and Greek wisdom than upon old Arab virtue and the Muslim faith"³⁸ may be true of his early years in the Abbāsīd capital.

Al-Kindi's philosophic interest and outstanding scholarship brought him to the attention of al-Ma'mūn, the great patron of culture and learning. Al-Kindi was attached to the ruler's court and contributed no little to the activity of translating Greek works into Arabic and probably in a supervisory capacity. This important work of translation was done from original sources and, when these were lacking, then from Syriac versions. Al-Kindi also engaged in revising existing Arabic translations such as the Enneads of Plotinus. Al-Qiftī, an early biographer, reports that "many philosophical books were translated by al-Kindi who clarified their difficulties and summarized their theories."³⁹

Al-Kindi was highly esteemed by al-Ma'mūn, his brother and successor al-Mu'taṣim and the latter's son Aḥmad, whose tutor he became.⁴⁰ "Al-Kindi and his writings," Ibn Nabātah wrote, "embellished the empire of al-Mu'taṣim."⁴¹ Al-Kindi became to be known as "The Philosopher of the Arabs" (faylasūf al-'Arab). He continued to provide scholarly leadership during the rule of al-Mutawakkil. However, it was during the reign of this caliph that misfortune befell al-Kindi. The philosopher's prominent position in the court, we

are told by Ibn abi Usaibi'ah,⁴² aroused the envy of the sons of Mūsa ibn Shākir, Muḥammad and Aḥmad, whose conspiracy against him brought the displeasure of the caliph upon him. Al-Kindi was punished and his huge library was confiscated and transported to al-Baṣrah where it was stacked and designated "the Kindian Library." Not very long afterwards, however, the conspiracy was discovered and al-Kindi's books were returned to him. In connection with this incident, the fact must be borne in mind that under al-Mutawakkil, as it was mentioned earlier, Orthodoxy in Islam regained the upper hand and, consequently, al-Kindi, with his Mu'tazilite leanings, was no longer welcomed at the court as he had been under the liberal caliphs al-Ma'mūn and al-Mu'taṣim.

The works credited to al-Kindi by the earliest biographer, Ibn al-Nadīm,⁴³ indicate that he was an encyclopedic writer with rare competence in numerous fields of knowledge. The 268 titles of essays listed by Ibn al-Nadīm cover a wide range of subjects such as logic, philosophy, music, psychology, physics, mathematics, ethics, politics and astronomy. Unfortunately, most of this scholarly output was lost. A few of his scientific works were translated into Latin and had some influence on medieval European thought. Girolamo Cardanus, the medieval historian, considered al-Kindi one of the twelve greatest minds in the history of human

thought.⁴⁴

The recognition of al-Kindi as an original and profound thinker has gained increasing support since the discovery of a collection of his essays by Hellmut Ritter in Istanbul libraries. The philosophic treatises in this collection were edited and published in two volumes (1950, 1953) by Professor Muḥammad Abū Rīdah (Cairo) under the heading Rasā'il al-Kindi al-falsafiyyah (Al-Kindi's Philosophic Essays).⁴⁵

Al-Kindi's works vary in their length and they are often addressed to the reigning caliph or to some close friend. At times, the introduction and the conclusion disclose that the treatise was written in reply to some inquiry directed to him. Al-Kindi repeatedly states in his essays that he writes concisely and with due awareness and consideration of the degree of intellectual maturity of his reader.

There is no evidence that al-Kindi was actively engaged in teaching, except as the private tutor of al-Mu'tasim's son Ahmad. No doubt, he participated in the discussions and debates that took place in the presence of the caliph. A contemporary of al-Kindi, the Mu'tazilite al-Jāhiz, a well-known humorist, mentions in his Book on the Misers (Kitāb al-Bukhalā') that al-Kindī was notorious for his thriftiness.⁴⁶ As Abu Rīdah has pointed out, the context in which this reference occurs is not explicit as to whether al-Kindi, the

philosopher, is actually meant.⁴⁷ In the first part of his article, "Al-Kindi als Literat," Dr. Franz Rosenthal addresses himself to this non-complimentary trait of al-Kindi's personality, which came down in the oral tradition and was recorded by several writers, and questions the authentic reliability of this characterization.⁴⁸ At any rate, the impression the reader gets from al-Kindi's writings seems to be expressive of the author's generous nature and his readiness to share especially the fruits of his mind. In his ethical treatise "Al-hīlah fī daf' al-ahzan" (The Cure and Prevention of Sorrows), al-Kindi specifically urges men not to be enslaved by their material needs and possessions and declares that happiness is dependent more on the acquisition of intellectual rather than material riches.⁴⁹

It is most likely that in the pursuit of his intellectual endeavors, al-Kindi lived aloof from society. Around his comfortable house in suburban Baghdad, he had a garden in which he reared a variety of strange and rare animals. Al-Qiftī relates that al-Kindi resided in the vicinity of a wealthy merchant who did not know that al-Kindi was a great physician. The merchant's son was afflicted by some serious malady which no physician could cure. Informed by someone that the prominent philosopher, who lived in his neighborhood, was also a capable physician, the merchant took his son to al-Kindi who cured him through musical therapy.⁵⁰ According to al-Qiftī also,⁵¹ al-Kindi tried in vain to heal himself from some illness from which he died probably at the age of seventy-two (c. 873 A.D.).

A "Millenium of Baghdad and al-Kindi" was celebrated in the Iraqi capital in December 1962 at which a number of papers covering various aspects of this first Muslim philosopher's thought were read.⁵²

b. Philosophy, Truth and Religion

Al-Kindi's "Treatise on First Philosophy" is the longest of his extant works. It was addressed to the Abbāsid caliph al-Mu'tasim who succeeded al-Ma'mūn in 833 A.D. and ruled in Baghdad until 842 A.D. The complimentary words directed to the caliph at the opening of the Treatise express a mood which is indicative of the close relationship which al-Kindi had to his patron and the high esteem which was accorded him at the court. This is also substantiated by the fact that "the Philosopher of the Arabs" was granted the privilege to be the tutor of al-Mu'tasim's son Ahmad. Al-Kindi enjoyed an honorable status at the palace also during the reign of al-Ma'mūn who entrusted him with a role of leadership in the task of introducing Greek philosophy and science to the Islamic world.

At the very end of the "Treatise on First Philosophy," al-Kindi points out that it was his intention to "continue our discussion with what would naturally follow."⁵³ The editorial note with which the work closes states that Part I has been completed (tamma al-

juz' al-awwal). It is a matter of speculation whether the continuation of this philosophic work was completed and lost or whether the projected plans, for some personal or political reason, never materialized.⁵⁴ Whatever the case may have been, the present work, fortunately, constitutes an integrated whole and its significance as most probably the first philosophic essay in medieval Islam is invaluable.

The first chapter of the Treatise deals with the nature of philosophy and its relation to truth and religion. Philosophy, as the highest and noblest of man's arts (*ṣinā'āt*), is defined as the knowledge of the nature of things (*'ilm al-ashia' biḥaqā'iqihā*) as far as this is possible to man.⁵⁵ In other words, philosophy seeks to know the truth about things. To the question "How can we be sure that the truth we seek does exist?" al-Kindi replies: Simply by sheer necessity does the truth exist, for if the truth is identical with the nature of things, and inasmuch as we know by empirical experience that things exist, it follows that these things must have a real nature which is the object of our philosophic quest.⁵⁶

The knowledge acquired by philosophy, al-Kindi emphasizes, is not an end in itself. It is for this reason that he hastens to link knowledge of the truth with ethics. In his theoretical knowledge (*'ilm*), the philosopher's objective is to attain the truth

(iṣābat al-ḥaqq). In his practical knowledge ('amal), he seeks to live in accordance with the truth (al-'amal bi'l-ḥaqq).⁵⁷ This stress on the practical implications of philosophy, which al-Kindi places at the outset of his discourse, is highly significant. Aristotle had considered theoretical contemplation (theoria) as the highest and noblest activity of man.⁵⁸ Apparently, al-Kindi is not in agreement with this exaltation of 'theoria' as an end in itself. In a sense, he anticipates Kant in stressing the primacy of "practical reason" as we shall have occasion to elaborate later on.

Then al-Kindi proceeds by underscoring the Greek ontological keynote that the search for the truth is inseparable from the search for causes.⁵⁹ This prepares the way for his definition of First Philosophy as the knowledge of the Primary Truth which is the cause of all knowledge and of all truths.⁶⁰ Knowledge of the Primary Truth (al-ḥaqq al-awwal) is identical with knowledge of the First Cause ('lm al-'illah al-ūla).⁶¹ The perfect philosopher is he who devotes himself to the attainment of this supreme goal. This ultimate Truth, which First Philosophy or Metaphysics seeks to reach, is the cause of the existence and maintenance of all things.

Al-Kindi concludes this ontological prelude with a reference to the four Aristotelian causes, the material, formal, efficient

and final.⁶² This is followed by a brief discussion of "the four scientific inquiries" (al-maṭālib al-'ilmiyyah): "Whether" inquires about the existence or non-existence of a thing. "What" attempts to find the genus of an existent. "Which" seeks to identify its species, and "why" searches for its final cause or purpose.⁶³

In our effort to know the truth, al-Kindi reminds us, we must keep in mind that truth is universal in character. It transcends all barriers. There can be no monopoly on the truth. Men often violate and crucify the truth by the narrowness of their minds. We should never hesitate to assimilate the truth regardless of the source from which it may come to us.⁶⁴ Sheer necessity demands that we do so. For during the brief span of life, a person's acquisition of the truth can only be fragmentary. Men must cooperate in their search for the truth. They must gratefully remember that the bequest of truth they inherited has been the result of serious search and tireless research of many generations. Indeed, we are duty-bound to acknowledge our debt to those who have contributed, in whatever small way, to the fund of knowledge, to say nothing of our debt to those who have done so in a large measure. Those who have shared with us the harvest of their minds have thereby facilitated our investigation and attainment of the truth. They have become our intellectual in-laws (ansāb) and partners (shurakā') in knowledge.⁶⁵

Al-Kindi is quite severe in his criticism of the men of religion who reject all philosophical pursuits, the knowledge of things as they are, and who jump to the conclusion that all philosophical preoccupation is nothing but heresy (kufr).⁶⁶ Al-Kindi's obvious liberalism leads him to use very strong language in his attack against the Orthodox traditionalists with their fanatic fundamentalism. He describes them as perverters of the truth and traders of religion and enemies of all that is refined and noble.⁶⁷

Al-Kindi's universalistic attitude toward the truth guided him in his methodology. His method of research seeks first to review in a comprehensive manner what has been said about the subject under investigation. After that he proceeds to complete and discuss what had not been elaborated by others. He pledges his reader the necessary sensitivity and regard to the prevalent usages of the Arabic language and the literary style of the times.⁶⁸

Before this introductory chapter is concluded, al-Kindi underscores the importance of philosophical knowledge as a vital instrument for attaining religious truth. In fact, he considers theology ('ilm al-rubūbiyyah), knowledge of Divine Unity ('ilm al-wahdāniyyah) and ethics ('ilm al-fadīlah) as falling within the scope of philosophy.⁶⁹ He goes on to assert, however, that the knowledge concerning the Divinity and Unity of God, which is attained by the philosopher is

not different from that revealed directly by God to His prophets.⁷⁰ But this revelation to the few does not in any way nullify or minimize the importance of the philosophical channel for the realization of Divine Truth. The philosophical method, al-Kindi insists, is a precious possession (qunyah nafīṣah) which it is our duty (wājib) to use and not to lose.⁷¹ Even those who are opposed to philosophy will find themselves compelled by logical necessity to avail themselves of its services. For their objections to it are invalid unless they are supported by demonstrative proof which is itself a part of the philosophic knowledge they reject.⁷²

It has become evident in the course of this first chapter that al-Kindi wrote his First Philosophy with the purpose of substantiating and defending both the reality and Divinity of God against two particular enemies. He was engaged in a battle on two fronts. On the one hand, as alluded to above, al-Kindi's attack was directed to the Orthodox traditionalists (ahl al-sunnah) who vigorously opposed the infiltration of philosophy into Islam and the use of the logical method in matters of faith. Their fanatical adherence to the doctrine of predestination made them intolerant, in a very aggressive manner, of the Mu'tazilite stress on freedom and responsibility. Their fundamentalistic understanding of the Koran, the Mu'tazilites believed, was a perversion of religion and a distortion of the reality of God. The Orthodox doctrine of reward and punishment and the denial of man's

freedom of choice and responsibility was an encroachment on God's Justice. Al-Kindi was determined to defend the freedom of man, particularly the freedom to use his mind in matters of religion. He attempted in his First Philosophy to show the Orthodox traditionalists the futility of their literalism and the validity of philosophical knowledge as a path to religious truth.

On the other hand, al-Kindi was equally concerned about the danger to which his Islamic faith was subjected by the assaults of the unbelievers (al-kāfirūn) and the threat to the Divine Unity created by the dualism of the Manichaeans and the trinitarian doctrine of the Christians. To the unbelievers he wanted to prove, by means of the same dialectic they themselves used, the existence and reality of God. With respect to the Manichaeans and Christians, it was al-Kindi's intention in this metaphysical essay to vindicate the truth of the basic Mu'tazilite doctrine of Divine Unity. These concerns find expression in the very last section of this first chapter of First Philosophy where al-Kindi appeals to divine support and asks God "to prove His lordship and elucidate His Unity" and grant him the guidance that he may "refute by logical arguments (hujaj) the stubborn unbelievers, whose godlessness and shamefulness we seek to dispel, and the defects and ill-effects of their religious beliefs we attempt to reveal."⁷³

c. Theory of Knowledge

Before starting his metaphysical inquiry, al-Kindi lays down the necessary epistemological foundations. The first half of the second chapter is devoted to this matter. The theory of knowledge delineated in this context deals primarily with the channels and nature of cognition.

Man acquires knowledge through two avenues: his sense organs and his mind. Corresponding to these two channels are the two modes of cognition (wujūd): perception (wujūd ḥissi)⁷⁴ and conception (wujūd 'aqli)⁷⁵. Our sense perception is a function of our physical nature. It is direct and immediate. The world we come to know through the senses is the temporary world of phenomena which is constantly in flux. Knowledge gained by the senses, al-Kindi points out, is far removed from the true nature of things because it is a knowledge of the appearance only. Nevertheless, sense perception performs a vital and necessary function. It supplies us with a considerable part of the raw material which our mind organizes and utilizes, in the form of images, for its specific task. For al-Kindi, the world of phenomena does not reveal the nature of things but, unlike Plato, he considers it a real world.

We have been equipped to know not only through our senses but also through our minds. The objects of our conceptual cognition are

universal realities and rational principles.⁷⁶ Knowledge obtained by the mind is nearer to the true nature of things than knowledge gained by the senses. What we perceive through the senses are particular things (al-ashīā' al-juz'iyyah) which are material. These are the individual (ashkhāṣ) beings and things of the species. What we conceive by our minds are the universals (al-kulliyyāt) such as the genera (ajnās) and the species (anwā').⁷⁷

Al-Kindi argues quite strongly and convincingly against extreme empiricism which contends that all knowledge is acquired through the senses. He would agree with Kant that all knowledge begins with sense perception, but not with Locke that all knowledge comes from empirical experience. There are realities which we know directly through our minds, such as the fact that the states of being (huwa) and non-being (lā huwa) cannot be attributed to an object simultaneously.⁸⁰ At one point, al-Kindi turns to outer space to illustrate his argument and makes the statement that outside the All (jism al-kull) there is nothing at all neither a void (khalā') nor occupied space (malā').⁸¹ The truth or falsity of this proposition cannot be verified by empirical observation. Only our mind can deal with this problem. We conceive the truth of this assertion logically and in the following manner: If space, whether empty or occupied, were to exist outside the All, which is the totality of being, then what we conceive to be the All could not possibly be the All at all, for

the All must contain all existence. Al-Kindi goes on to advance two logical arguments in support of his premise. He demonstrates first that space and its content are inseparable entities. Secondly, he shows that infinity cannot be an actuality because then it would be limited and ceases to be infinity. Therefore, he concludes, beyond the All there is nothing at all. This is a logical necessity and can be conceived only by the mind.⁸²

Al-Kindi discusses the nature of cognition very briefly in the present context. Of the mutable world of phenomena which is perceived by the senses only images are retained by the imagination (al-muṣawwirah) which, in turn, deposits them into the memory (ḥifẓ) for eventual use by the mind.⁸³ While sensory objects require the medium (mutawassit) of images in order to be apprehended, conceptual knowledge is comprehended without the instrumentality of images because it is represented by concepts which are grasped directly by the mind. The concepts have no material existence although the presence of material objects may help us in their acquisition. But this does not mean, al-Kindi hastens to add, that the concepts or the universals are abstracted from material phenomena because they never align themselves with the material.⁸⁴

The attainment of knowledge through perception and conception, through the senses and the mind, al-Kindi emphasizes, renders our knowledge of the truth easy in certain respects and difficult in

others - easy when we know that these two channels of cognition are applicable to two corresponding orders of reality, difficult when we ignore this distinction and try to use the one channel or the other for the acquisition of all knowledge. He who seeks to know the universals through empirical experience, al-Kindi warns, will be disappointed for his efforts will be in vain. His predicament would be similar to that of a bat in daylight unable to see what is perfectly visible to us.⁸⁵

Al-Kindi would be critical of the attempts of certain disciplines today which try to be scientific by imitating physical science in its empirical method. It is because of the confusion of methods of investigation, says al-Kindi, that many thinkers in his day were puzzled whenever they directed their inquiries to metaphysical fields of knowledge and tried to apply the scientific method in this higher order of reality. We should not use, for instance, persuasion in mathematics, empiricism in theology, discursive reasoning in physics or demonstrative proof in rhetoric.⁸⁶

Other aspects of al-Kindi's epistemology appear in some of his other works particularly in his "Treatise on the Intellect" (risālah fi al-'aql) and the "Treatise on the Nature of Sleep and Dreams" (risālah fi māhiyyat al-nawm wa-al-ru'ya).⁸⁷ The imagination (al-muṣawwirah) has a vital role in his theory of knowledge. This faculty works continuously. During the waking hours, its energies

are divided between the senses and the mind rendering its services to both perception and conception. During sleep, when perception ceases, it serves the mind exclusively. Dreaming is a form of thinking.⁸⁸ The highest receiving station in al-Kindi's epistemology, however, is intuition which he designates as inspiration (ilhām) and revelation (waḥī).⁸⁹

d. From Cosmology to Ontology

Al-Kindi defines physics as "the science of that which moves" ('ilm kull mutaharrik) and metaphysics as "the science of that which does not move" ('ilm ma la yataharrik).⁹⁰ The rest of the second chapter is devoted to a philosophical analysis of the terms 'Eternal' (azalī), 'Infinite' (ghayr mutanāhi), 'Time' (zamān), 'Motion' (ḥarakah) and 'Change' (tabaddul).

What is the nature of the Eternal? In the first place, it is that which is always Being (huwa) and never non-Being (laysa).⁹¹ The Eternal, moreover, is self-sufficient, immutable and has no cause. It is not made of matter and has no form. It is not a species and has no genus. The Eternal has no ontological development because it is itself absolutely perfect. It is not a body and, therefore, it is immune to corruption and passing away. These qualities of the Eternal are established by means of a strictly logical argument which systematically posits the opposite and shows the contradictions that ensue.

Al-Kindi then goes on to demonstrate that the Infinite can

never be actual. It is impossible for a body to be infinite in actuality.⁹² The truth of this matter is demonstrated by strictly mathematical arguments which al-Kindi also advances in some of his other philosophical essays, particularly "The Proof of the Finititude of the Universe" (Idāh tanāhi jirm al-'ālam),⁹³ "Fi mā'iyyat mā lā yumkin an yakūn lā nihāyah lahu wamā alladhi yuqālu 'lā nihāyah lahu'" (On the Nature of that which cannot possibly be Infinite, and that which is called Infinite),⁹⁴ and "Fi waḥdāniyyat Allāh wa-tanāhi jirm al-'ālam" (On the Oneness of God and the finitude of the Universe).⁹⁵

Having established the basic fact that anything that is quantitative is necessarily finite, al-Kindi proceeds now to prove that Time and Motion are quantitative entities and, therefore, finite. This is followed by a penetrating analysis of the nature and interdependence of Time and Motion and their relation to Change. The arguments presented are reminiscent of Aristotle's discussion of these categories in his Physics. The famous Aristotelian definition of Time as "the number of motion"⁹⁶ is stated and the various forms of Motion such as the locomotive, qualitative (transformation - istiḥālāh) and quantitative (increase and decrease - rubūw, idmihlāl) are described. A more elaborate analysis of these matters is found in al-Kindi's essay "Ibānah 'an al-'illah al-fā'ilah li-'l-kaum wa-'l-fasād" (Exposition of the Active Cause of coming into being and passing away).⁹⁷

After showing that Change is nothing but a form of Motion, and that Time and Motion are ontologically inseparable from 'magnitudes' or 'bodies', al-Kindi goes on to refute the belief that the universe was first at rest before it was set in motion. If this belief were true impossible contradictions would be the result. These contradictions would follow regardless whether the universe were assumed to have been eternal or whether it was brought about out of nothing. If an eternal universe were first at rest and then moved, it would imply that something eternal underwent a change. But that which is eternal is immutable, as it was demonstrated earlier. We know that the universe is in motion and an eternal universe must have been eternally in motion. If we assume, on the other hand, that the universe came into being out of nothing, then the very process of its generation must have involved movement, for generation is a form of motion. The existence of the universe, in this case, could not have preceded its process of generation, but must itself be identical with that process. This means that the universe could not have possibly existed without being in motion.⁹⁸ The conclusion that is reached from this discussion is that the universe, motion and time never preceded each other in existence. They are co-existents.

Al-Kindi has so far set the logical stage for a final act that must be performed before he can move into the heart of his metaphysics. Through a winding but consistent series of proofs, he attempts to

demonstrate the fact that the world, the cosmos, cannot be eternal and infinite. The existence (inniyyah) of the universe is, of necessity, finite and must have had a beginning.⁹⁹ In this, of course, al-Kindi is diametrically opposed to Aristotle with his doctrine of the eternity of the world. He undertakes to prove this by more than one way, he says, in order to assist those who speculate in this field to acquire added skill in their effort to penetrate the frontiers of this field of knowledge.

The crux of the philosophical argument for the non-eternity and finitude of the universe revolves around the refutation of the theory that time can be infinite in actuality. Al-Kindi attempts to show that Time is finite in both of its dimensions, the past and the future. Time is a continuous quantity (kammiyyah muttasilah). This means it has a part, that is, the present (al-*ān*) which is common to both past and future. The present marks the end of the past and the beginning of the future. The present renders both the past and the future as finite because it defines the end of the one and the beginning of the other. The addition of two definite periods of time does not and cannot result in infinite time. By implication, the duration of corporeal bodies cannot be infinite. From this follows that a body, whether it is a single object or the body of the All (jism al-kull), the universe, cannot be eternal.¹⁰⁰

e. Existence, Essence and Causality

As a Muslim advocating the Mu'tazilite theo-philosophical position which stressed the Justice and Unity of God and the doctrine of human freedom and responsibility, al-Kindi is basically concerned in his Treatise on First Philosophy with the problem of proving philosophically both the Existence and Oneness of God and expounding the nature of Divine Oneness. The discussion so far was only a preparation for dealing effectively with this objective. He had earlier established the inevitable necessity of philosophic knowledge as a tool for attaining Divine Truth but without minimizing the epistemological importance of intuition and revelation in this matter. Man has the freedom to use his reason in the search for truth in general, and religious truth is no exception. The fact that the Muslim creed stipulates that God had revealed Himself earlier to other nations gave all knowledge and truth a universalistic quality. This meant a divine sanction of their assimilation by the Muslim regardless of the source from which they may come. Moreover, al-Kindi's logical arguments in the previous chapter have led to the conclusion that the universe is not eternal and infinite. It must have had a beginning and, therefore, a cause. But before he can search for that cause, he must first prove that it cannot have possibly been the cause of itself. This is his immediate task at the opening of the third chapter. Can a thing be the cause (Allah) of its own generation?

Al-Kindi proceeds to answer this question by making a hypothetical distinction between existence and essence and describing the possible conditions that would result if we had the one (existence or essence) with or without the other. This is done in order to determine whether or not there can be a causal relationship between the existence and essence of one single object.¹⁰¹

Of course, the question of causality does not arise if a thing had neither existence nor essence, for it would be simply non-existent, and it goes without saying that the cause-effect ('illah wa-ma'lūl) applies only to existing things. Al-Kindi disposes quickly with other hypothetical situations which would not involve the problem of causality. This is the case when a thing is assumed of having existence without essence or essence without existence. This assumption is absurd because such a thing cannot possibly exist unless it has both existence and essence. The maxim is posited at this point that the existence and essence of a thing are identical.¹⁰² The field of causal relationship is thus narrowed down to things that have both existence and essence. Can a thing that exists and has essence be the cause of itself? If this were possible then it would mean that a thing can generate its own essence. In other words, a thing would be the cause and its essence the effect. But this would be a contradiction of the logical necessity that the effect is invariably other than the cause. Therefore the conclusion must be drawn that if a thing is identical with the cause

and its essence is identical with the effect, then the essence can no longer be the thing itself. To state the matter differently, if a thing were the cause of its own essence, then it follows that that thing and its essence are two different things. But we know by empirical experience that a thing and its essence are the same thing. Therefore, it has been demonstrated, that a thing cannot be the cause of itself. It cannot bring itself into being. It must have a cause outside itself.¹⁰³

There is still one matter to be ascertained before al-Kindi can turn to the main topic of his metaphysics, the One and the Many, and can inquire into the nature of the Primary Cause of all that exists. This pertains to an analysis of substance (jawhar) and its relation to the problem of meaning (ma'na). Philosophy seeks to know that which has meaning. Meaningful words are either general, universal (kulli) or particular (juz'i). Being the knowledge of the true nature of things, philosophy is not so much concerned with the particular, which cannot be fully known, but rather inquires into the universal which is whole and not fragmentary and whose real nature is accessible to knowledge. Again, the universal, the general, is either essential (dhātī) or non-essential (ghair dhātī). That which is essential in a thing, like life in all living beings, is also called substantial, and the substance makes the very existence (qiwām) of a thing possible.¹⁰⁴

Moreover, it is the integrative substance (al-jawhar al-jāmi')

that unifies things and makes them wholes and thereby gives them their forms and genera. The differentiative substance (al-jawhar al-mufarriq), on the other hand, accounts for the unique features in beings and things such as the rational (al-nāṭiq) among living beings. It is called differentia (faṣl) because it differentiates things and sets them apart from each other.¹⁰⁵

Metaphysics deals with that which is universal and substantial and not with that which is particular and non-essential or accidental ('araḍi). The existence of the accidental such as property (khāṣṣah), like the laughter of man and the braying of a donkey, is contingent on the substance which it predicates (mawḍū' lahu) and on which its existence and continuance (ṭhabāt) depends.¹⁰⁶

f. Unity, Plurality and First Cause

Although essentially a religious book, the Koran deals with metaphysical and existential problems that are commonly shared by both religion and philosophy. Its teachings encompass basic theological and philosophical areas such as the nature of Ultimate Reality, the world and its relation to God, the origin and destiny of man, the problem of predestination and free will, the ethical and ontological conflict of good and evil, truth and error, appearance and reality, change and permanence, space and time and the certainty of knowledge.

The Koran, needless to say, is not always clear about these matters. It is often possible to derive deductively contradictory views on these issues as it was shown above, for instance, concerning the problem of predestination and free will. Practical difficulties relative the "khilāfah" (succession) and the nature and scope of "al-ummah" (Islamic community) raised quite early in Islam theological questions which pressed for answers. It was only natural that differences of opinion with respect to doctrinal interpretation of Koranic teachings should arise and, consequently, various schools of thought should develop.

The fact must be stressed that Arabic philosophy had its own original problems because it is not, as is commonly asserted, merely a repetition and reworking of Greek ideas. There is in it an element of originality and spontaneity. Prior to its encounter with Greek thought, philosophical inquiry in Islam revolved around the problem of causality. In this, the focus of attention was directed to the question of creation with the primary emphasis placed on the relation of God to the world. This is one of the basic issues which was raised early in Islamic thought. The Koranic concept of the "Preserved Tablet" (al-lawḥ al-mahfuz), for example, implied the eternity of the sacred Book. If this were true, then it would mean that something other than God co-existed with Him from eternity. Moreover, the creation of objects in time by an eternal, unchangeable Will seemed to be a contradiction to the intellectual Muslim, for this was inter-

preted by him as indicative of a change in the Divine Will. No wonder, the oldest Muṭtazilites tried to solve this problem by conceiving of the Koranic terms "khalaqa," "bara" and "ṣana'a" (to create, generate, make) in such a way ~~as~~ not to refer to creation but rather to causality - First Cause - not in time but in essence.¹⁰⁷ Another philosophic problem that arose quite early in Islam was related to the Divine attributes (ṣifāt) of which the Koran speaks which tended to suggest a plurality. How to reconcile this plurality with God's absolute unity presented intellectual difficulties which demanded solutions.

The influx into Islam of many converts from older religious traditions, chiefly Judaic, Christian and Persian, served to sharpen the focus on these theological and philosophical problems and to intensify the urgency for resolving them. For these converts were formerly adherents of religions that had dealt with these same issues in a systematic fashion, and not a few of them brought along, as a part of their intellectual cargo, the very epistemological and metaphysical ways of thinking which Islam itself desperately needed. Among these converts were those who had absorbed hellenistic learning and were experienced in applying the philosophical method to religious inquiry. They now set out to use their Greek philosophical knowledge for the vindication of their new Islamic faith.

How can plurality, which we encounter in the world, proceed

from God without the implication that plurality is also present in the Divine essence? It is to this difficult question that al-Kindi addresses himself in his metaphysics. He attempts to demonstrate the fact that plurality in the creation does not affect the Oneness of the Divine essence. Indeed, he goes much further. He seeks to prove that without the existence of the True One (al-wāḥid al-ḥaqq), the Creator who is the absolute One, there can be no plurality in the world at all. He tries to show that the endless multiplicity of beings and things cannot be explained unless there is a Cause which is essentially One.

Al-Kindi ushers the period in Islamic philosophy during which Greek philosophy was believed to provide the solution to the fundamental problem of harmonizing faith and reason. It was he who was the first to introduce into Islamic thought the Neo-Platonic concept of emanation (fayḍ)¹⁰⁸ as a middle way in his effort to reconcile the Koranic teaching about creation out of nothing and the Aristotelian doctrine of an eternal world.

Al-Kindi begins this major part of his First Philosophy which deals with the relationship of the One and the Many with an investigation of the general characteristics of Unity or Oneness. Unity is, first of all, continuity which is found in diverse things. Any individual being or thing may be described as "one." This applies to both natural and man-made objects such as a tree and a house. The tree is "one", a unity, by natural continuity. The structure of a house has "one" form by means of accidental continuity brought

about by craftsmanship. The house became "one" through the unification of its parts. But unity is not only descriptive of the house as a whole but also of the individual parts of it, for each part constitutes "one" part. This is true regardless whether the whole has similar parts, as in the case of a body of water, or whether it has dissimilar parts, as it is true of the body of a living being.¹⁰⁹

The unity that exists in all individual things, however, is not an absolute unity because individual things are divisible. This means that it is a unity by circumstantial necessity. In other words, the unity which we find in all predicables is not essential but accidental. And whatever is accidental in a thing is an effect upon it which is the result of a cause other than the thing itself.¹¹⁰ Moreover, whatever exists accidentally in one object must exist essentially in another which is necessarily the cause of its accidental existence. It follows that the unity that is present in the predicables accidentally must have its cause in another source in which unity exists essentially. This line of thinking leads al-Kindi to postulate the existence of the True One (al-wāḥid al-ḥaqq) in which unity exists essentially because it is not derived from anything else.¹¹¹

Al-Kindi's next move is to examine the predicables and all that is related to them and demonstrates at great length that they all partake of both unity and plurality. Systematically, he sets forth all the contradictions which would result if only unity or

plurality were to exist in them. If the predicables partook of plurality to the exclusion of unity, then there could be, for instance, no contrariety or similarity and there cannot be one thing common to all of them. They would have to be simultaneously at rest and in motion. But by empirical experience we know that contrariety and similarity are facts, that the predicables have one thing in common and they are in motion. Nine such contradictions are advanced as proofs for the fact that the predicables cannot partake solely of plurality.¹¹²

In a similar detailed argument, al-Kindi also proves that the predicables and all that is related to them cannot partake of unity without plurality. Another set of nine contradictions would ensue.¹¹³ If they partook of unity only, they would have no differences and no shapes and there can be neither movement nor rest. But things do have differences and shapes and are in motion.

On the basis of these two series of proofs, al-Kindi concludes that both unity and plurality are present in the predicables. It is in the very nature of things to be 'one' and 'many', to be wholes and have parts, to partake of unity and plurality. Unity and plurality cannot exist separately. Their existence is interdependent.¹¹⁴ This interdependence, moreover, cannot be attributed to chance (bakht) and coincidence (ittifāq) because this would imply that unity and plurality must have existed separately, and this has already been proven to be im-

possible. The interdependence of unity and plurality, therefore, must have a cause. It cannot be self-caused because this would lead to an infinite chain of causes and it has been shown that nothing can be infinite in actuality. The interdependent co-existence of unity and plurality in the predicables must, consequently, be attributed to an external cause, a cause that is transcendent and ontologically prior to both unity and plurality.¹¹⁵ This is the First Cause which is nobler and more ancient than all things. This First Cause must itself be either a unity or a plurality. If it were a plurality, it would also comprise unity, inasmuch as plurality consists of unities. This would mean that the First Cause is both unity and plurality. This possibility must be ruled out because it would be identical to saying that a thing is the cause of itself and it was demonstrated that this is impossible. Unity and plurality cannot be the cause of unity and plurality. Hence, the only possibility that remains is that the First Cause is mere Unity, One only (wāḥid faqat). It is void of plurality.¹¹⁶

g. The Nature of Divine Unity

Having established the existence of God in terms of a First Cause that is mere Oneness and pure Unity, al-Kindi devotes now the final part of his metaphysics to elucidate the nature of Divine Unity. In the light of what has been said so far, the Divine Oneness or Unity must be very much unlike the unity that exists in the predicables.

What are its distinctive features? In what sense is it the True One (al-wāḥid al-ḥaqq)?

The fourth chapter is devoted to this metaphysical problem. Al-Kindi begins the investigation with a comparative analysis of the two terms "the relative" and "the absolute" (al-qawl bi-al-idāfah wa-al-qawl al-mursal).¹¹⁷ Thereby he seeks to demonstrate the relativity of all descriptive terms and that the only exception to this is the term "One" as it is applied to the "True One" which alone is used in the absolute sense. There is nothing, for instance, that is "large" or "small" as such. It is so only in relation to another thing. An object may be "larger" than one object and "smaller" than another. The same is true of other magnitudes such as "long" and "short," "many" and "few." They can be used only in a relative sense.

Al-Kindi attempts, not without certain difficulties, to prove that the magnitude "smallness" as such cannot exist. These difficulties are created by the number "one" as the smallest number. His only way out is to subscribe to the view that "one" is not a number and that, therefore, "two" is the smallest number. But the "two" is the smallest number only in a relative, not in an absolute, sense.¹¹⁸ This is so because the quality of smallness characterizes it only the moment it is considered in relation to, or compared with, a larger number.

Before al-Kindi concludes that One is not a number, he advances numerous arguments for and against the idea that One is not a number.

If One were a number, then it would have to be a certain quantity, and anything that is quantitative is divisible. But by definition the One is not divisible. The One should not be confused with the matter which it qualifies and on which it bestows oneness. When we say 'one house,' for instance, it is the house that is material and not the 'one.' The house is divisible but the 'one' is indivisible. The 'one' is not a composite (murakkab) like the 'two.' It is simple (basīṭ), for it is composed of nothing else.¹¹⁹ The One is the constituent element of number, for numbers are aggregates of 'ones', but the One itself is not a number. A number is a magnitude of 'ones' or units (waḥdāniyyāt), a total sum, a putting together of units. 'Two' is the beginning of number and in relation to other numbers is the smallest because it is the sum of two units while the others are sums of more than two units.

Having demonstrated the fact that Unity, which constitutes the essence of the True One, is exclusively absolute, al-Kindi takes up the task now to prove that the True One is neither species nor genus.¹²⁰ Comparisons can be made among things of the same genus. The True One cannot be compared with anything else because it has no genus. That which is without genus is eternal, as it was shown before. The True One, consequently, is eternal.

From this al-Kindi goes on to establish that the True One is not compounded of form and matter and that it is not a predicable.

Because plurality exists in motion, the True One cannot be motion. Inasmuch as thought in the soul moves from some images to others and from one passion to another, it follows that that both motion and plurality exist in the soul. Therefore, the True One cannot be a soul.¹²¹ After a brief discussion in which is shown how the soul becomes rational ('āqilah), that is, acquires an intellect ('aql) by means of its union (ittiḥād) with the species and genera of things, that is, their universals, al-Kindi draws the conclusion that the True One cannot also be intellect simply because the universals which constitute the content of the intellect are a plurality.¹²²

What, then, is the nature of the True One? Negatively, it is not substance, genus, species, individual, differentia, property, accident, motion, time, space, subject, predicate, whole, part, soul or intellect. It is void of matter, form, quantity, quality and relation. Positively, the True One is the Absolute One (al-wāḥid al-mursal) and nothing but Pure Oneness (waḥdah maḥḍ).¹²³ The True One is the One-Itself (al-wāḥid bi-al-dhāt) which never partakes of plurality in any form.¹²⁴ It is indivisible in any manner. The True One, moreover, is the First Cause (awwal 'illah) of the unity and plurality which is found in all individual things.¹²⁵ The Unity or Oneness of the Primary True One (al-wāḥid al-ḥaqq al-awwal) is identical with its own Being.

The True One never partakes of plurality although it is the source of all plurality, for plurality is nothing but the aggregate

of unities (jamā'at wahdāniyyāt). Without the Unity of the True One there can be no plurality in existing things whatsoever. The accidental unity and plurality in every existent (mutahawwi) are the effect of the First Cause, the True One. Thus the emanation (fayd) of unity and, with it, plurality from the Primary True One is equivalent to the process of coming into being (tahawwi).¹²⁶

An individual thing comes into being when it acquires its unity from the True One. It, then, becomes a created thing (mubda'). The Primary True One, therefore, is the Cause of creation ('illat al-ibdā').¹²⁷

It is the Active Agent (al-fā'il), the (First) Mover (al-muḥarrik) which accounts for the beginning of motion. Consequently, the Primary True One, which sets the process of generation in motion is both the Primary Creator (al-mubdi' al-awwal) and Sustainer (al-mumsik) of all that exists.¹²⁸ The True One created the world ex nihilo.

3. Evaluations and Conclusions

a. Epistemological Realism

By accepting both perception and conception as necessary avenues of cognition, al-Kindi was advocating an epistemological realism that enabled him to bridge the gulf between empiricism and rationalism. He thus reconciles the empiricism of Aristotle and the rationalism of Plato, and before so doing he reconciled Plato and Plato by uniting Plato's Idea of the Good and the personality of the mythical demiurge,

the world-architect of the *Timaeus*, into One Creator-God who is as ideal as the Idea but as personal and active as the demiurge, and yet a Creator-God who is neither so intellectual nor so mythical as Plato's concepts are.

Moreover, through his epistemological realism and through his emphasis on the application of philosophic knowledge, al-Kindi was able to solve to an appreciable degree the antinomies of faith and reason, God and the world, the world and man. This solution was not a speculative deduction, as metaphysical systems have offered, but rather moral and quasi-mystical. The purpose of theoretical knowledge, he says, is to attain the truth. The purpose of practical knowledge is to live in accordance with the truth. He makes the same distinction between the "acquired intellect" (al-'aql al-mustafād) and the "practical intellect" (al-'aql al-zāhir).¹²⁹ In this emphasis, al-Kindi can claim affinity to Kant who insisted on the primacy of "practical reason" rather than "pure reason." This ethical affinity arises out of significant epistemological similarities in both al-Kindi and Kant. Both bridged the gap between empiricism and rationalism. Both recognized that it is the mind which imposes on the unorganized and often chaotic raw material of sensory perception certain form or order. In other words, the mind is not a mere passive recipient of impressions but an active instrument that turns the flux of sense data into meaningful order. The structure or constitution of the mind is revealed in the finished product of the cognitive

process. Reality, as we know it, is more made than given; it is a construct rather than a datum. All that makes the world coherent and meaningful comes from what Kant calls "the transcendental understanding" and of what al-Kindi calls "The True One."

Through his universal conception of truth, al-Kindi was able to graft Greek philosophy, particularly its Neo-Platonic form, unto Islamic thought but without doing violence to his religion. Having placed intuition at the top of his epistemological hierarchy, he was able to maintain the primacy of faith. Aristotle was put in the service of Muhammad. Reason was made to bow to religious faith in al-Kindi's metaphysics. What Julius Guttman says about Philo that he "adheres to the Jewish concept of revelation and regards the Torah as the complete and absolute vehicle of God's truth"¹³⁰ is also true of al-Kindi in his high regard to revelation and the Koran. Like Philo, he sought to bring together the two forms of truth, namely, human knowledge and divine knowledge. Epistemological similarities are strikingly conspicuous between al-Kindi and the great Jewish philosopher, Saadia. Saadia, who was born about a decade after al-Kindi's death, also thought that "the task of philosophy was merely to provide rational proof of what was already known through revelation."¹³¹

Al-Kindi's contribution to Islam resembles that of St. Augustine to Christianity. Both strove for a philosophic knowledge of their beliefs.

Both were able to harmonize philosophy and religion and both gave religious faith the primacy in that harmony. Both stressed the fact that the highest religious truth cannot be attained by reason and can only be received with the prerequisite illumination and purification. Al-Kindi and St. Augustine were both influenced by Neo-Platonism and each of them replaced the state of ecstasy to which Plotinus appealed with religious faith. Both did not permit their respective religions to be suffocated by Greek philosophy. In the words of Dr. Richard Walzer, "in al-Kindi we find a balance unique in early Islam between an 'advanced' theology, based on reasoned interpretation of revelation, and a philosophy which aimed at utilizing the totality of our obviously limited human faculties in the understanding of God, the universe and man himself."¹³²

In his epistemological emphasis on the primacy of religious faith and revelation, al-Kindi differed from all later Islamic philosophers. Al-Farabi (870-950 A.D.) enthroned reason on a pedestal and gave revelation a secondary place. He asserted the primacy of philosophy over religion and yet never ceased to be a devout Muslim. "The Second Teacher" (second to Aristotle, as al-Farabi came to be known), attempted to reformulate the Islamic religious tradition from the point of view of philosophy and he did this in a way that was not offensive to his fellow Muslims.¹³³ "Philosophy is prior to religion in time," al-Farabi writes in "The Attainment of Happiness" (tahsīl al-sa'ādah) and "religion is an imitation of philosophy."¹³⁴ In his

opinion, philosophy and religion must be united in the function of the philosopher as supreme ruler and lawgiver. The ruler-philosopher must be able to teach all citizens and thus enable them to achieve the happiness or perfection he is capable of attaining by nature.

The psychological process of cognition is briefly discussed by al-Kindi at the end of his "Treatise on First Philosophy" as well as in his "Treatise on the Intellect."¹³⁵ To know the world of phenomena is not simply to copy it. The soul comes to know the exterior world because the forms of this world are potentially in the soul. The soul knows when it becomes one with the object of its cognition. The same is true of cognition of the immaterial world. Its concepts are potentially in the soul before they are known through conception.¹³⁶ The Neo-Platonic influence on al-Kindi here is obvious. However, he differed from Neo-Platonism in conceiving of this "innateness" of the truth in the soul as merely potential rather than actual as the Neo-Platonists had asserted.¹³⁷ In this, one is tempted to say, al-Kindi has some affinity to the seventeenth century German philosopher Leibniz, who thought that the soul (as every monad) knows the world because it is the world. The ideas or representations in the soul, according to Leibniz, are not always conscious, not always distinct and clear. Through cognition, they become clear and conscious in the soul.¹³⁸

In his "Treatise on the Intellect" (risālah fi al-'aql),¹ which was translated into Latin and played a significant role in Medieval philosophy, al-Kindi designates four types of intellect. He accepts Aristotle's distinction between the 'passive' and the 'active' intellect. The 'passive' is the potential which resembles matter that becomes all things. The 'active' intellect is analogous to the efficient cause which makes all things. The 'active' intellect, in other words, makes the 'passive' intellect become what it apprehends. Alexander of Aphrodisias had added to these two the intellectus habitus or adeptus which al-Kindi adopts but divides into two, and this is his original contribution to the doctrine of the Intellect: "the acquired intellect" (al-'aql al-mustafād) and "the apparent or practical intellect" (al-'aql al-zāhir).¹³⁹ The purpose of the former is strictly theoretical, namely, to know reality, and that of the latter is ethical, namely, to put the "acquired" knowledge into practice.

b. Metaphysical Absolutism

One of the oldest and most difficult problems with which the philosophic mind has wrestled pertains to the relation of the One and the Many. Granted that Ultimate Reality is One, how can we understand the plurality of being out of its unity? How can the multiplicity of things have come out of One supreme entity? In theological terms, what is the relation of God and the world? How could the endless varieties and diversities of beings and things in the universe have

been derived from One // single Ultimate Unity? Subsidiary problems are the relations of Being and non-Being, the eternal and the temporal, the absolute and the relative. Indeed, these and many other philosophic problems are facets of the basic issue of the One and the Many.

The first extensive discussion of the relation of the One and the Many appears in Plato's Parmenides in which Plato agrees with the historical Parmenides in recognizing the distinction between the really real and the seemingly real, but disagrees with him on conceiving of the Existent as One only. In Plato's opinion, if this were true it would lead to nihilism. For him, the Existent is the world of Ideas with its manifoldness and in the Dialogue, therefore, Plato attempts to show that the One and the Many are compatible with each other.¹⁴⁰

The problem of the One and the Many was brought into sharper focus by the conflict between Aristotelian and the Stoic philosophies. While Aristotle maintained the transcendence of God, the Stoic philosophers stressed the immanence of God. The problem became more accentuated as the religious dualism became more pronounced. As Windelband has pointed out, the dissatisfaction with contrasting God as Spirit with matter led to the tendency "to raise the divine being above all that can be experienced and above every definite content, and thus to make God who is above the world also a God above mind or spirit."¹⁴¹

The conception of God as complete absence of all qualities

makes its debut in Judaism in the philosophic system of Philo who elevated the infinite God far above the finite world and divested Him of all the predicates known to the human mind. The Christian Apologists who were influenced by Philo, particularly Justin,¹⁴² also indulged in this "negative theology" which was the result of widening considerably the gap between the One and the Many.

It is this same tendency to overexalt the Divine Unity above everything else that we encounter in Neo-Platonism in even more exaggerated form. For Plotinus, God is the absolutely transcendent Being, who is perfect Unity above reason. God is conceived by him as the Principle which contains plurality in its Unity.¹⁴³ "Before the manifold," Plotinus writes, "there must be the One, that from which the manifold rises: in all numerical series, the unit is the first."¹⁴⁴ In the words of Philippus V. Pistorius, "from the teleology of the universe Plotinus postulates a governing unity, which in some way must be the author or basis of all existence."¹⁴⁵ The One is the First who is infinite, formless and precedes all thought and being. Plotinus identified the One with Plato's Good as the absolute beginning and end of all things.

And how does multiplicity proceed from this supreme Unity? What is the relation of the True One to the Many? The world is generated from the One, says Plotinus, by a process of emanation. "The One, being perfect, overflows; and this superabundance produces a thing

different from it."¹⁴⁶ In relation to the world, which is its overflowing by-products, the True One is the highest Good, the Power and the Force which upholds everything it brings into being. Plotinus compares the activity of the One with that of the light which does not suffer at all in its own essence as it shines into the darkness.

This is the philosophic stream in which al-Kindi navigates in his First Philosophy. It is a Neo-Platonic stream into which mighty tributaries of Greek philosophers, chiefly of Plato and Aristotle, flow but which also has a strong undercurrent of Islamic religious thought. Al-Kindi displays a thorough knowledge of the great philosophers whose views and arguments he utilizes in order to strengthen his own theo-philosophic position on which he stands firmly.

As Marmura and Rist have clearly shown,¹⁴⁷ in his effort to prove the existence of both unity and plurality in the predicables, al-Kindi is much indebted to Plato's Parmenides which he regards not so much as a metaphysical but rather as a dialectical resource. Thus he utilizes the numerous arguments in the Parmenides for his own purposes and yet without surrendering his originality. This is first evident in the general ontological approach to the antimonies. While Plato asks negatively as to what would happen to the "Many" if the "One" did not exist, al-Kindi proceeds positively by putting the question: "Because the "Many" exist what are the consequences for Unity?" There is also a marked difference in their epistemologies. Plato tends to

be strictly rational in his method. Al-Kindi, on the other hand, is both rational and empirical. He appeals to both logic and experience. Often our empirical experience affirms what logical deduction negates. For instance, plurality without unity, says al-Kindi, would logically lead to the conclusion of the impossibility of knowledge. "But knowledge does exist," he goes on to say, "our assumption that it does not exist is a contradiction of the facts."¹⁴⁸

Al-Kindi leans quite heavily on Plato's Philebus when he attempts to establish the existence of both unity and plurality in all things and the theory that it is the One who bestows unity on all existences. Plato calls it "a marvel of nature ... that one should be many or many one" and that "the one is many and infinite, and the many are only one."¹⁴⁹ He considered the knowledge "that whatever things are said to be are composed of one and many, and have the finite and infinite implanted in them," as "a gift of heaven."¹⁵⁰ Plato divides all things into four classes: the finite, the infinite, the union of the two, and the cause of the union.¹⁵¹ He refers, on the one hand, to this union of the One and the Many as "being a birth into true being,"¹⁵² and, on the other hand, he says earlier in the Dialogue that "this union of them will never cease, and is not now beginning, but is, as I believe, an everlasting quality of thought itself."¹⁵³ Al-Kindi seems to be much clearer about the derivation of the unity in all things from the True One. The process occurs in time. Without this unity, says Plato, things will disintegrate into chaos. Without this unity, insists al-Kindi,

things will simply cease to exist.

Al-Kindi's understanding of the process by which the world comes into being out of the True One is thoroughly Neo-Platonic. As it was already indicated, he adopts the Neo-Platonic concept of emanation (fayḍ) to explain the process of generation. However, he does not accept the Neo-Platonic intermediaries through which the emanation takes place. In other words, al-Kindi rejected the Neo-Platonic Godhead which consists of the transcendent One, the Nous or Intellectual Principle which reflects the image of the One and from which the Soul proceeds and from which the world emanates.¹⁵⁴ He recognizes only the True One as the Godhead from whom all things flow directly. God alone is the Creator and Sustainer of the world. In this way, al-Kindi adapted the Neo-Platonic speculative system to his monotheistic faith.

As to the nature of the True One as not being genus or species or any of the predicables, al-Kindi used the traditional Neo-Platonic view. Negative theological descriptions of the True One suited the Muslim philosopher in his effort to draw a sharp line between the creation and its Creator. The sharp distinction between the two was expressed by him through the theory that while all things partake of unity accidentally, unity is present in the True One essentially.

No doubt, the Metaphysics of al-Kindi shows the powerful influence of Aristotle. "The Philosopher of the Arabs" shows a remarkable

knowledge of Aristotle's writings especially the Organon, De Anima, Physics and Metaphysics. One of al-Kindi's essays is devoted to "the Quantity of the Books of Aristotle and what is required for the Attainment of Philosophy" (Fi kammiyyat kutub Aristūtālīs wa-ma yuhtāj ilaihi fi taḥṣīl al-falsafah).¹⁵⁵ Major dicta and themes of Aristotle's philosophy appear in al-Kindi's Metaphysics and the debt is gratefully acknowledged. In his argument that the co-existence of both unity and plurality in the predicables implies a Transcendent Cause, al-Kindi utilizes the Aristotelian maxim that infinite regress of the cause-effect sequence is impossible. Aristotelian theories such as pertain to the relation of potentiality and actuality, that infinity can never be actuality, and the law of contradiction that "the same attribute cannot belong and not belong to the same thing at the same time and in the same respect," as well as the analysis of causes, substance, time, space, motion and change by Aristotle are all extensively used in al-Kindi's First Philosophy.

The famous Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world was unconditionally rejected by al-Kindi. He maintained that the movement of the world is not co-eternal with the First Cause, the Unmoved Mover, the True One. Being is finite and not eternal. God alone is eternal. Al-Kindi's solution to the problem of infinity is based on strictly mathematical foundations. The basic Islamic dogma that God is the Creator ex nihilo and that He is the Sustainer of all that He has created are vigorously reaffirmed by al-Kindi.

This is the view that prevailed in Islamic philosophy, despite the pro-Aristotelianism of Ibn Sīna and Ibn Rushd with respect to the eternity of the world, a view that was reaffirmed by the great al-Ghazālī in the eleventh century.

Most of the outstanding Medieval Jewish philosophers took a similar stand and defended the biblical tradition of creation out of nothing by the One True God. The Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world was the first of thirteen theories which Saadia refuted in the first treatise of his important work The Book of Beliefs and Opinions (kitāb al-amānāt wa-al-i'tiqādāt).¹⁵⁶ Some of the proofs he advances are of Mu'tazilite origin and, therefore, resemble those used by al-Kindi. The same is true of the arguments which Saadia develops to prove the existence and Oneness of God in the second chapter on "The Unity of God." Striking similarities may be observed also between al-Kindi and Bahya ibn Bakuda who was born in the latter part of the eleventh century and lived in Spain as a judge (dayyan) in the Jewish community. His first attack in his "Book of Guidance to the Duties of the Heart" (kitāb al-hidāyah ila farā'id al-qulūb) in defence of God's existence and Unity is directed to the dahriyyah (materialism) which advocated the eternity of the world. His proofs, which are similar to those of the mutakallimūn (dialectical theologians) of Islam, are chiefly teleological. Like al-Kindi, Bahya was influenced by Neo-Platonism and thus like him asserts, through a purely conceptual deduction, that unity (of God) precedes plurality (of the world).¹⁵⁷

He echoes al-Kindi and the Neo-Platonic tradition when he writes:

"The True One cannot be described with an attitude which necessitates plurality, change, subdivision or transformation in any way."¹⁵⁸

An additional reference must be made in this comparative religious thought, namely, to the great Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides (1135-1204). There are significant resemblances between al-Kindi and Maimonides not only in their common disagreement with the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world but also in a number of related matters such as in their efforts to reconcile philosophy and revelation, their conceiving of philosophic knowledge as a means for appropriating the content of revelation and regarding their philosophic task of doing so as a religious one, and indeed in their intellectualist conception of faith. However, the two philosophers differ sharply in their attitude and reaction to the Neo-Platonic Aristotelian ontological process of emanation. While al-Kindi seems to acquiesce with it and incorporates it into his Metaphysics without any reservation, Maimonides makes it the target of his attack as he finds it in fundamental opposition to the Jewish doctrine of creation. For him, the question whether the world was eternal or created was basically a question whether the cosmos emanated from God by necessity or whether it was freely created by Him.¹⁵⁹ In the words of Guttman, "Maimonides' discussion of this problem is guided by the desire to replace the Aristotelian system of necessity by a system of freedom compatible with divine sovereignty, and in keeping with the voluntaristic

character of the Jewish idea of God."¹⁶⁰

As a Mu'tazilite thinker, it was natural that al-Kindi should adhere to the Islamic teaching of a creation ex nihilo and thus boldly oppose one of the most basic ideas of Greek philosophy that being can never come out of non-being. Thus in this decisive issue, al-Kindi the philosopher bows to al-Kindi the theologian. He is in full agreement with his Islamic faith on this fundamental tenet and in this respect differs from all the important Islamic philosophers who came after him. The element of emanation that al-Kindi injected into the creative act of God is balanced by his conception of the True One, the Creator and Sustainer, as having life and Will.¹⁶¹ This means that emanation is not the work of a blind necessity but of a Divine Will. It is the result of a free creative act.¹⁶²

Unlike al-Kindi, al-Fārābi, Ibn Sīna and Ibn Rushd adopted the Neo-Platonic theory of an eternal creation. Al-Fārābi tried to solve the problem of the One and Many by his Theory of the Ten Intelligences. God is the One who is Necessary by Himself. He is an Intelligence, knows Himself and can be known.¹⁶³ From this Necessary One flows the first intelligence which is the first step toward plurality. The chain of emanations continues until the tenth intelligence from which emanate the human soul and the four elements.¹⁶⁴ Al-Fārābi extolled the intellect so highly that revelation was rendered unnecessary. His was a religion of the mind in the light of which he set out to draw the

blueprints of the ideal society.¹⁶⁵ Both Ibn Sīna and Ibn Rushd assimilate the Neo-Platonic ontology and stress the primacy of reason in their metaphysical systems but not without certain modifications. It was al-Ghazālī, known as the Defender of Islam (hujjat al-Islām), who about a century before Ibn Rushd reaffirmed the doctrine of creation by God ex nihilo and the primacy of religion and revelation over philosophy and reason.¹⁶⁶ "In the struggle in Islam between Philosophy and Theology," writes Simon Van Den Bergh, "Philosophy was defeated, and the final blow to the philosophers was given in Ghazali's attack (in his book The Incoherence of the Philosophers - tahāfut al-falāsifah) on Philosophy which in substance is incorporated in Averroës' book (The Incoherence of the Incoherence - tahafut al-tahafut) and which he tries to refute."¹⁶⁷

In conclusion, it may be said that al-Kindi's First Philosophy constitutes, as far as we know, the first systematic effort to weave Greek philosophy into the religious thought of Islam within the framework of Mu'tazilite theology. In it "the Philosopher of the Arabs" expounds a Metaphysical Absolutism for the purpose of defending the theological position of the Mu'tazilites in general and their dogma of the Divine Unity (al-tawḥīd) in particular. The Mu'tazilites, who called themselves The People of Justice and Unity (ahl al-'adl wa-al-tawḥīd), directed their attack against the unbelievers, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, the dualism of the Manicheans and the literalism and anthropomorphism of the Traditional Orthodox Muslims. Al-Kindi's

Metaphysics contains philosophical ammunition for the fight against these enemies of true Islam. God is conceived as Absolute Oneness, the creative Source of all unity and plurality in the world, who endowed man with a mind to be used freely in the attainment of Divine Truth. The work gives evidence of the author's original and logical mind which is able to assimilate philosophical ideas and dialectical methods and to use them for religious ends. To quote Professor Ahmad Fouad El-Ehwany, "al-Kindi opened the door for the philosophical interpretation of the Qur'ān, and thereby brought about an accord between religion and philosophy."¹⁶⁸ Indeed, al-Kindi's First Philosophy is the first attempt in Islam to harmonize faith and reason, speculation and revelation, religion and philosophy, an objective that continued to be a major characteristic of Islamic philosophy. As the first Muslim philosopher or, perhaps more accurately, philosopher of religion, al-Kindi pioneered in the difficult task of translating Greek works into Arabic, probably in a supervisory capacity, and, therefore, in coining a new Arabic philosophical terminology.¹⁶⁹

Through his Epistemological Realism also, which gave validity to knowledge acquired by perception, conception and intuition, al-Kindi exercised a considerable influence on later Islamic philosophers as well as on Medieval Jewish and Christian philosophical theologians. His treatises on the Intellect and Prophecy initiated a series on these same subjects by the other Islamic philosophers. As mentioned above,

his "Treatise on the Intellect" was translated into Latin and had some impact on Medieval philosophy. With al-Fārābī (known as the Second Teacher - al-mu'allim al-thānī - second to Aristotle), al-Kindi can rightly claim to be one of the founders of Islamic philosophy. While al-Kindi may be compared with St. Augustine in Christianity, as noted earlier, al-Fārābī resembles St. Thomas Aquinas in whose philosophical theology Aristotle conquers Plato.

Professor Richard Walzer's outstanding work in Classical and Islamic philosophy has shed considerable light on the value of the new material in the field of Islamic philosophic thought for the history of Greek philosophy. It is thanks to al-Kindi, for instance, that we possess today the only remnant of an ancient commentary on Aristotle by Plotinus. Mistakenly known then as The Theology of Aristotle, this document was translated into Arabic, at al-Kindi's request, for the benefit of his royal pupil Ahmad, the son of al-Mu'taṣim.¹⁷⁰ In the same context, Walzer writes:

We are indebted to al-Kindi, as to many other Arabic philosophers, for new material for the history of Greek philosophy. The arguments he uses are not always to be traced in such Neo-Platonic works as we possess in the original Greek, and so add to our knowledge of Neo-Platonism, and treatises on the soul on Neo-Platonic lines have yielded new fragments of a lost dialogue, the Eudemus, written at a period when he still adhered to Plato's theory of the immortality of the soul.¹⁷¹

TRANSLATION

CHAPTER I

AL-KINDI'S TREATISE ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY

Addressed to al-Mu'tasim bi-Allah

97 Unto you, who are the son of the noblest masters and the bonds
of happiness, may God grant a long life. He who adheres to your
counsel shall be blessed in time and eternity. May God adorn you with
all the robes of virtue and purify you from all the stains of vice.

(PHILOSOPHY AND TRUTH)

5 Among man's arts, philosophy occupies the highest rank and noblest
position. It may be defined as the knowledge of the nature of things
as far as this is possible to man. In his theoretical knowledge ('ilm),
the philosopher's objective is to attain the truth (iṣābat al-ḥaqq). In
his practical knowledge ('amal), he seeks to live in accordance with
the truth (al-'amal bi-al-ḥaqq). We must bear in mind, however, that
our philosophic preoccupation is not an eternal activity, for it comes
to an end and we abandon it once we reach the truth.

It must emphatically be stated that the search for the truth
is inseparable from the search for causes. The cause of the existence
and maintenance of everything is the truth. Anything that has existence
(inniyyah) has reality. Consequently, the truth exists by sheer
10 necessity simply because there are existent beings and things.

(THE SIGNIFICANCE OF METAPHYSICS)

98 The noblest philosophy, exceeding any other in importance,
 is First Philosophy. By First Philosophy I mean knowledge of the
 primary Truth which is the cause of all truth. The perfect and
 noblest philosopher is he who achieves full knowledge of this highest
 101 Truth; for knowledge of the cause is nobler than knowledge of the
 effect. We acquire full knowledge of every intelligible when we gain
 complete knowledge of its cause. A cause may be material, formal,
 efficient, that is, initiator of motion, or final, namely, identical
 with the purpose for which an object exists.

(THE FOUR SCIENTIFIC INQUIRIES)

5 The scientific inquiries are four, as we have established
 elsewhere in our philosophic statements: "whether," "what," "which"
 or "why." "Whether" inquires solely about existence. An existant
 must have a genus, and "what" searches for that genus. "Which" looks
 10 for the species. "What" and "Which" together seek to find the kind.
 "Why" inquires into the final cause, for it aims at knowing the
 absolute cause.

(GENUS AND SPECIES)

It is quite evident that the moment we know the matter of which
 a thing is made, we also become cognizant of its genus. Similarly,
 when we comprehend the form of an object, we gain knowledge of its

kind; and knowledge of the kind implies knowledge of the species.

An object is defined when its material, formal and final causes are known, and to define an object is to know its nature.

(KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST CAUSE)

- 15 Knowledge of the First Cause has properly been called First Philosophy, for it is the source of all other philosophic knowledge. It is first in nobleness, in genus, in certainty of cognition. It is first in time, for it is the cause of time.

(INDEBTEDNESS ACKNOWLEDGED)

- 102 The truth makes it imperative that we refrain from depreciating those from whom we have benefited even if it were in a modest way in small matters, not to speak of those who have enriched us in a large measure in significant areas of endeavor. Those who do not attain the whole truth but do share with us the fruits of their minds become our intellectual in-laws and partners. Their contributions have paved for us the way to discover a great deal of knowledge which eluded
- 5 them. As it was observed by great non-Arab philosophers before us, no seeker of the truth worthy of the name has ever attained complete knowledge solely by his own efforts. Of course, there are those whose search yields nothing, while others have to be content with finding fragments of knowledge. However, the partial knowledge obtained by various minds, when assembled, does add up to a picture that is

meaningful and valuable.

10 We are duty-bound, therefore, to show our genuine gratitude
to all those who have contributed in any manner, whether modestly or
generously to the growing heritage of knowledge. By imparting to us
the harvest of their thinking, they have thereby facilitated our
investigation of the facts that are still hidden from us. Their
discoveries have become stepping-stones on which we were able to
move forward on the path of truth. Without the efforts of those who
have gone before us, we could not have possibly acquired, within the
brief span of our lives and research, the entire wealth of knowledge
we found at our disposal at the beginning of our journey. This
accumulated fund of knowledge indeed accelerated our progress in
finding answers to the problems we set out to solve. We must always
15 gratefully remember that the capital of truth we inherited has been
the result of serious search and tireless research of many generations.

It goes without saying that no one person during a lifetime of
concentrated intellectual activity can gain as much knowledge as may
103 be gathered through the cooperative effort over the years. It was
Aristotle, the leading Greek philosopher, who rightly said that we
must never neglect to thank the parents of those who contribute to
the common treasury of truth for they are the cause of their being
and, indirectly, enhance our attainment of the truth.

(UNIVERSAL VALIDITY OF THE TRUTH)

We should not hesitate to appreciate and assimilate the truth
5 regardless of the source from which it may come to us. We should
not be ashamed to receive it from those who differ from us in their
race and belief. Truth is universal and transcends all barriers.
Any honest seeker of it is entitled to it. Truth being to him the
highest value, he will naturally honor all discoverers and transmitters
of the truth. Obviously, truth never degrades us. On the contrary,
it constantly and consistently ennobles us.

(METHODOLOGY)

We do well, therefore, as we endeavor to perfect our species -
which is in line with the truth, to adopt in the present study the
same principle that has guided us in all our investigations. We shall
10 begin by stating in a comprehensive and lucid manner what the ancients
had said on the subject. Then we shall proceed to discuss, to the best
of our ability, the areas which require further elaboration. This
we shall undertake with due regard to the present usages of the Arabic
language and of the literary style in our times. And whenever necessary,
we shall give a detailed analysis of that which is complex and ambiguous
in order to safeguard ourselves against the possible misinterpretation
of those of our contemporaries who claim to be thinkers, but who in
fact are not worthy of the name because they are hopelessly alienated
15 from the truth. They are void of the qualities which adorn the men of

independent thought. Instead of upholding the truth, they crucify it by the narrowness of their minds. These enemies of the truth
 104 diligently pursue that which is common and passionately appropriate that which is mediocre. The poisonous envy which permeates their animal natures blinds them to the light of truth. It makes them look down at all who excel in the very virtues which they themselves lack. These men misrepresent the truth and are the enemies of all that is refined and noble. Their primary concern is to guard the
 5 positions which they have illicitly created, unworthily occupied and efficiently use to rule and dominate.

(THE TRADERS OF RELIGION)

Unfortunately, these perverters of the truth are nothing but traders of religion. Having sold their religion, they are left without a religion, for what is sold is no longer owned. A trader in religion, therefore, is inevitably an irreligious man. Moreover, he who refuses to acquire the knowledge about the true nature of things and calls ~~those who do so~~ unbelievers should not claim to be a man of religion.

(THE SCOPE OF KNOWLEDGE AND REVELATION)

Knowledge of the nature of things or things as they actually are implies the knowledge of divine truth and divine unity. It encompasses ethics ('lm al-faḍīlah) and acquaintance with all that is

useful and with the means of acquiring it. Indeed, knowledge of the truth demands that we steer away from all that is harmful and guard ourselves from it. All these facts we learn from the true prophets who communicated them to us from God, may His praise be exalted.

The true messengers of God - may they be blessed - have surely professed the lordship of God alone. They have indeed preferred the necessity of abiding in the virtues that are acceptable to Him, and of avoiding the vices which contradict the virtues in their essence.

It is our duty, therefore, to adhere to, and spend our every effort in pursuit of, the truth for the reasons mentioned above and which we are about to expound.

(THE NECESSITY OF PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE)

Even those who are opposed to acquiring it (knowledge of the nature of things = philosophy), will be compelled by logical necessity to yield to it. For their attitude toward philosophical knowledge must inevitably take one of two directions, namely, that its acquisition is either necessary or unnecessary. If they say that it is necessary, then they would impose upon themselves the obligation of acquiring it. On the other hand, if they should say that philosophical knowledge is not necessary, then they will find it necessary to support their statement by a demonstrative proof. But the very giving of a demonstrative proof is itself a part of the philosophic knowledge which they reject.

They must, therefore, appropriate this valuable possession (knowledge of the nature of things or philosophy), if not willingly, then by sheer necessity.

(THE NEED FOR DIVINE SUPPORT)

10 We call upon Him who has full knowledge of our secret thoughts and is aware of our endeavors to prove His lordship and elucidate His unity, to refute by logical argument the stubborn atheists, whose godlessness and and shamefulness we seek to dispel, and the defects and ill-effects of their religious beliefs we attempt to reveal, beseeching Him to shield us and all true believers with His protecting care and to enable us by His great power to reach the goal which we have set before us, namely, the victory of truth and truthfulness. We pray Him

15 to help us reach the spiritual altitude of those whose intentions and actions are acceptable to Him and to whom He graciously granted success in life and triumph over those who have disregarded His grace and ignored His truth.

CHAPTER II

106 Having introduced our discussion with some pertinent facts,
we shall proceed now to set forth our thesis in a systematic way.

There are two kinds of cognition (*wujūd*) by which man acquires knowledge. The first is sense perception which is easily accessible to us but far removed from the true nature of things. It begins to
5 operate the moment we are born. We share it with all members of our species as well as with the animal world in general. Our cognition through the sense organs is direct, immediate and of brief duration because the objects of our perception are in a state of flux, constantly undergoing change of location, quantity and quality. The change occurs in the direction and speed of their movement. Their quantities may increase or decrease. At one moment they may be equal to each other, at another moment be unequal. Their qualities may change and thus become stronger or weaker, resembling each other at one time and differing from each other at another. Such is the mutable world of
10 phenomena, always in flux. Its images are retained by the imagination (*muṣawwirah*) which, in turn, deposits them into the memory (*ḥifẓ*). The objects of our sense perception are retained as images in man's soul. Because they have no permanence in existence, their true nature eludes us even though they are very near to our sense organs by which
107 they are perceived immediately. All that is perceived is invariably material (*hayūlī*) and is inevitably corporeal (*jirm*).

(THE UNIVERSAL AND THE PARTICULAR)

The other source of cognition, which is nearer to the true nature of things (ṭabi'ah), but not as easily accessible to us (as sense perception) is knowledge obtained by the mind (wujūd al-'aql) or conception. It is not without a reason that our knowledge is acquired through two channels, the senses and the mind. For the objects of our cognition are both universal (kulliyyah) and particular (juz'iyyah). By universal we mean the genera (ajnās) of the species (anwā'), and the species of individual beings and things (ashkhās). By particulars
 5 we mean the individual beings and things of the species.

Particular things that are material are perceived by the senses. Their genera and species, however, are not accessible through perception. They cannot be known by sense perception but rather by one of the developed faculties of the soul, namely, that which makes us human (al-insāniyyah), known as man's intellect (al-'aql al-insānī). While individual things are perceived by the senses, the images of these
 10 perceived objects which appear in the soul belong to the faculty which uses the sense organs. However, concepts signifying species and all other universals cannot be represented by images in the soul because images always presuppose empirical experience. The reality of such concepts is ascertained in the soul by means of primary, rational principles (al-'awā'il al-'qliyyah al-ma'qūlah). This is a logical necessity. Being (huwa) and non-being (la huwa), for instance, are states that cannot be attributed to one object simultaneously. This
 108 type of cognition is the function of the soul and not the senses. This is true by sheer necessity. Conceptual knowledge does not require

a medium (mutawassit). It cannot be represented by images in the soul because a concept has no color, sound, taste, smell and cannot be touched. Conceptual knowledge is comprehended without the instrumentality of images (idrāk lā mithālī).

That which is material (hayūlānī) is capable of being represented
 5 by images through sensation in the soul. The non-material (lā hayūlānī) may be found in conjunction with the material. An example of this is the form (shakl) which is identified by means of the color because it corresponds to the area covered by that color. But it is only accidentally that the form is recognized by means of visual perception (al-hiss al-baṣarī) because it is equivalent to the periphery the object that is perceived by the visual sense.

It may be supposed that the form is represented in the soul as an after-effect (lāḥiqah) of our total sensory perception, an after-effect that we experience immediately following our perception of the color. This sensation is identical with the periphery of the color
 10 which we perceive as the form. But, it must be stressed, our cognition of the periphery as identical with the form is a mental process which has occurred only accidentally by means of sense perception. In reality, the form is not perceived (but rather conceived by the mind). All universals have no material existence although the presence of material objects may lead us to conceive them. This does not mean that the universal is abstracted from material phenomena because it never aligns itself with the material. It never appears in the soul as an

image and we should not suppose that it does. This fact we must
 109 admit, for we are led to it by necessity.

(CONCEPTUAL COGNITION ILLUSTRATED)

Let us consider the state ment that outside the totality of
 being, the All (jism al-kull), there can be no existence of any space,
 either empty (khalā') or occupied (malā'). We mean there can be neither
 empty space nor a body at all. This assumption can have no representa-
 tion (by images) in the soul because "no void and no occupied space"
 are things that cannot be perceived by our senses. Their experience
 cannot follow any sense perception and thus appear in the soul as an
 image even if this were only a supposition. That such a space, empty
 or occupied, does not exist beyond the All is a truth conceived by the
 5 mind by logical necessity by means of premises which we wish to point
 out.

By the void (al-khalā') is commonly understood a vacant space,
 a space without any occupant (mutamakkin). But a space and its content
 are constructs, that is, they are not separate entities. By necessity
 (idtirāran), The existence of space implies that it is a space for
 something. It must inevitably have a content. By the same token, an
 object is invariably found somewhere, in some place. Therefore, a
 space without a content is inconceivable. Although the void is defined
 10 as an empty space, we must conclude that the absolute void (al-khalā'
 al-muṭlaq) cannot possibly have any existence (wujūd).

Moreover, if the content of space is corporeal, then it follows that the corporeality of the All (jism al-kull) would be either infinite or finite in quantity. But it is axiomatic that nothing can be infinite (lānihāyata lahū) in actuality (bi-al-fi'l) as we shall
 15 show after a while. Therefore, we must conclude, the corporeality of the All cannot be infinite in quantity. This means that beyond the All there can be nothing at all. Because if there were, then this additional content would have to be corporeal. Logically, we will then have to assume that beyond this content there is more content and so on ad
 110 finitum(bilā nihāyah). This would necessitate the existence of a corporeal object that is infinite in quantity. Thus infinity will have to be an actuality. This is a logical contradiction and cannot be true. Therefore, we conclude that beyond the corporeal All there is nothing at all. For, as we have demonstrated, beyond it there can be no space
 5 or anything corporeal filling that space. This is necessarily so (wājib idtirāran). For this conclusion there can be no image in the soul because by logical necessity this reality is conceived only by the mind (wujūd 'aqlī).

Whoever seeks to know metaphysical (fawq al-ṭabī'ah) realities, which are incorporeal and have no material associations (tuqārin al-hayūlī), will never find images or replicas of them in the soul. Metaphysical truths can be known only by intellectual investigation (al-abhāth al-'aqliyyah).

- 10 Commit to your memory this basic premise (muqaddimah) that it may be your guide in the search for all truths and a light dispelling from your intellectual vision the darkness of ignorance and the sorrow of perplexity. May God keep you in all the virtues and guard you from all the vices.

(EPISTEMOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS)

The use of these two channels of cognition (perception and conception) renders (our attainment of) the truth easy in certain respects, difficult in others. The intelligibles, for instance, can be comprehended only by the mind. He who seeks to know them as images (of empirical experience) will do so in vain. His predicament would be similar to that of a bat in daylight unable to see what is perfectly visible to us.

- 15 It is for this reason that many speculative thinkers (nāẓirān) have been puzzled whenever they have directed their inquiries to metaphysical matters. Their problem lies in searching for metaphysical images in their soul and thus applying the method they are accustomed to but which is applicable only to sensory knowledge. This is certainly an immature approach, namely, to use the short-cut of the familiar means to reach all ends. Naturally, the process of learning is facilitated when the subject matter has a resemblance to what is already familiar. This fact may be substantiated by the speed with which speech-making, letter-writing, story-telling and poetry are learnt, for they

are all areas which involve the ability of speaking and relating which is acquired early in life.

These thinkers have also encountered difficulties in their investigation of physical phenomena due to their application of the
 111 mathematical method which must be restricted to the non-material.
 For the corporeal, the physical, is subject to change, such as motion.
 Nature (ṭabī'ah), on the other hand, is the primary cause ('illah
 awwaliyyah) of motion and rest.

All that is natural must be material. The mathematical method
 cannot be applied for the investigation of natural phenomena. Mathematics,
 5 being immaterial, may be applied to that which is not natural. Its use
 in the natural sciences will yield no results and is bound to be confusing.

It is imperative, therefore, that anyone who is engaged in research
 in one of the sciences should inquire first about the cause of the subject
 matter investigated by that particular field. Our search for the cause
 of natural objects, for instance, would lead us back to the first natural
 principles (awā'il al-ṭabī'ah) which account for all motion. We conclude,
 therefore, that the natural applies to everything that is in motion.
 10 Natural science or physics, then, is the science of all that is in motion.
 Metaphysics, by contrast, deals with that which is not in motion, for
 nothing can ever be the cause of its own coming into being ('illat kawn
 dātihi), as we shall explain later. Thus the cause of motion cannot be
 motion, and the cause of a moving object (mutaḥarrik) cannot be a moving

object. Metaphysics is, then, the realm of that which is motionless. The knowledge of metaphysical realities, we conclude, is the knowledge of that which does not move.

(METHODS OF INVESTIGATION)

Demonstrative knowledge (wujūd burhānī) should not be sought in every inquiry, for not every intellectual problem can be solved by demonstration. This is so because not all things can be proven true. There are demonstrative proofs for certain things, but we cannot prove the proof itself. If this were possible, then the chain of establishing demonstrative evidence would go on infinitely. This would mean that nothing at all could be proven true and thus nothing at all could be known, because a thing is known only when we can trace its beginning. Thus knowledge of any kind would be an impossibility. If we want to know, for example, what is man, who is a living, thinking and dying being, and we did not understand what is meant by the terms "living, thinking and dying," we obviously would not know what man is.

Similarly, persuasion (iqnā') should not be used as a tool for establishing facts in mathematical sciences (al-'ulūm al-riyāḍiyyah). Demonstrative proof should be our method in this area. If we used persuasion in mathematics, then our knowledge would be mere opinion (ẓinniyyah) and cannot be scientific ('ilmiyyah).

Moreover, analytical speculation (naẓar tamyizī) into a field of knowledge requires particular method of investigation and verification

that may not be applicable to other fields. Overlooking this episte-
 10 mological necessity and the indiscriminate use of methods, whether it
 be the persuasive, comparative, objective, empirical or discursive,
 have led many analytical thinkers astray in the pursuit of knowledge
 in their respective fields. The refusal to make distinctions between
 the various objects of knowledge and the arbitrary and persistent
 adherence to one method of investigation, regardless of the subject
 matter of knowledge, account for the failure of many to acquire any
 knowledge. The method of inquiry that must be adopted is determined
 by the area of knowledge that is pursued. We should not use, for
 15 instance, persuasion in mathematics, empiricism in theology (al-ilm
 al-ilāhi), discursive reasoning (al-jawāmi' al-fikriyyah) in the
 inquiry about first natural principles, demonstrative proof in rhetoric
 (balāghah) or for substantiating another proof. If we take this basic
 matter into consideration, the goals of our search and research become
 accessible. On the other hand, if we disregard this fundamental truth,
 we will lose sight of our aims and fail to realize our objectives.

Having indicated these guideposts well in advance, we shall now
 20 introduce the essentials (of metaphysics) which we need in this art.

(THE CONCEPT OF THE ETERNAL)

113 The Eternal (al-azali) is that which is never Non-Being (laysa)
 but is Being (huwa) in the absolute sense (muṭlaqan). The existence (hawīyyah)
 of the Eternal has no ontological development. The Eternal is that which

is self-sufficient and has no cause. It is not object, predicate, has no agent and no end - we mean that for which it exists - for there are no primary causes other than these.

5 Moreover, the Eternal has no genus (jins), for if it had a genus it would itself be a species (naw'). A species is a composite (murakkab) of the genus, which it has in common with others, and the differentia (faṣl) which distinguishes it from others. This would mean that the Eternal is made of matter, namely, its genus with which its form or any other form (ṣurah) may be combined, and of form which is uniquely its own and is not shared by any other. Thus the Eternal is made of matter and form. But it has been proven that it is without matter and form; and this is a contradiction that cannot be possible. Therefore, it must be concluded that the Eternal has no genus.

10 Again, the Eternal is immune to corruption which is a change of form but not of primary substance (al-hāmil al-'awwal). This primary substance, which is its existence (aysa) does not undergo any change. The process of decay in an object is not the result of re-creation of its existence (ta'yīs aysiyyatihi). ~~Alteration in an object is caused~~ by its nearest opposite with which it shares the same genus. Heat, for
15 instance, is changed by means of the cold and not by dryness, sweetness, length or anything else simply because these qualities are not the nearest opposite to heat. Related contraries (al-aḍḍād al-mutaqāribah)
114 are of the same genus. A decaying object has a genus. If the Eternal decays, it must have a genus. But it has been established that it is

without a genus. This is an impossible contradiction. We conclude, therefore, that the Eternal is immune to decay.

Inasmuch as change (*istiḥālah*) is substitution (*tabaddul*), the Eternal is immutable because it is never substituted by something else and does not develop from a state of imperfection (*naqṣ*) to a state of perfection (*tamām*). For development (*intiqāl*) is a form of change, and the Eternal does not develop into a state of perfection because it it
 5 is immutable. That which is perfect is characterized by a condition of constancy (*ḥāl thābitah*) which is the basis of its excellence. The imperfect lacks this constancy and this excellence. The Eternal cannot be imperfect because it is impossible for it to develop into a condition by which it attains excellence. This is so because it cannot possibly change into any any state that is more perfect or more imperfect. By necessity, the Eternal is perfect. Inasmuch as a body (*jism*) has genus and species, and the Eternal has no genus, therefore the Eternal cannot be a body.

10 We can make the conclusive statement that no eternal body or anything else that has quantity (*kammiyyah*) or quality (*kaifiyyah*) can be infinite in actuality (*bi-alfi'l*), and that which is infinite is only potentially (*fī al-quwwah*) so.

(BASIC PREMISES)

This leads us to state several primary premises that are certain and are intelligible without the medium (of sense perception):

- (a) All bodies (ajrām) of which none is larger than the rest are equal (mutasāwiyah).
- (b) The distances (ab'ād) between the farthest ends of equal bodies are congruent potentially and actually.
- (c) That which is finite cannot be infinite.
- 15 (d) If a body is added to one of equal bodies it renders it larger than the rest and larger than it was before the addition was made.
- (e) If two bodies finite in size were joined, the resultant body would also be finite in size. This is necessarily true also with respect to any quantity or anything quantitative.
- (f) The smaller of two bodies of the same genus is smaller only in comparison with that other body or part of it.

(THE FINITE AND THE INFINITE)

- 115 If from an infinite body one were to take a body finite in size, the remainder would be either finite or infinite in quantity. Assuming the remainder to be finite in size, if then the separated body, which is finite in size, were added to it, the resultant body would be finite in size. But this resultant body is the same as the original one
- 5 before anything was separated from it which was infinite in size. This is an impossible contradiction.

Suppose now that the remainder were infinite in size. If then what was taken away from it were again added to it, it would either become larger than what it was before the addition was made or equal to it. If it becomes larger than what it had been, it would mean that

10 an infinite body has become larger than an infinite body. We know

that the smaller of two bodies is smaller in relation to the larger of part of it. Thus one of the two objects, both supposedly infinite, is smaller than the other one or part of it. If in size the smaller body ranks second to the larger one, then it inevitably ranks second to part of it. The smaller body could be said to be equal to part of the larger.

However, two bodies are equal when the distances between the periphery of their common features (*mutashābihātuhumā*) are equal. They are consequently finite, for equal bodies which are dissimilar have, nevertheless the same number of equal units (quantitative), although their ends may differ in plurality (*kathrah*) or quality or both. Thus they are finite. (According to our argument), the smaller of the two bodies would have to be both infinite and finite, and this is an impossible contradiction. Therefore, we must conclude, that neither of the two bodies (mentioned above) is larger than the other.

Moreover, if the body does not become larger than what it had been before anything was added to it, this would mean that a body has been added to another body without resulting in any increase. Thus the total sum of the two is equal to the one, although the one to which it was added is only part of the whole as well as part of of the two parts that have been rejoined. Consequently, the part is equal to the whole (*al-kull*). And this is a logical impossibility.

It has thus been demonstrated that a body cannot possibly be infinite. The same argument leads also to conclude that nothing

quantitative can be infinite in actuality.

(TIME, MOTION AND CHANGE)

Time is a quantitative entity. Therefore, it cannot be infinite in actuality, for it has a beginning and an end. All things that are predicated by that which is finite are necessarily finite. Thus all the
 10 categories implied in a body such as number, space, time - which is divided by motion - and all that constitutes a body in actuality is also finite, because the body itself is finite. The body of the whole (universe) is finite. The same may be said of all that it contains.

Inasmuch as it is possible by imagination (bi-alwahn) to increase the totality of being continuously, namely, to imagine a larger universe indefinitely, therefore the possibility (imkān) of imagining a larger universe can go on infinitely. Thus potentially, the universe (jirm al-kull) is infinite, because potentiality (of it being so) and possibi-
 15 ty (of our imagining it to be so) are identical. In other words, that which is finite can be so only potentially. Al that is inherent in what is infinite in potentiality is also potentially infinite. This applies to motion and time. To sum up, that which is infinite is infinite only in potentiality. Nothing can be infinite in actuality, as we have shown.

117 Because that is a logical necessity (i.e. the principle that infinity cannot be an actuality), it becomes evident that time cannot be infinite in actuality. For time is the duration of the totality of being. If

time is finite, it is so by virtue of the fact that the existence (inniyyah) of the universe is finite, for time itself has no independent existence.

- 5 Moreover, there can be no body existing without time, because time is the number of motion. It is, in other words, a duration measured by motion (ḥarakah). Whenever there is motion there is bound to be time. The absence of motion is the absence of time.

Again, motion implies a body that moves. There can be motion only when there is a body, for without it there can be no motion. Motion is a form of change. This change may involve the location of any or all the parts of an object with or without its focal point (markaz). This is known as locomotion (al-ḥarakah al-makāniyyah). The change of location may also be the result of the movement of any or all of the
10 parts of a body away from, or nearer to, its focal point. This would be identical with the processes of growth (rubūḥ) and dissolution (iḍmiḥlāl) respectively. If the change involves the predicative qualities (al-kaifiyyāt al-maḥmūlah) of a body only, then it would be identical with transformation (istiḥālah). But if the change takes place in its essence (jawhar), the process would be equivalent to generation (kawn) and decay (fasād).

Every change marks the duration (muddah) of a body. In other words, change and time are ontologically inseparable, and so are motion and bodies, for wherever there is motion, there must of necessity be

a body. The existence of a body necessitates the existence of motion. Without an body there can be no motion (for there would be nothing to move).

- 15 The postulated existence of an immoveable body would mean that motion is an impossibility, definitely or indefinitely, or that it is a possibility. If motion is a definite impossibility, then it would mean that it is non-existent (laisat bimawjūdah) while the body exists. But (we know that) motion does exist; and this is an impossible contra-
- 118 diction. When there is an existing body, then the complete absence of motion would be impossible. ~~The existence of a body renders the existence of motion a possibility,~~ for motion exists in some bodies by necessity. The possibility of a condition in a body may be postulated on the basis of its actuality in other similar bodies. Let us say, for instance,
- 5 that the ability to write is not an actuality in Muhammad. But we can assume its existence in him as a possibility because other men can actually write. Thus the fact that motion necessarily exists in some bodies leads us to conclude that it must necessarily exist in bodies in general. Therefore, wherever there is a body, there is inevitably motion also. It has been said that there can be a body without motion.
- 10 If this were true, it would mean that a body can be in motion and at rest simultaneously. But this is inconceivable (muḥāl) and an impossible contradiction. Thus we conclude that the existence of a body without motion is impossible, and that wherever there is a body, there must necessarily be motion also.

(TIME, MOTION AND COMING INTO BEING)

We may suppose that the universe was originally at rest and
 15 that it moved because it was possible for it to do so. This supposition
 is necessarily false because if the universe were first at rest and then
 moved, it must have come into being out of nothing (kawn 'an laysa) or
 existed eternally (lam yazal). If it came into being out of nothing,
 then being (aysa) has come out of non-being (laysa), and this is a process
 of generation (kawn) which must involve movement. This fact was stated
 above when we described the nature of motion and pointed out that genera-
 119 tion was one of the forms of motion. If the existence of the universe
 did not precede the process of generation, it must itself be identical
 with that process. The generation of the world, therefore, could not
 have possibly preceded motion.

It has been asserted that the universe existed first without
 motion. This means it was at rest, but (we have shown that) it did
 not exist without motion. This is an impossible contradiction. Therefore,
 if the universe were generated out of nothing, it could not have possibly
 5 preceded motion.

On the other hand, if the universe were eternal and at rest (sākin)
 and then it moved because it was possible for it to do so, this would
 imply that the eternal universe underwent a change (istahāl) from
 actual rest to actual motion. But that which is eternal is immutable,
 as we have demonstrated earlier. The universe is then mutable and

immutable, and this illogical and cannot be possible. The universe
 10 could not have been eternal and at rest in actuality and then moved
 in actuality. But the universe is in motion. We must conclude that
 the existence of the world did not precede its movement at all. There-
 fore, wherever there is motion there must also be a body (that is in
 motion), and wherever there is a body there must also be motion.

It has been pointed out that time is ontologically not prior to
 motion. This means that time does not necessarily precede the universe
 15 in existence because there can be no time without motion. Moreover,
 the universe and motion co-exist. There cannot be one without the
 other. Similarly, it is inconceivable to have a body without duration
 (muddah), for there can be a duration only of something that exists.
 Furthermore, the duration of a body implies motion, because a body and
 motion are absolutely inseparable, as it has been shown. The duration
 of a body, which is invariably simultaneous with the existence of that
 body, is measured by the movement which inevitably co-exists with it.
 This establishes the fact that the universe is not ontologically prior
 20 to time. We conclude that the universe, motion and time never precede
 each other in existence.

120 The fact has been elucidated that time cannot be infinite for
 the simple reason that a quantity (kammiyyah) or anything quantitative
 (dhū kammiyyah) can never be infinite in actuality. All time must
 actually come to an end. Moreover, corporeality does not precede

time. The existence (inniyyah) of the universe cannot possibly be infinite. Of necessity, it must be finite. This means that the
 5 universe cannot be eternal. And although this truth has been delineated by what we have advance, we shall attempt to prove it in another way in order to enable those who speculate in this field to acquire added skill (tamahhur) for penetrating (tawalluj) its frontiers.

To begin with, change may take the form of composition (tarkīb) and assimilation (ʿitilāf), that is, the assembling (jamʿ) and harmonious arrangement (nazm) of things. A body is a three-dimensional substance having length, breadth and depth. It is composed of the substance (jawhar) which is its genus, and of the dimensions (abʿād) of length, breadth and depth which constitute its differentia. A body is made up
 10 of matter (hayūlī) and form (ṣūrah).

Furthermore, composition is equivalent to the change in a condition which itself is not a compound. In other words, composition is motion, for without movement no composition can take place. A body is a composite. Without motion there can be nobbodies. Corporeal bodies and motion cannot ontologically precede each other.

15 Again, time exists through the instrumentality of motion because motion is change, and change marks the duration of that which is changing. Thus motion measures the duration of the change in a body. Time is a duration computed by by motion. All bodies have a duration, as we have stated earlier. By this we mean the duration of their

existence. Corporeality does not precede motion, as we have already explained. Corporeal existences do not precede duration which is measured by motion. We arrive at the same conclusion that corporeal
 20 existences, motion and time do not precede each other ontologically. They co-exist. Therefore, if time were actually finite, the existence of bodies will necessarily be also finite in actuality. This conclusion
 121 is inevitable if composition and assimilation were a form of change. We would not have reached this conclusion if composition and assimilation were not a type of change.

We shall attempt now to show in a different way that time cannot be infinite in actuality in both its past and future aspects. Let us
 5 proceed by assuming that each period of time is repeatedly preceded by another until a period of time is reached that is not preceded by any other. In other words, we shall go back in time until a disconnected interval is reached which is not preceded by another disconnected interval. In our opinion, things cannot be otherwise. For the alternative would be a sequence of time intervals that would stretch into the past infinitely. This would mean that we can never determine the length of an exact interval stretching from a definite
 10 point in time into the distant past because such an interval cannot be designated if its far end is in infinity. And if a period beginning with a definite point in time and ending in infinity were measurable and knowable, then that which is infinite is also finite. This is an impossible contradiction.

Moreover, if no definite period of time can be reached (in the past) without finding that it is preceded by another and that by still another and so on infinitely - and that which is infinite, its distance cannot be crossed and its end cannot be reached, for
 122 one cannot expect to cover infinite time and reach a definite period of time - but (by empirical experience we know that) a definite time can be reached. Therefore, time is not infinite and must necessarily be finite. By implication, the duration of corporeal bodies is not infinite. Likewise, a body cannot be without a certain duration because its existence is not infinite but finite. Therefore, a body can never be eternal.

5 Similarly, the future cannot be infinite in actuality, for as we have demonstrated, if the past, up to a definite point in time, cannot be infinite (the same would be true of the future). Periods of time do continue to follow each other repeatedly. But if any length of time is added to a segment of time that is already finite, the total time resulting from this addition would also be finite. If this were the case, the alternative would mean that the addition of one finite quantity to another finite quantity results in an infinite quantity (and this is illogical).

10 Time is a linked quantity (kammiyyah muttasilah). By this we mean that it has a part that is common to both past and future, namely, the present (al-*ʿān*), which marks the end of the past and the beginning

of the future.

A definite period of time has two terminations, one at the beginning and the other at the end. If two limited periods of time were joined together by a moment that is common to both, the other
15 end of each of them would still be definite and known. It has been argued that the total sum of the two periods would be finite. This would mean that the ends in question are simultaneously finite and infinite, which is a contradiction that must be rejected. Therefore, if a limited period of time were added to another limited period of time, the sum of the two cannot be infinite. For whenever a limited time is joined to another limited time, each of these two segments of time will still have a definite end on one side. We conclude that
20 the future cannot be infinite in actuality.

CHAPTER III

(EXISTENCE, ESSENCE AND CAUSALITY)

123 Our preceding discussion may now be followed by an inquiry into the possibility as to whether or not a thing can be the cause (ʿillah) of its own generation (kawn dhātihi). We shall attempt to argue that this is impossible, for a thing cannot be its own cause, that is, the cause of its own coming into being (tahawwīyhu), whether out of something else or out of nothing. Some would argue that in
5 certain situations, being (kāʿin) is generated out of some specific thing. For a thing, in the first place, may exist (aysa) and be without essence (dhātuhu laysa). Then a thing may be non-existent (yakūn laysa) and yet have an essence (dhātuhu aysa). Moreover, a thing and its essence may not have any existence. Finally, a thing may exist and have an essence.

To begin with, if a thing had neither existence nor essence, then that thing would be nothing (la shayʿ) and its essence would also be nothing. This would mean that no cause-effect (la ʿillah wala maʿlūl) sequence is involved, for such a sequence is applicable only to existing things. In this case, therefore, a thing cannot be the cause of its own generation, for there is absolutely (muṭlaqan) no cause. To argue
10 that a thing can be the cause of its own becoming would be then illogical. It is impossible for a thing to be the cause of itself when that thing is nothing and its essence is also nothing.

The same conclusion is reached if a thing had an essence but without having a (concrete) existence, for in this case it would also be non-being (laysa), nothing and as such it would be neither cause nor effect, as we have shown earlier. Therefore, it cannot be the cause of its own being. To assume that a thing can be the cause of
 15 its own being would be an absurdity in the event a thing had an essence without a concrete existence.

The same result applies when the essence of a thing is identical with another object, for mutable existents may undergo a change in
 124 some of their parts only without the rest being affected. Such a change could dissolve the existence of a thing without having any effect on its essence. But when a thing ceases to exist then its essence becomes other than itself. However, we know that a thing is identical with its essence. Therefore, in this case a thing will have to be both itself and other than itself. This is self-contradictory and is likewise an impossibility.

This conclusion is also true if a thing exists but without its essence. This would be the case when its essence happens to be other than itself. Such a condition may be due to the fact that the existence
 5 and essence of a thing undergo dissimilar changes. This, however, would be in conflict with the fundamental truth that a thing and its essence are identical. Therefore, the hypothesis of having an existing thing without its existing essence must be rejected because it is a sheer

impossibility.

We arrive at the same consequence when a thing has both existence and essence. Even under these circumstances, a thing cannot be the cause of its own being for the simple reason that otherwise a thing would be generating its own essence. This would mean that a thing would be the cause and its essence would be the effect, but
 10 the effect is invariably other than the cause. Thus if it so happens that a thing is identical with the cause and its essence is identical with the effect, then it follows that the essence can no longer be the thing itself. But we know that a thing and its essence are identical. According to the present argument a thing and its essence would have to be two different things while in reality they are the same. Both views cannot be correct. Therefore, we conclude that a thing cannot be the cause of its own generation when both it and its essence are existing entities.

Obviously, a non-existing thing cannot be the cause of its non-existing essence, for in this postulated instance the thing and its essence cannot be identical, while in actuality they are the same.
 15 Thus we have established as true the basic principle that a thing cannot be its own cause. It cannot bring itself into being.

(THE PROBLEM OF MEANING)

Having demonstrated the above truth, we shall now proceed by

stating that a word (lafz) may or may not signify a meaning (ma'na). That which is void of meaning cannot be the object of knowledge and, therefore, is of no concern to philosophy which seeks to know that which has meaning.

- 20 Meaningful words are either general (kullī) or particular (juz'ī). Philosophy does not seek to know particular things because they are incomplete entities, and what is incomplete and fragmentary cannot
125 be fully known. Being the knowledge of the true nature of things, philosophy inquires into the universal which is whole and whose real nature is accessible to knowledge.

The universal, the general, is either essential (dhātī) or non-essential (ghayr dhātī). By the essence of a thing we mean that
5 which constitutes its very substance (muqawwim dhāt al-shai') and that by whose existence a thing comes into being and is maintained (thabāt). Without an essence, a thing disintegrates and decays (intiqāḍ wafasād). Life, for instance, is the essence of a living being (ḥayy), the very core which makes it what it is. The absence of life means the setting in of corruption and dissolution. Thus life is essential in all
living beings, and that which is essential is also called substantial (jawharī). It makes the very existence (qiwām) of a thing possible.

Substance may be integrative (jāmi') or differentiative (mufarriq). That which is integrative applies to many things giving each its name (ism) and its definition (ḥadd) and thereby unifying it and making

it whole. The integrative which names and defines many things may apply to individual entities (ashkhāṣ) as individual men. As such, it is called form (ṣurah), for all individual men have the same form.

- 15 The integrative may also characterize many forms such as the living and thus applying to all forms of living beings as man and mare. This is called genus (jins), and the one genus is applicable to all these forms.

The substance that is differentiative, however, accounts for the unique features in the definitions of things. The rational (al-nāṭiq), for instance, differentiates the living beings from each other. This is what is called differentia (faṣl) because it differentiates things and sets them apart from each other.

- 20 The non-essential, on the other hand, is the very opposite of what has just been described. Its existence depends on that which it
126 predicates (al-mawḍū' lahu) and which is also the source of its continuance (thabāt). Without the subject which it predicates it ceases to exist. It is inseparable from the substance for which it serves as a predicate. It is for this reason that it has been called accident ('arad).

- An entity whose existence is contingent on the substance is found in one individual thing, a characteristic of its own, distinguishing
5 from the rest such as the laughter of man and the braying of a donkey. It is called property (khāṣṣah) because it belongs to one specific

thing. The accidental may also appear in many things like whiteness in paper and cotton. It is called common accident ('araḍ 'āmmī) because it is commonly shared by many things.

A word that has meaning is either genus, form, individual, 10 differentia, property or common accident. All these may be classified under two headings: substance and accident. Genus, form, individual, and differentia are substantial. Property and the common accident are accidental. Moreover, a meaningful word may also be universal (kull) or particular (juz'ī), integral (mujtami') or disparate (muftariq). Inasmuch as we have discussed these concepts earlier, we shall proceed to investigate the problem of unity.

(THE NATURE OF UNITY)

What are the things in which the One or unity may be said to 15 exist? The One (al-wāḥid) is found wherever there is continuity ('la kull muttaṣil) and in those things that do not partake of plurality kathrah). This is equivalent to saying that unity may be descriptive of diverse things as genus, form, individual, differentia, property and common accident and all what has been mentioned above.

The individual may be natural (ṭabi'iy) as animal or plant 127 and the like or it may be man-made (ṣinā'iy) as house and so on. There is a natural continuity about the house. Its. Its structure is

continuous by accident, that is, by means of the occupation (of house-building). The house is one as far as its natural parts are concerned. Its structure is one by virtue of craftsmanship. The house became one by accidental unification (ittihād)(of its natural parts). But the house itself is one by natural unification.

Unity may also be said of wholes and parts. It may be applied
 5 to everything and to some things. It may be supposed that there is no distinction between the "All" and the "every", for "all" may be said in connection with things that have similar or dissimilar parts. We say, for instance, "all" the water, and water has similar parts, and "all" the body which is composed of bones and flesh. It applies to other things that have dissimilar parts as "all" the generation which
 10 has different individuals. "Every", on the other hand, is not applied to things with dissimilar parts. One does not say, for example, "every" water. However, "every" may be used with different things that are accidentally assembled or that are unified by some meaning, even though each individual thing may stand on its own, independent of the others. "All", on the other hand, may be applied to any conglomeration of things whatever the means of their unification. Thus we do not say
 15 "every" water because water is not made up of different things each standing on its own by its very nature. But we say "all" the water because water is a conglomeration of similar parts.

Likewise, there is a distinction between "part" (juz') and "some"

128 (ba'd). "Part" is a designation of that which measures the whole, dividing it into equal quantities (aḡḡār mutasāwiyah). "Some" is that which cannot be used as a measuring unit for the whole which it divides into unequal quantities. The "some", which divides the whole into unequal portions, is, nevertheless, part of that whole.

Unity, then, is ascribed to all the categories (al-maḡūlāt) and
 5 all that is derived from them whether it is genus species, individual, differentia, property, common accident, whole, part, every (part) or some (of the parts). (Unity is attributed to genus) because genus exists in all its species, for it is a category consistently applied to each of them. (The same is true of the) species which is present
 10 in each of its individuals for it is invariably said of each of them. Likewise the individual which is a unity by circumstantial necessity but which is itself divisible. Thus the individual is not a unity in essence. Its unity is accidental not essential and is in reality
 15 non-existent. That which is not in reality essential in a thing must of necessity be accidental. Whatever is accidental in a thing is caused by something other than itself. The accidental in a thing is an effect upon it (aḡḡar fīh), and an effect is relative (muḡāf) and is the result of a cause (min mu'aḡḡar), Therefore, unity (waḡḡdah) in individual things is necessarily an effect of a cause (aḡḡar min mu'aḡḡar).

The species is descriptive of many things which differ as

individuals. It is, therefore, a plurality because it comprises many individuals and is also composed of things, for it has genus and differentia. An example of this is man whose constituent elements are the qualities of living (ḥayy), thinking (nāṭiq) and dying (mayyit). Thus the species is essentially a plurality with respect to its individuals as well as its structure (tarkīb). The unity (waḥdah) that characterizes it is circumstantial and not essential. Therefore, it does not possess unity in reality, for the unity that it has is only accidental. That which happens to a thing accidentally is caused by some other agent. Accident in a body is an effect upon it, and the effect is relative (muḍāf), for it is the result of a cause. It has, then, been established that unity in the species is necessarily an effect of a cause also.

The genus covers many things that differ in their species which is indicative of what a thing is (ma'īyyat al-shay'). It is, therefore, a plurality because it has numerous species each existing independently. It is thus a plurality in this respect. This means that unity in it also does not exist in reality, for it appears in it only in an accidental manner. An accident in a thing has an external causation. The accident is an effect in a thing and is, therefore, relative. The effect is the result of a cause. We conclude that unity in the genus is likewise an effect necessarily caused by another agent,

The differentia embraces many things having different species which identify what a thing is (a'yīyyāt al-shai'). The term comprises all

the individuals of the species under which this differentia comes indicating its classification. Thus the differentia is a plurality with respect to the species and the individuals that belong to these
 15 species. The unity that is apparent in it, therefore, is not real.
 130 Its presence is only accidental. An accident has its causation outside the thing in which it occurs. It is, consequently, an effect in the thing in which it happens, and that which is effect is relative, for it is the result of a cause. It must be concluded that unity in the differentia is also an effect of a cause.

Property is said of one species and of all the individuals that belong to it. It substantiates the existence of a thing which of necessity must be particular. Property is, therefore, a plurality
 5 because it exists in numerous individual things, and because it is motion which is particular. Thus the unity present in property is also not real, for it is accidental. That which is accidental in a thing is caused by another agent. It is, therefore, an effect which is relative and is the result of a cause. Consequently, unity in property is also an effect of a cause.

The common accident is also said of many individual things. Therefore, it is a plurality because it is found in many individual
 10 entities. The common accident is either a quantity which is disposed to increase or decrease and is, therefore, particular. Or it may be a quality (kayfiyyah) which has a propensity to assimilate that which is similar or dissimilar, stronger or weaker. Thus quality can

accommodate contrariety (ikhtilāf) and is, therefore, a plurality. This means the unity present in it is not real unity because it is accidental. Accident, as we have already shown, is an effect of a cause. It must then be concluded that unity in common accident is likewise an effect of a cause.

"The all" (al-kull) applies to the categories (al-maqūlāt) which are composed of parts and this is true of all the categories. Any
 10 category (maqūlah) to which the "all" is applied has also parts because every category is a genus. This means it has forms, and every form has individual things. The "all", then, is a plurality because it has many divisions. The unity that it manifests, therefore, is not real, for its is accidental and thus an effect, as we have demonstrated before with respect to all that is accidental.

The same is true of "every" (jamī'), for it is a designation that applies to many assembled things. Therefore, it is a plurality.
 131 The unity that is present in it is not real, for it is accidental and, consequently, an effect of a cause, as it was pointed out above.

The particular is either essential or accidental. The parts
 5 of the essential may be similar or dissimilar. That which has similar parts is a plurality. An example of this is water whose every part is truly water and is itself divisible. Every part of water, which is water in its perfect form, is a plurality. The essential which has dissimilar parts is also a plurality. By "dissimilar parts" we

different parts such as the animal's body which is composed of flesh, skin, nerves, veins, arteries, ligaments, dermis, diaphragms, bones, brain, blood, gall, mucus and all that constitutes the body
 10 of a living being. All these are dissimilar, and each part of the body which we have just enumerated is itself divisible.

The particular which is accidental, on the other hand, is implied in the particular which is essential. An instance of this is the length, width and thickness in the flesh and bones as well as in the other parts of an organism, and to which we can add the color and taste and other accidentals. The particular that is accidental follows the essential in its divisions. Therefore, it has parts and is a plurality. We conclude that unity in the particular is also not real.

15 Both natural and accidental continuity have parts. The natural continuity of the house, for instance, lies in its form which has sides. Its accidental, that is, man-made continuity consists in the assembling of the material of which it is constructed as the stones, mortar and the parts of its bulk. Thus it is a plurality also. Its unity, then is not real.

As we have mentioned above, a thing may be said to partake of unity in relation to another thing. An illustration of this is the
 20 mile which signifies unity when we refer to "one mile" as a whole or general (measurement) for distances covered by a flung arrow (ghalwāt).

But in relation to the parasang (farsakh), the mile represents only a part. On the one hand, the mile is continuous and unified because the specific distances of a flung arrow (ghalwāt) are continuous and unified in it. Thus it is a whole, an "all" (kull) for such distances.

132 On the other hand, the mile is disconnected (munfaṣīl) from other miles, namely, the miles which add up to one parasang. Therefore, the unity present in it is not real also, for it is accidental.

To sum up, the categories we have investigated do not in reality partake of unity. In each of them, unity exists accidentally. Whatever
5 happens to a thing accidentally must have its cause in something other than the thing itself. It is the result, therefore, of some external causation. An accident, in other words, is an effect of some external cause, and cause and effect are always inseparably related.

Moreover, whatever exists accidentally in an object must exist essentially in another. This fact must be underscored that accidents
10 which appear in an object exist essentially in another. Having demonstrated the fact that unity is present in the categories only accidentally, we must now draw the conclusion that unity in them is not particular, that is, it is whole and general, not essentially but accidentally, and inasmuch as the accidental existence of unity in one thing must necessarily be attributed to another in which unity exists essentially, it follows that the existence of the True One (al-wāḥid al-ḥaqq) must be postulated whose unity is not an effect caused by another. Further light needs to be shed on this reality.

(THE ONE AND THE MANY)

15 All predicables (maqūlāt), whether perceived by the senses
 (al-ḥiss) or conceived by the mind (al-'aql) must relate to unity
 and plurality in one of the following ways: each existent can be
 either (1) one or many, or (2) both one and many, or (3) one only,
 133 or (4) many only.

(1. PLURALITY WITHOUT UNITY)

If the predicables were supposed to consist of plurality only,
 then they could not possibly share in one common state or meaning.
 But the truth of the matter is that they do share in one common state
 and meaning. Therefore unity (in them) co-exists with plurality. We
 5 have assumed that unity does not exist. This means that unity is
 both existent (aysa) and non-existent (laysa), and this is an im-
 possible contradiction.

Similarly, if the predicables partook of plurality to the
 exclusion of unity, then plurality would have no contrariety at all
 because such contrariety (khilāf) can only be unity. If the predi-
 cables had no contrariety, they would necessarily have to be identical.
 10 But in reality they are not identical, for identity (ittifāq) would
 imply having one state or meaning in common. But the predicables
 cannot be simultaneously identical and non-identical. This is illogical.
 Thus the existence of unity is inevitable.

Moreover, plurality without unity would imply that the predicables

are dissimilar (la mutashābiha), for things that are similar must necessarily have at least one thing in common. Our supposition of the existence of plurality without unity would rule out the possibility of having one thing that is common to all of them. This means that the predicables are dissimilar. But as a matter of fact they are similar (in a negative way) in not having unity. However, they cannot
 15 at the same time be both similar and dissimilar. This is an impossible contradiction. We conclude that it is inconceivable not to have unity.

Again, plurality without unity would also mean that the predicables are in motion inasmuch as the absence of unity would negate the existence of one state of being. This would imply that they cannot be in a state of rest (sukūn), that is, without change (mutaghayyir) or motion (muntaqil). And if they cannot be in a state of rest they
 20 must be in motion. But plurality alone would likewise necessitate the absence of motion because motion is a form of change of place (makān) or quantity (bi-kam, lit. change in the "how much"), or quality (b-kayfa, lit. change in the "how") or substance (jawhar). Change is equivalent
 134 to becoming other than it had been. But a state other than plurality is unity. Without the possibility of unity, plurality would be immune to change. Our presupposition of the non-existence of unity would mean that change of plurality is also non-existent and that movement, consequently, cannot exist. In other words, plurality without unity

would lead to the conclusion that the predicables are without motion and at the same time not at rest, as we have demonstrated before. This is contradictory. Therefore, unity must of necessity exist in the predicables.

- 5 Furthermore, plurality to the exclusion of unity would imply that the predicables either have or do not have individual things (ashkhās). If they were composed of individual, then these individuals of plurality (ashkhās al-kathrah) are or are not single units (āḥād, lit. ones). If they were not single units, then they would have to
- 10 be an infinite plurality (kathrah bilā nihāyah). If a section is separated from that which is infinite, notwithstanding the remainder being larger than what was separated from it, this severed section would have to be either finite or infinite in plurality. If its plurality were finite, and we have supposed it to be infinite, it would mean that it is simultaneously finite and infinite in plurality.
- 15 This is a logical contradiction. If, on the other hand, its plurality were infinite, and we know that it is smaller than the remainder, the implication would be that one infinity is larger than another infinity. This is also self-contradictory, as we have shown earlier.

The individual entities of plurality are, therefore, by necessity ones (āḥād), that is, single units. Thus unity exists because each individual is one, that is, a unity. To the earlier statement that predicables partake of plurality only, we must now add that they

20 do not partake of plurality only. And yet unity is present in them. This is contradictory. We would arrive at the same contradiction if we supposed the predicables not to consist of individual entities or of plurality, for plurality signifies assembled individual things. Things cannot be simultaneously a non-plurality (*lā kathrah*) and a plurality. Therefore, it is inevitable that unity must be present in the predicables.

135 Likewise, plurality without unity would result in the impossibility to define any of the individual entities of plurality. For definition (*ḥadd*) is one thing applicable to one meaning. If there were no oneness in plurality, no definition could be made because there would be nothing that could be defined (*maḥdūd*). But the individual entities of plurality are defined for they are definable. Thus they are both defined and indefinable. Again, this an impossible
5 contradiction. We must here also assert the necessary existence of unity in the predicables.

Plurality without unity would also mean that plurality cannot partake of number since one, that is, unity is the beginning of number and number, moreover, is a plurality composed of ones (*āḥād*). A plurality exceeds another by the additional ones or single units it has. Therefore, if there are no ones, there can be no number. And if there
10 were a plurality without ones, it could not be numbered. But plurality can be numbered. Consequently, the ones or unity are present with

plurality. Our assumption that plurality contains no ones or single units is, therefore, a contradiction of empirical evidence. Thus it is impossible not to have ones, single units, that is, unity.

Once again, to have the many without the one or plurality without unity would mean the impossibility of knowledge (ma'rifah). This is so because knowledge involves description (rasm), the
 15 description or picture of the known object in the soul of the knower as that object exists in one particular state. For if it were not in one specific state, which would make it possible for the soul of the knower and the picture of the known object to be united, knowledge would be impossible. But knowledge does exist and, therefore, the one state also exists. Consequently, unity is a reality. Our assumption that it does not exist is a contradiction of the facts. Unity cannot but exist.

Likewise, plurality without the one or unity would lead us
 20 to argue that each predicable is either a thing or no-thing. If it were a thing, then it must be one. Thus unity co-exists with plurality. We have assumed that the predicable is merely plurality. This means that it is both a plurality without unity and a plurality
 136 with unity; and this is contradictory. If the predicable were no-thing, then neither can it form a plurality nor can itself be a plurality. It was assumed to be a plurality. Thus it is simultaneously a plurality and a non-plurality, and this is illogical. We conclude

that the predicable cannot be without unity.

- 5 It has thus been demonstrated that it is impossible for some things to partake of plurality only simply because nothing can be mere plurality. For an existent can be either some-thing or no-thing. If it is some-thing, then it must necessarily be one. If it is no-thing, then it cannot be plurality. Thus an existent cannot be a plurality. But the fact is that it is a plurality. This is an impossible contradiction. Therefore, it is impossible for some things to partake of plurality to the exclusion of unity.

- 10 Our investigation has shed light on the fact that the predicables or things in general cannot be plurality without being also unity simply because it is impossible for some things to partake of plurality without also partaking of unity. At the same time, it has also become clear that unity cannot exist without plurality. Without exception, nothing can be a plurality without its being a unity.

(2. UNITY WITHOUT PLURALITY)

We shall now argue that if the predicables partook only of unity without plurality, contrariety (*mudāddah*) would have to be ruled out because an opposite (*didd*) is an opposite of another thing and "otherness" (*ghayriyyah*) involves at least two things, and two things constitute a plurality. Thus the absence of plurality means the absence of contrariety. But if there is contrariety then there must also be

plurality. Since contrariety exists, therefore plurality must also exist. We have supposed it to be non-existent. This would mean that it is both existent and non-existent, and this is self-contradictory. We conclude that it is impossible not to have plurality.

Also, unity without plurality would mean the absence of exception
 20 (istithnā'), for exception applies to one or more things other than
 137 that to which the exception is made. In other words, exception implies plurality. It is an empirical fact that both the exception and that to which the exception is made do exist. Therefore, plurality exists also. We have supposed it to be non-existent. This would mean it is both existent and non-existent, and this is an impossible contradiction. Consequently, the existence of plurality is inevitable.

5 Moreover, mere unity without plurality would exclude the possibility of difference (tabāyun), for in order to have difference there must be a minimum of two things. Two or more things constitute a plurality. Without plurality difference is inconceivable. If there is difference, then there must necessarily be plurality. As a matter of fact difference does exist. Therefore, plurality exists also. We have assumed its non-existence. This would mean it is simultaneously being and non-being, and this is a contradictory
 10 impossibility. We conclude that plurality necessarily exists.

Furthermore, mere unity without plurality would rule out agree-

ment (ittifāq) and disagreement (ikhtilāf) as well as continuity (ittiṣāl) and separation (iftirāq). For these conditions are possible when there are at least two things, and two things comprise a plurality. Without plurality there could be neither agreement nor disagreement.

- 15 But agreement and disagreement are empirical facts. Consequently, plurality exists. We have assumed that it does not exist. This means that at one and the same time it exists and does not exist. This is illogical. We conclude that it is impossible not to have plurality.

- Again, unity to the exclusion of plurality would necessarily eliminate the possibility of a beginning (ibtidā'), a middle (tawassuṭ) and an end (ākhir), for these can exist only in things that have parts.
- 138 The one has no beginning, middle or end. However, a beginning, middle and end do exist. Therefore, things which have parts must necessarily exist and such things are obviously more than one. Consequently, plurality exists in that which is more than one. We have supposed plurality to be non-existent. This is self-contradictory. We conclude
- 5 that plurality exists by sheer necessity.

- Once again, mere unity without plurality would rule out the possibility of a thing having a particular shape (shakl). Shapes (ashkāl) are composed either of curved or straight lines or of both. They may also be formed by curved or straight surfaces or both. Shapes that are circular or spherical must have a focal point (markaz) and
- 10 a circumference. That which is composed of curved lines and curved

surfaces or of straight lines and straight surfaces or a combination of these two possibilities must necessarily have angles and ends and, therefore, constitute a plurality. Thus wherever there are shapes there must also be plurality. But shapes do exist. Consequently, plurality is an existing reality. We have assumed that it does not exist. To say that it both exists and does not exist is self-contradictory. We conclude that it is impossible not to have plurality.

Likewise, mere unity without plurality would exclude the possibility of both motion and rest in the predicables, for the movement of an object is equivalent to a change of place, quantity, quality or substance, and all these constitute plurality. That which is at rest is at rest in a specific place. Yet some of its parts are elsewhere. Thus both terms "place" and "parts" imply a plurality because "parts" are more than one part and "place" consists of top, bottom, front, back, right and left. By its very nature (*biṭibā'ihī*), "place" necessitates the existence of plurality. For place is other than the occupant (*al-mutamakkin*). An occupied place implies an occupant. height implies that which is high, diminution that which diminishes, change that which changes, existence that which exists, and decay that which decays. Negation (*nafy*) of all these entities would necessitate the existence of plurality, for to refer to a thing as not existing, not decaying, not rising, not diminishing or not changing would constitute a subject (*mawḍū'*) and predicate (*maḥmūl*), a subject

5 that is predicated by a negation of limited things. Therefore,
 if there is rest there is bound to be plurality. Without plurality,
 there can be neither rest nor motion. But rest and motion do exist.
 Consequently, plurality exists also. We have assumed its non-existence.
 This would mean that it both exists and does not exist, and this is
 an impossible contradiction. Therefore, plurality inevitably exists.

Thus it has been demonstrated that it is impossible for a thing
 10 to exist without partaking of plurality, because without plurality
 it can neither be in motion nor at rest. But the fact is that nothing
 perceptible (shay' min al-mahsūsaḥ) or anything related to things
 perceptible can neither be in motion nor at rest. Therefore, not
 a single thing can be without plurality.

Likewise, unity alone without plurality would eliminate the
 possibility of a part or a whole existing at all, for the whole is
 the sum of the parts which are at least two in number, and two parts
 constitute a plurality. Thus without a plurality there can be no
 15 whole, and without a whole there can be no part because the whole
 and the part are inseparably related. The existence of the one
 presupposes the existence of the other. The one cannot be without
 the other. We are then led to say that things are not wholes and
 that they do not have parts. But empirically things are wholes and
 have parts. This would mean that the whole and the part are
 simultaneously being and non-being, and this is self-contradictory.

140 The part is also one. Therefore, if there is a part, then
 there is unity. Similarly, the existence of the part implies the
 existence of the whole, for without a part there can be no whole.
 And if there were neither part nor whole, then nothing could possibly
 exist. If nothing existed, then there can never be anything perceptible
 (maḥsūs) or conceivable (ma'qūl), and there can never be unity in
 5 anything perceptible or conceivable. If we assume that there is no part
 and no unity, it follows that there can be no part and whole and,
 consequently, no unity. We have supposed that unity exists. This
 would mean that it both exists and does not exist, which is illogical.
 Therefore, we conclude that plurality must inevitably exist.

It has thus been proven that none of the predicables mentioned
 above could partake of unity without partaking of plurality also for
 the simple reason that there cannot but be parts and wholes, as we
 10 have shown. The preceding investigation has also demonstrated the
 fact that there can be no plurality without unity in any of the
 predicables which were discussed. Part of the discussion has also
 shown that there can be nothing that partakes of unity without
 partaking of plurality also.

(3. UNITY, PLURALITY AND CAUSALITY)

It has become clear, therefore, that unity and plurality cannot
 exist separately and independently. All the predicables mentioned

15 earlier partake of both unity and plurality. It is a sheer necessity
 that the one and the many be present in all things such as we have
 enumerated above. Having established the fact that it is in the very
 nature of things to be both unity and plurality, it must now be stated
 that unity can be either distinct (mubāyin) from plurality or the two
 (unity and plurality) are interdependent. If unity were distinct from
 plurality, that is, if unity existed separately, we would have the
 same contradictions which were pointed out when the possibility of
 unity without plurality was postulated. The same would be true of
 20 plurality (if it existed separately).

141 The one alternative that remains is for unity and plurality
 to be interdependent (mushārikah), namely, co-existing in all perceptible
 objects and all that is related to them. In other words, anything
 that partakes of plurality partakes also of unity, and wherever unity
 is present, there one finds also plurality.

Having demonstrated the co-existence of plurality and unity in
 5 all sensory objects and all that is related to them, it must now be
 pointed out that this simultaneity or co-existence (ishtirāk) (of
 unity and plurality) can be due either to chance (bakht), that is,
 by coincidence (ittifāq) without a cause, or is the result of a cause.
 If it were due to chance, then we would have to assume that unity
 and plurality had existed separately. But to this condition (separate
 existence of unity and plurality) would be applicable all the contra-

dictions (~~mu~~ḥālāt) which we have encountered when we searched for plurality without unity. And how is it possible to have plurality and unity simultaneously if they were distinct? Is not the many
 10 simply a plurality of ones, an assembled group of unities? Therefore, unity must exist with plurality. Things cannot be otherwise. Moreover, If they were distinct, how could possibly by mere unity, when they are two things (unity and plurality), and two things constitute a plurality? We conclude that it is inconceivable for unity and plurality to be distinct.

We could return to the possibility of attributing the cause of the (assumed) distinctiveness (of unity and plurality) to chance. But this distinctive features are existences (inniyyāt) and to these,
 15 too, apply the logical contradictions which we have encountered. Therefore, unity and plurality could not have possibly been separate and then have united (ittafaqat) by chance, that is, without a cause. Hence, the only possibility that remains would be to say that the interdependent co-existence of unity and plurality must have been the result of a cause and that this condition must have prevailed from the beginning when they came into being.

Having established the necessity of a cause to explain their interdependent simultaneity, we must go on to say that this cause can either be from within itself (internal) or other than itself, that
 20 is, external and separate from it. If we suppose the cause to be

from itself, it would necessarily have to be part of the self. This would be identical to saying that the part (as the cause) is ontologically prior to the rest (as the effect). Since the cause precedes the effect in existence, as we have shown in our Book on the Differences (kitāb 'la al-mubāyanah), it follows that any sensory object or that which is related to it, we mean all things, would have

142 to be either mere unity (waḥdah faqat) or mere plurality (kathrah faqat) or must be both unity and plurality simultaneously. If it were mere unity (or mere plurality), the ensuing result (i.e. contradictions) would be similar to what was encountered earlier. Con-

5 sequently, unity and plurality must co-exist interdependently. This interdependent co-existence must be the result of either chance or a cause from within or from without. If it were due to chance, the same contradictions would follow which have already been indicated. If it were self-caused, the consequence would be a chain of causes that is infinite. But it has been demonstrated that nothing can be

10 infinite in actuality. Therefore, we must conclude that the interdependent co-existence of unity and plurality cannot be self-caused.

(4. FIRST CAUSE: THE TRUE ONE)

The only possibility that remains would be to attribute the interdependent co-existence of unity and plurality (in predicables or perceptibles in general) to a cause other than themselves (unity and

plurality), a cause that is transcendent and nobler than, and ontologically prior to, both unity and plurality. For the cause precedes the effect in existence, as we have shown in our essays on Differences, a cause that is separate from both. For simultaneity is a necessity in co-existents, as we have shown earlier, and it is caused by some exterior agent. If this were the case, we would have an infinite chain of causes. But infinity in causality is an impossibility, as
 15 we have demonstrated. This is so because nothing can be infinite in actuality.

Moreover, this transcendental cause cannot be of the same genus as unity and plurality, for nothing can be ontologically prior to other things of the same genus. For instance, neither the substance of man's humanity (al-insāniyyah) nor that of the horse's animality, which are both of the same genus, the living, could precede each other ontologically. The cause exists prior to the effect. Therefore, the cause that accounts for the interdependent co-existence of unity and plurality in things that are many and one cannot be found in a genus.

20 If it (the transcendental cause) does not have a genus in common with them (unity and plurality), it does not also share with them one similarity. For things that are similar are so with respect to one genus, one species, such as redness, redness and shape, and shape and so on. Therefore, the cause of the interdependent co-existence of plurality and unity in things that are many and one cannot be located

in a genus or similarity or form. This is so because it is the very cause of its (simultaneity of unity and plurality) being and continuity and must, therefore, be higher, nobler and older than it.

143 It has thus been demonstrated that all things have a First Cause ('illah 'ūlā) which does not partake of any of their genera, forms and similarities and has nothing in common with any of them. This First Cause is higher, nobler and more ancient than all things. It accounts for their coming into being as well as for their continuous existence.

 This Cause must itself be either one or many. If it were many, then it comprises unity, inasmuch as plurality is the configuration
5 of ones. This would mean that this First Cause is both a plurality and a unity. Consequently, we would have to say that the cause of plurality and unity is unity and plurality. In other words, a thing is the cause of itself. But the cause must be other than the effect. A thing is then other than itself, and this is an impossible contradiction. Therefore, we must conclude that the First Cause cannot be a plurality or both a plurality and a unity. Hence, the only possibility that remains is that the First Cause must be One only (wāhid faqat) without plurality in any way.

 Thus we have delineated the fact that the First Cause is One. The One (or unity) is found in all things that are caused. We have
10 discussed above the variety of forms the one or unity takes in sensory

objects and related things. We must now elucidate the nature of unity in the predicables as well as the nature of the True Unity (al-wahdah al-haqq) and the meaning of unity allegorically (bi-al-majāz) and in reality (bi-al-haqīqah). This is our objective in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV

We shall now discuss the type of unity that exists in the predicables (al-maqūlāt) and the nature of the One in Truth (al-wāḥid bi-al-ḥaqq) and the One when it is used in the allegorical (bi-al-majāz), rather than the real, sense.

(THE RELATIVE AND THE ABSOLUTE)

15 Beginning with the necessary premises, the fact must be stated that "the great" and "the small," "the long" and "the short," "the many" and "the few" are terms used to describe things in a relative (bi-al-Idāfah) rather than absolute (qawl mursal) sense. Thus a thing is described as "great" in relation to, or comparison with, something that is smaller. It is said to be "small" when it is compared with something that is greater. Likewise, a matter
144 or affair is described as great in contrast to a matter that is small or minor. A mountain is depicted as small in relation to another mountain that is bigger.

If the word "big" were applied in an absolute manner to that to which bigness may be ascribed, and in the same way the term "small", we would be referring to something infinite that can never (battah) exist in actuality (bi-al-fi'l) or in potentiality (bi-al-quwwah).

5 This would be the case because there could not possibly be anything bigger than that which is described as big in an absolute manner.

Thus the absolutely large cannot be infinite actually or potentially. For if something other than it that is larger existed actually or potentially, then it itself could not be said to be absolutely large because the existence of something larger would render it comparatively small. If this were not the case, then that which is larger than it
 10 would by comparison be either smaller than it or equal to it, and this self-contradictory. Therefore, we conclude, nothing could possibly be larger, actually or potentially, than that which is absolutely large.

This argument means that a magnitude (*ʿazīm*) exists which cannot be doubled in actuality or in potentiality. To double a thing is to double its quantity (*kammiyyah*), and this doubling of
 145 its quantity exists either actually or potentially. Therefore, a magnitude twice as large as the absolutely large exists in actuality or in potentiality. Thus the absolutely large can be doubled. The resultant double (*ḍiʿf*) is a whole to that which is doubled, and that which is doubled is equal to half the double, and the half (*niṣf*) is part of the whole. This would mean that which is doubled is part of the double.

This all adds up to the conclusion that the absolutely large is both a whole and a part. If the double of the absolutely large
 5 is **not** larger than the absolutely large, then it will have to be either equal to it or smaller than it. If it were equal to it, an

absurd contradiction (*muhāl shanī'*) would result, namely, the whole would be equal to the part, and this is illogical. A more absurd impossibility would ensue if the double of the absolutely large were to be smaller than the absolutely large.

Inasmuch as the whole is larger than the part, it follows that
 10 twice the magnitude of the large, which was thought to be absolute, exceeds in size the large that is supposed to be the absolutely large. Now what is meant by the expression "the absolutely large" is simply that magnitude which nothing can surpass in size. Thus we must conclude that "the absolutely large" is not a magnitude that is large absolutely. Therefore, it is either not great at all or it is relatively large, for the term "large" cannot be used in the absolute but rather in the relative sense.

146 If the absolutely large is not large, this would be equivalent to saying that being is identical to non-being (*huwa lā huwa*), and this is a contradiction of terms. Moreover, if the absolutely large were equal to the relatively large, then the two words "absolute" and "relative" would have to be synonymous (*mutarādifān*), applying to one thing, a thing in comparison with which nothing could be smaller. For it has already been established that nothing can ever be larger than the absolutely large, potentially or actually.

5 By the same argument (*tadbīr*) it could also be proven (*yatabayyan*) that a thing can be described as small only relatively and not

absolutely. The terms "large" and "small" may be used to describe any quantity. The terms "long" and "short", on the other hand, are applied to describe a continuous quantity (kammiyyah muttasilah) to which they strictly belong and not to any other kind of quantity.

- 10 But these terms are also used relatively and not absolutely. The proof (bayān) for this fact would be the same as that advanced for the terms "large" and "small." When we come to the words "few" and "many" we find that they are applied to a discrete quantity (kammiyyah munfasilah). What has been said of the terms large and small, long and short, is also true of "many", namely, it may be used only in a relative and not in an absolute sense. This fact is proven by what has been stated before inasmuch as the argument is the same.

- 15 As to the term "few" (al-qalīl), it may be supposed that it could be used in the absolute sense, namely, when "two" is thought to be the beginning of number and all numbers other than "two" would then be larger than the "two." On the basis of this supposition, "two" as the smallest number would be, therefore, identical with "the absolutely few," because it can never be "many" for there is no number smaller than it.

(THE NATURE OF THE ONE)

- If the "One" were a number, and there is nothing less than the One, then it would be equivalent to the "absolutely few." But
 20 this conjecture cannot be true because if we considered the One a

number, a considerable absurdity would necessarily follow. For if the One were a number, it would have to be a certain quantity; and if the One were a quantity, then quantitative characteristics would necessarily have to be attributed to it. In other words, it would have to be equal (to certain things) and unequal (to others). If
 147 thus the One had units, some equal to it, others unequal to it, then the One will have to be divisible. For the smaller unit must come after the largest unit or after some parts of it. This would mean that the largest unit is equal to some units, and is, therefore, divisible. But the One is not divisible. Its divisibility, then, exists and does not exist, and this is an impossible contradiction.
 5 We conclude that the One is not a number.

Our saying "One", however, should not be interpreted to mean the material (hayūlī) constituent of the One, namely, the substance ('unsur) which is found in the One and thereby becomes One. It is the substance that exists and not the One (or oneness). Likewise, that which is formed of matter may be enumerated by number, but is not a number itself. For instance, when we say "five horses," it is understood that the horses are enumerated by five which is a number but which does not consist of matter. The material is in the horses. Thus our saying "One" should not be construed in such a way as to lead to that which derives its oneness from the One (i.e. the material)
 10 (al-muwahḥad bi-al-wāḥid). Our saying "One" should be understood to suggest oneness or unity (waḥdah) itself, and this unity is never

divisible.

If One were a number and not a quantity, and the rest of the numbers, namely, two and the numbers that follow it, also constituted quantity, then the One would have to be classified under a category other than quantity. Therefore, the One and the other numbers are all said to be numbers by virtue of the similarity of their names rather than their natures. Consequently, One is a number by name only and not by nature. For numbers are not used except in relation to one thing. The various branches of medicine, 15 for instance, are related to the one science, medicine, and the medical drugs (al-mubri'āt) are related to the one process of healing (al-bar').

But how can this hypothesis (ẓann) be true? In other words, if the One were a number, it would necessarily have quantitative characteristics which are equal and unequal (to other quantities). This would mean that besides the One there are other ones some of which are equal to it while others are either more or less than the One. But if this applies to the One, it must also be applicable 148 to all other numbers. In other words, a number would have a synonym (samī) that is equal to it and another synonym that is smaller and still another that is larger. Number three, for instance, would have other threes, some equal to it, others smaller and still others that are larger. This would be the case with each number.

Now if this is not true of numbers about which we have no doubt (that they are numbers), it cannot also be true of oneness
 5 (al-wahdāniyyah). If our saying that the characteristic feature (khāṣṣah) of number as well as of anything that is quantitative is to be equal (to certain things) and unequal (to others) means that each number has another number similar to it and another number that is dissimilar to it, namely, larger or smaller than it, it would follow that two is not a number. This conclusion is based on the fact that there is no number less than two, but that there are numbers larger than two. If two were considered a number on the basis that it has a number equal to it, namely, another two, and that it has numbers unequal to it, namely, those that are larger, we would have to conclude that One is also a number because it has
 10 a number equal to it, that is, another One, and numbers that are not equal to it, namely, two and all the numbers which follow. If this were true, then One would have to be a quantity. The One and the other numbers would then be quantitative. Thus if the One is not a number by name, it must be a number by nature.

Again, the One must be either a number or not a number. If it were a number, it would have to be an even (zawj) or an odd (fard) number. If it were an even number, it would have to be divisible into two part that are similar (mutamāthil) in their oneness. But the One is indivisible. To say that it is both divisible and in-
 20 divisible would be self-contradictory. Furthermore, if the One

contained single units, then it is a composite of such units. This means it is constituted of its own essence. It is thus One and at the same time units. But the One is One only and not Ones or units. To say that it is both One and Ones (unity and plurality) would be also self-contradictory.

If the One were not an even number, it would have to be an odd number. Now an odd number, when divided into two, would have two parts that are dissimilar in the number of their units. This would mean that the One is simultaneously divisible and indivisible, and
 20 that it is Ones and not just One, and this is an impossible contra-
 149 diction. Therefore, we must conclude that the One is not a number.

It must, however, be pointed out that this manner of defining the odd number may be supposed to be legitimate only after the proof has been established that One is not a number. Otherwise, what would prevent anyone, who considers the One a number, from defining an odd number as the number whose division into two parts would have
 5 two sections that are dissimilar in the number of their units? This definition would apply to the One which of necessity is indivisible.

If it has not been demonstrated by the previous discussion that One is not a number, the following argument will then have to be advanced: The basic element which constitutes a thing is not necessarily identical with the thing itself. The vocal letters, for instance, from which speech is composed, are not equivalent to the speech itself.

For speech is a harmonious sound meaningfully arranged to indicate a certain thing with respect to time. The letter, on the other hand, is a natural sound which does not have any components. If that which is generally considered a number were composed of Ones or single units, then the One is the constituent element of number. Therefore, the One itself cannot be number. Furthermore, the One has no constituent element from which it is composed and which also becomes the constituent element of the numbers that are formed of groupings of Ones. This would render the One a number whose basic substance is also the substance of all the recognized numbers. In this way, the One could be considered a number.

It may be supposed that the One is the constituent element of Two, and the Two the constituent element of Three, simply because the Two is contained in Three. If Two, which is a number, is the constituent substance of Three, the conclusion is drawn that One, which is the constituent substance of Two, must also be a number. This supposition, however, is not true because Two, which is a composite, if thought to be the constituent substance of Three, has itself the One as its own constituent substance. But the One, while being the constituent element of Two, is itself without a constituent element. The One is not a composite. Unlike the Two, it is simple (basit). The Two, on the other hand, is a composite (murakkab) made up of the simple One. But a number cannot be partly simple, which constitutes its basic substance - and by "simple" we

mean that which is composed of nothing else - and partly composite made up of that simple element.

It may be believed, however, that this is the case in composite substance (al-jawhar al-murakkab) such as a body that is composed
 5 of two simple substances, namely, matter ('unṣur) and form (ṣūrah). It has been argued that substance has three components: two are simple, namely, matter and form, and the third is a composite of these two, in other words, formed matter (al-'unṣur al-muṣawwar), which is the body itself. In a similar fashion, number is believed to be composed of simple parts, the One, which is the constituent substance of what are accepted as numbers, and of the recognized number itself, which is a composite of the simple One.

This belief is not true, for this is a converse comparison
 10 (tamthīl 'aksī). The primary, simple substances (al-jawāhir al-ūlā al-basīṭah), from which a body is made, are matter and form. But the body itself, even though it is composed of matter and form, it is so composed only accidentally, for by nature it is nothing but a body, that is, composed of matter and dimensions (ab'ād), which are identical with its form. Neither matter nor the dimensions, which are the form, can separately become a body, which comes into being only as the result of their union.

15 Thus the One, which is the basic substance that constitutes what is commonly known as number, cannot itself be number. For

number is the aggregate of Ones. It is made up of Ones or units in the same sense as the body is substances because it is composed of substances. Of course, nothing can prevent us from designating names and giving definitions to the constituent parts which go into the making of things, such as "the living" (al-ḥayy) in living beings and "substance" in substances, and what we have in mind here are the
 20 essential and not the accidental names. This discussion leads us to conclude that the One is the constituent element of number, but itself is positively not number.

Thus it has been demonstrated that One is not a number. The definition that is used of number is rather a comprehensive (muḥīṭ) description of number. By this we mean that the number is a magnitude
 151 ('izam) of units or ones (waḥdāniyyāt), a total sum of units and a putting together of units.

Two, therefore, is the beginning of number. Considered by itself without thinking of the other numbers, Two would not by nature seem a small number. The quality of "smallness" or "few-ness" (al-qillah) becomes its characteristic the moment it is considered in relation to, or compared with, a larger number. It is then that it (the Two) may be described as small or "few", because all other numbers are larger than
 5 it. Thus Two is few or not many in relation to other numbers. However, by its very nature, the Two is a doubling (tad'īf) of the One, a sum of two Ones. It is, then, made up of two Ones, and that which is a composite must have parts and it is the whole or the total of its

parts. But the whole is larger than the part. Therefore, number Two is not small by nature.

The terms "large" and "small", "long" and "short," "many" and "few" cannot be used in an absolute but only in a relative sense.

- 10 Each may be related only to another thing which has the same genus and not to that of another genus. The word "largeness," for example, if it referred to a body, could then be related only to another body and not, for instance, to another surface (saṭḥ), line (khaṭṭ), space (makān), time (zamān), number ('adad) or speech (qawl). As an illustration, one cannot say: 'a body larger or smaller than a surface, line, space, time, number or speech' but rather 'a body
- 15 larger than (another)body.' The same rule applies to all the other categories (mentioned above). In other words, it is incorrect to use the terms 'larger' or 'smaller' to compare things of different genera.

- Nor could one say: 'a surface larger or smaller than a line, space, time, number or speech' but rather 'a surface larger or smaller than (another) surface;' and not 'a line larger or smaller than a space, time, number, speech or line, ' but rather 'a line larger or smaller than (another)line;' and not 'a place larger or smaller than a time, number or speech,' but rather 'a place larger or smaller than
- 20 (another) place;' and not 'a time larger or smaller than a number, speech, but rather 'a time larger or smaller than (another) time; and not 'a number larger or smaller than a speech'but rather 'a number larger

or smaller than (another) number;' and not 'a speech larger or smaller than any of the rest of qualities' but rather 'a speech larger or smaller than (another) speech.'

152 Likewise, it would be incorrect to say: 'a body longer or shorter than a surface, line, space, time, number or speech.' One would be utterly mistaken in making the statement that 'a body is longer or shorter than a surface, line or place. If it is supposed that the length of a body were longer or shorter than the length of
5 a surface, line or place, then the comparison would be referring only to the length of each of these categories, and the length is only one of their dimensions and this dimension is a line. Therefore, when we say that a body, surface, line or place is longer or shorter what we really mean is that the line of this is longer than the line of that. For in this case we would be having varieties of the same continuous quantity (al-kammiyyah al-muttaṣilah).

Time is also a continuous quantity. But because time does not
10 have an overtly recognizable line, it could not, therefore, be said: 'a body longer or shorter than time.' Obviously, length and shortness cannot be applied to anything in comparison to another except if they were of the same genus even though both may have length and shortness. The two things will have to be either bodies, surfaces, places or periods of time. Length and shortness in themselves, however, cannot be applied to number or speech except with reference to the duration of

time in which they take place. Thus we can say: a long number,
 meaning in a long time. Similarly, it may be said: long speech,
 15 meaning of long duration, not that the qualities of length and
 shortness can be applied directly to speech and number.

Similarly, the terms "many" and "few" are used to designate
 things of the same genus. Take, for instance, number and speech.
 It would be incorrect to say: "a speech more or less than a number,"
 and "a number more or less than a speech." It would be correct to say:
 "a number more or less than (another) number," and "a speech more or
 20 less than (another) speech."

(THE NATURE OF THE TRUE ONE)

153 What has been established in the preceding argument leads us
 to conclude that the One cannot really be related to anything else
 of a similar genus. This would be possible if the One itself had a
 genus. But the True One (alwāḥid al-ḥaqq) has no genus at all. We
 have shown earlier that whatever has a genus cannot be eternal (azalī)
 and that the eternal is void of genus.. Therefore, the True One is
 5 eternal. The True One never multiplies itself in any form and cannot
 be related to, or compared with, anything else. It has neither matter,
 which would render it divisible, nor form consisting of genus and
 species. That which has these (matter and form) multiplies through
 its constituent elements. Moreover, the True One is never a quantity
 (kammiyyah) and also does not have a quantity. That which is quanti-

tative is also divisible, for every quantity or anything quantitative is prone to increase or decrease. That which decreases is divisible, and what is divisible is capable of multiplying in some form. It has
 10 been said that plurality (kathrah) is present in all the predicables (al-maḳūlāt) and anything that is implied in them, that is, genus, species, individual, differentia, property, common accident, whole, part and all (the rest). Likewise, the One may be said to be present in all the numbers that follow it. Therefore, the True One cannot be one of these.

Motion exists in any of these, that is, in any body which is matter and form, for motion is movement (naqlah) from one place to another (locomotion), increase, decrease, generation,,decay or
 15 transformation (istiḥālah). Moreover, motion partakes of plurality because space is quantitative and, therefore, divisible. That which in sections is divided by the different locations. Consequently, it is a plurality. Locomotion (al-ḥarakah al-makāniyyah), it must be concluded, partakes of plurality.

Increase (rubuwiyyah) and decrease (naqṣiyyah) also partake of plurality, for the movement of the extremities (nihāyāt) of that which increases or decreases is divided by reason of its taking place in
 20 the different locations extending between the points before and after the increase or decrease.

154 The same may be said of generation and decay, for the processes

of generation and decay, from their beginning to their end, are divided by means of the intervals of time during which they occur.

- 5 Thus the movements of increase and decrease, generation and decay, are all divided (into parts). Similarly, transformation of a thing into its opposite (qidd) or toward perfection (tamām) is also divided by means of the periods of time in which it occurs.

Thus all movements are divisible but are also unified (mutawaḥḥidah) because every movement in its totality is One. This is so by virtue of the fact that every absolute whole (al-kull al-muṭlaq) partakes of unity. This is also true of any part of the whole, for an absolute part (al-juz' al-muṭlaq) also constitutes a unity. No if plurality exists in motion, it must then be inferred that the True One is not motion.

- 10 Inasmuch as all things that are perceived by the senses or conceived by the mind must exist either by nature, objectively (fi 'aynihi) or subjectively (fi al-fikr), or by accident in our speech or writing, it follows that motion exists in the soul. What is meant by this is that thought (al-fikr) moves from the images (ṣuwar) of some objects to the images of other objects as well as from one of the soul's virtues and passions to another such as anger and fear, joy and sorrow and so on. Thus thought is capable of partaking of both plurality and unity. Because each plurality consists of a whole and parts, it
- 15 can be measured. What has just been described happens accidentally

to the soul and thereby the soul partakes of plurality and unity.

The True One, therefore, cannot be a soul.

If the logical course of thought is traced back, it would lead to the intellect (al-'aql). The intellect contains the species of things, for a species and that which is prior to it (i.e. genus) are conceivable (ma'qūl). The individuals (al-ashkhās), on the other hand, are objects of sensory perception. By individuals we mean particular things which do not determine the names and definitions of objects. The fact that the species unite with the would is an evidence that they are conceivable. The soul conceives in actuality (bi-al-fi'l) when the species are united with it. Prior to this union (ittihād), the soul's conception was only in potentiality (bi-al-quwah). It always takes another agent to change anything from potentiality to actuality. Without this agent a thing is a thing only potentially. But this agent (mukhrij, lit. producer) must itself be in actuality. The rationality of the soul is turned from potentiality into actuality by means of the universals themselves (al-kullīāt a'yānuha). This process is identical with the unification of the species and genera of things, which are their universals, and the soul. It is through this merger (ittihād) that the soul becomes rational ('āqilah), that is, acquires an intellect ('ql). To say that the soul has an intellect is the same as saying that it contains the universals of things. These universals, which by being in the soul have moved from potentiality to actuality, are identical with the soul's Acquired Intellect (al-'ql al-mustafād). The Acquired Intellect had

existed in the soul only potentially. The universals are, therefore, the Efficient Intellect (al-'ql bi-al-fi'l) which moved the soul from potentiality to actuality. Inasmuch as the universals are multiple (mutakathirah), as shown above, it must be concluded that
 10 the Intellect partakes of plurality. The Intellect may be considered Primary and multiple. But somehow it partakes of unity because it is a universal, a whole, as has been demonstrated, and a whole is One and partakes of unity. Thus True Unity (al-wahdah bi-haqq).

In our language, the synonyms (al-asma' al-mutarādifah) 'blade' and 'knife' are both used to designate the iron instrument of slaughter. Synonyms are said of One thing. The 'blade' and the 'knife' are One thing. But this One is also multiple because its substance ('unṣur) and its designations are multiple. In this case, the iron instrument
 15 of slaughter is the substance of the synonyms 'sharp edge,' 'blade' and 'knife,' and is itself divisible and multiple. Likewise, the terms by which it is identified are multiple. The True One, we must conclude, cannot be synonymous with anything.

Moreover, there are in our utterances words that have a resemblance to names, such as the lion which is called dog and the star which is also called dog. Both are One as far as the name is concerned which is 'dog.' The substance of this 'dog' is multiple, that is, the lion and the star. Neither of these similar terms is the cause of the other, for the star is not the cause of the lion, and the lion is not the cause of the star. However, there are cases in which the things that

share the same name can be the cause of each other. Examples of this are the terms 'the written' (al-makhtūṭ), 'the spoken' (al-malfūz), 'the contemplated' (al-mufakkar fīhi) and 'the thing-itself' (al-'ayn al-qā'imah). The 'written', itself a substance (jawhar) spells out that which is 'spoken', which is also a substance; and the 'spoken', which is a substance, expresses that which is 'thought about', which is likewise a substance. Moreover, the 'contemplated',
 156 which is substance, represents the 'thing-itself,' which is also a substance. The One may be ascribed to all of these, namely, 'the thing-itself' (al-'ayn fi dhātiha), 'the idea' (al-fikrah), 'the utterance' (al-lafz) and 'the inscribed' (al-khaṭṭ). The thing-itself is the cause of the 'thing-in-thought' (al-'ayn fi al-fikr), and the thing-in-thought is the cause of the 'thing-in-utterance' (al-'ayn fi al-lafz), and the thing-in-utterance is the cause of the 'thing-in-writing' (al-'ayn fi al-khaṭṭ). This kind of One is also multiple
 5 because it is used to designate many things. Therefore, the True One cannot be One of mere resemblance of names.

One may be said of things whose substance is One. However, the substance may undergo change either by action (fi'l), effect (infi'āl), relation (idāfah) or by some other way. For example, the door and the bed, which are made of one substance - wood or any other substance of which things with various forms are made - and thus it is said that the door and the bed are of One substance. But these (the door and

the bed) are also 'many' with respect to their substance, which
 10 is multiple and is made up of parts and 'many' with respect to their
 forms. Thus it is possible for things whose primary substance is
 One to be multiple with respect to that substance simply because
 it exists in numerous forms.

The expression 'One in substance' (wāḥid bi-al-'unṣur) may
 also be applied to things with reference to One specific thing in
 them but which, by necessary implication, would refer to another
 thing also. An example of this is when we speak of decay as it
 manifest in an object and, by implication, involves also generation
 inasmuch as the decay of one thing may be at the same time the
 generation of another. Therefore, it may be said that the existent
 (al-kā'in), in this case, is in actuality identical with that whose
 substance is decaying. This is another instance of multiplicity
 15 because the one substance is used for several forms.

This kind of potential Oneness, namely the 'One in substance',
 may be said of things which apply to One thing and imply another.
 Growth (rubū), for instance, designates increase but also implies
 decrease. For that which increases has the potential to diminish.
 Thus we may refer to the One process of increase-decrease. In other
 words, this dual process may apply to the one and the same thing.
 But this One thing is also multiple with respect to substance because
 the substance belongs to several forms due to the process of increase-

decrease, expansion-contraction (al-rubū wa-al-ḍamr). The True One, therefore, can never be substance. None of the various things that are One in substance qualify to be called "The One."

157 The One may be used to describe that which is indivisible, as we have pointed out. That which is indivisible is so either actually or potentially. A thing may be indivisible in actuality due to its hardness (ṣalābah) as it is the case with a diamond. But a diamond has parts by necessity because it is a body and, consequently, is multiple. A thing may also be indivisible by reason of its minuteness which eludes the action of a dividing instrument (al-ālah al-
5 qāsimah). It is indivisible simply because there is no device that can divide it. But the fact remains that it has parts because it is a magnitude ('izām) and has been subject to diminution (al-ṣighar). It is, therefore, multiple.

A thing may also be described as indivisible in actuality even though it may undergo continuous separation, for through this separation it does not digress from its basic nature. Its definition and name continue to be applicable to the separated part. This is true of all continuous magnitudes (al-a'zām al-muttaṣilah), namely, a body, surface, line, space and time. Needless to say, a part separated
10 from a body is also a body, a surface severed from a surface is a surface, a line taken from a line is a line, a place disconnected from a place is a place, and a time separated from a time is a time.

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5 qāsimah). It is indivisible simply because there is no device that can divide it. But the fact remains that it has parts because it is a magnitude ('izam) and has been subject to diminution (al-ṣighar). It is, therefore, multiple.

A thing may also be described as indivisible in actuality even though it may undergo continuous separation, for through this separation it does not digress from its basic nature. Its definition and name continue to be applicable to the separated part. This is true of all continuous magnitudes (al-a'zām al-muttaṣilah), namely, a body, surface, line, space and time. Needless to say, a part separated
10 from a body is also a body, a surface severed from a surface is a surface, a line taken from a line is a line, a place disconnected from a place is a place, and a time separated from a time is a time.

All these are never divided actually or potentially into anything other than their species. Each of them is permanently susceptible to differentiation (tafṣīl) and multiplicity within its own species.

Furthermore, a body multiplies by means of its three dimensions (ab'ād) and six ends (nihāyāt), a surface by means of its two dimensions and four ends, and a line by means of its two dimensions
15 and two ends. Similarly, a space is multiplied or increases in proportion to the dimensions and ends of its occupant. Likewise, time is increased by means of its ends which are the moments (ānāt) of time that designate those ends. This is similar to the points that indicate the two ends of a line.

Moreover, the One may be said of anything whose parts are similar. Such a thing is indivisible because whatever is separated from it retains the same definition and name. But this also is subject to multiplicity even though it is not divisible (in the real
20 sense). In other words, everything is permanently susceptible to division.

Reference may also be made to what is indivisible actually or potentially, for such a division would result in the loss of its essence. An illustration of this is "the One man" or man as a unity, such as Muhammad and Sa'īd, and "the One horse," as 'al-rā'id' (the explorer) and 'dhū al-'iqāl' (the one with the hobbled hoofs). The

158 same may be said of all natural individual things that have magnitudes,
 as well as of accidental things and of species, genus, differentia,
 property, common accident. If any of these is divided it ceases to
 be what it is (lam yakun huwa mā huwa). But it is multiple by virtue
 of its components and its constant differentiation. All these may
 also be described as partaking of unity, for each constitutes a
 continuity.

5 The One is ascribed to that which cannot be divided into anything
 else. That which is indivisible because it is not continuous applies
 to two things: First, that which is not continuous, not compound,
 and has nothing in common with other things. An example of this is
 the numerical One (al-wāḥid al-'adadi) which is not a continuous
 entity. In other words, it has dimensions and ends. But the fact is
 that it is a continuous thing and is indeed indivisible and indiscrete
 (lā munfaṣil). At the same time, it is also multiple with respect to
 its components which we can count. This numerical One is the measure
 10 of all things. The other thing (that is indivisible because it is not
 continuous) is the vocal letters (ḥurūf al-aṣwāt) which are not
 continuous. The causes which render the numerical One indivisible
 cannot be set forth. The numerical One is a measure for the vocal
 utterances only.

The One is a designation that is said of that which is indivisible.
 It cannot be divided because it has no part that has any resemblance

to it or to anything else. It is also common. Whatever has this
 15 quality may be one of two kinds. The first of these is circumstantial
 (lahu waḍ') such as the point of a line which constitutes its end.
 It has no parts because it represents the termination of one dimension,
 and the end of a dimension is not a dimension itself. On the other
 hand, this termination of the line is multiple by reason of being
 subject to past and future and by being common to both.

The designation One is also applied to that which as a total
 entity (kulliyyah) cannot be divisible. When one says 'One pound,'
 for instance, it is implied that it ceases to be 'One pound' the
 moment a portion is separated from it, that is, from the total
 quantity of the pound. In other words, the 'One pound' would no longer
 20 be a whole, It is for this reason that the One may be more appropriate-
 ly ascribed to a circumference (khaṭṭ al-dā'irah) than to any other
 line because a circumference is a complete whole. The circumference
 contains the whole circle perfectly and is a complete whole. Whatever
 159 is constituted in this manner is also multiple by virtue of its
 differentiation. Among the things to which the One may be applied
 as a designation, it is the indivisible which is the most qualified
 to have Unity ascribed to it.

Our discussion has elucidated the fact that the One may be
 One essentially or accidentally. The term One may be used in an
 accidental sense as in a common name, synonyms or a designation that

5 contains many accidents. This may be illustrated by saying: the
 writer and the orator are One, whether the reference is to one specific
 man or to man in general; or the man and the writer are One and so on.
 On the other hand, if the One is used in an essential sense, it would
 apply to all the things mentioned above which partake of unity. This
 is so because in essence they are One, that is, they have the same
 substance in common. The essential may be differentiated primarily
 by continuity when it is a substance, by form when it is a species,
 by name when it is both substance and form, or by genus when it is
 10 continuity.

That which is One by virtue of its continuity is One either by
 substance or by amalgamation (ribāṭ). This is called One in number
 or shape. That which is One in form applies to things which have the
 same definition. That which is One in genus refers to things whose
 predicates are identical. Things which have the same name are,
 therefore, equal and necessarily One. Things which are One by reason
 of their equality (musawāt) are the things that have One common relation
 15 such as medical things which are all related to medicine.

Each of these things we have just mentioned, namely, that which
 constitutes Oneness in number, form, genus and relation follows (with
 respect to unity and plurality) that which precedes rather than that
 which follows it (in the order indicated). In other words, if a thing
 is One in number, it would be also One in form; and if it is One in

form, it would be also One in genus; and if it is One in genus,
 it would be also One in relation. On the other hand, if a thing
 20 is One in relation, it would not necessarily be One in genus; and
 if it is One in genus, it would not necessarily be One in form;
 and if it is One in form, it would not necessarily be One in number.

160 It has thus been established that over against unity stands
 plurality. Plurality characterizes all the varieties of existences.
 A thing is said to be multiple either because it is not continuous,
 that is, discrete (munfaṣil) or because its substance is divisible
 into forms or its forms into genus or relation. The fact has also
 been elucidated that individual existence (ḥuwiyyah) applies to
 anything that owes its being to the One. Individual existence,
 5 therefore, is a designation of all that owes its identity to the
 various forms of the One.

It has so far been proven that the True One (alwāḥid al-ḥaqq)
 is not one of the intelligibles (al-ma'qūlāt). It is neither substance,
 genus, species, individual, differentia, property, common accident,
 motion, soul, intellect, whole, part, all, few nor is it related
 to anything else. The True One is the Absolute One (wāḥid mursal).
 10 It is immune to multiplicity. It is not compound and is not 'many'.
 It is not identical with any of the existences mentioned above even
 though they partake of unity in one form or another. Whatever is
 is implied in their names does not apply to the True One. All the

things we have enumerated are the simplest (absat) manifestations of the True One or, more correctly, its simplest descriptions, and an intensified form (of their unity) would not constitute the True One. It follows that the True One is void of matter, form, quantity, quality, relation and cannot be described by any other category. It

15 has no genus, differentia and is not individual, property, common accident or in motion. It simply eludes any description that would negate its being truly One. Consequently, the True One is solely Absolute Oneness (wahdah mahd). In other words, it is nothing but pure Unity. Any unity other than the True One is necessarily multiple.

161 Therefore, unity which is accidental in all things is other than the True One as we have shown before.

The True One is the One-itself, the One in essence which never partakes of plurality in any way. It is indivisible in any manner within itself or with respect to anything else. The True One is not time, space, subject, predicate, whole, part, substance or accident.

5 It is immune to any form of division or multiplicity. The unity found in all other existences is not identical with it. This unity is accidental, and whatever exists accidentally in things has its cause elsewhere. For whatever is found in things exists accidentally or essentially. Nothing can be infinite in actuality. The First Cause (awwal 'illah) of the unity which is found in all individual things is the True One whose unity is not derived from any other source (than itself). For the cause-effect sequence cannot

- 10 be infinite at its inception. Thus the cause of unity in all individual beings and things is the Primary True One (al-wāḥid al-ḥaqq al-awwal). Anything that receives unity from a source other than itself is an effect (ma'lūl). All Oneness other than that of the True One is metaphorical and not real Oneness. The source of Unity in all objective existences is outside their own being. This implies that its plurality is not self-caused, for it is a fact that each existent is multiple and is not absolutely One or is not Unity in the absolute sense. The Absolute One never partakes of plurality. Its Unity is nothing other than its own Being.
- 15 If unity and plurality exist simultaneously in all sensory objects and anything that is related to them, and if unity in all of these is an effect of a cause (athar min muathir), occurring in them by accident and not by nature, and, moreover, if plurality is nothing but the aggregate of unities (jamā'at waḥdāniyyāt), it follows as a matter of sheer necessity (iqtirāran) that without unity there could never be plurality. This leads to the conclusion that the coming into being of any plurality is brought about by unity.
- 162 Without unity, plurality cannot possibly have any existence. Therefore, every existent (mutahawwi) is an effect (infi'āl) that is brought into being out of non-being (mā lam yakun). Consequently, the emanation (fayḍ) of unity from the Primary True One is equivalent to the process of coming into being (tahawwī) of every sensory object (maḥsūs) and anything that is related to it. An individual thing

comes into being when it acquires unity. Thus the cause of generation is identical with the True One whose unity is not derived from
 5 any other source because its very essence is unity or oneness. The cause of Being cannot be non-Being, and that which is not non-Being (laysa lam yazal) must be a created thing (mubda'), namely, it owes its existence to a cause. Thus that which is brought into being is created. If the cause of coming into being is the Primary True One, it follows that the cause of creation ('llat al-ibdā') is the Primary True One. The cause which accounts for the beginning of motion or that by which motion is initiated, namely, the (First) Mover, is the Active Agent (al-fā'il). Consequently, The Primary True One, being the cause which sets the process of generation into motion which is the effect, is itself the Creator (al-mubdi') of all that exists. There
 10 can be no existence (lā huwiyyah) without unity. In fact, acquiring unity (tawahḥud) and coming into being are the same thing. Unity is the backbone (qiwām) of all that exists. The disappearance of unity would mean the simultaneous (ma'ān) and immediate (bilā zamān) obliteration of all existing beings and things. The True One is, therefore, the Primary Creator (al-awwal al-mubdi') and Sustainer (al-mumsik) of all that He has created. Without His sustenance (imsāk) and power every existent would disintegrate.

As we have set out to do, we have explicated the distinctions between the types of unity for the purpose of shedding light on the nature of the True One, the (First) Cause and Creator, the

powerful Sustainer, as well as to understand unity in the metaphorical
15 sense. Such a unity is derived from the True One, may He be exalted
far above the descriptions of the unbelievers.

We shall continue our discussion with what would naturally
follow. This we shall attempt to do through the support of Him whose
perfect Will is all-powerful and whose gracious bounty is inexhaustible.

N O T E S

INTRODUCTION

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- 3 Wilhelm Windelband, A History of Philosophy, trans. by James H. Tufts (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1901), p. 215
- 4 Bertold Spuler, "Hellenistisches Denken im Islam," Saeculum 5 (1954), p. 181
- 5 Ludwig Stein, "Das erste Auftreten der griechischen Philosophie unter den Arabern," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, VII, p. 352
- 6 Ibid., p. 353
- 7 William Muir, The Caliphate, ed. by T. M. Weir (Edinburgh, 1924), p. 486
(London, 1891)
- 8 Ibid., p. 508f
- 9 Carl Brockelmann, History of the Islamic Peoples, trans. by Joel Carmichael and Moshe Perlmann (New York: Capricorn Books Edition, 1960), p. 126
- 10 Ibid., p. 126
- 11 Ibid., p. 126
- 12 Cf. S. D. Goitein, Studies in Islamic History and Institutions (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1966), p. 67
- 13 H. A. R. Gibb, Mohammedanism (New York: Oxford University Press - Galaxy Edition, 1962), p. 3f
- 14 Koran 6:126
- 15 Koran 10:100
- 16 Koran 13:27; 16:95; 74:34
- 17 Koran 41:17

- 18 Koran 18:29
- 19 Koran 41:16
- 20 Cf. Article on Kadar (decree) and bibliographical references in the Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 200
- 21 A. J. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed (Cambridge, 1932), p. 53
- 22 Alfred Guillaume, Islam (Penguin Edition, 1954), p. 112
- 23 Wensinck, The Muslim Creed, p. 38
- 24 W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Surveys I: Islamic Philosophy and Theology (Edinburgh: The Edinburgh University Press, 1962), p. 31f
- 25 Gibb, Mohammedanism, p. 112
- 26 W. Montgomery Watt, Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 63
- 27 Koran 2: 286
- 28 Koran 22:10
- 29 Guillaume, Islam, p. 131; cf. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed, p. 62
- 30 Quoted by Wensinck, The Muslim Creed, p. 62f (from al-Shahrastani, kitab al-milal wal-nihal, I, p. 30).
- 31 Ibid., p. 63
- 32 Ibid., p. 75
- 33 Koran 85:22
- 34 Koran 43:3
- 35 Al-Kindi's full name is Abu Yusuf Ya'qūb ibn Ishāq al-Kindi. Medieval Arab biographers elaborate on the geneological background of al-Kindi and are in general agreement concerning his descent, but they are silent about the exact date and place of his birth as well as about the year of his death.
- 36 Gustav Flügel states, on the authority of al-Nawai (born 1233 A.D.), the Shāfi'i jurist and traditionalist, that al-Ash'ath, upon his return to Yemen and after the death of Muhammad, deserted Islam. Thereupon, Abu Bakr, the first Chaliph, sent his troupes and subjugated him. Al-Ash'ath

- 53 Abu Rīdah, Rasā'il al-Kindi al-falsafiyyah (al-Kindi's Philosophical Essays), Vol. I (Cairo, 1950), p. 162
- 54 Al-Mu'tasim who ruled from 833 to 842 A.D. was al-Ma'mun's brother and successor and, like him, subscribed to the Mu'tazilite doctrinal position. The fact that al-Kindi, at the opening of his Treatise on First Philosophy, addresses and dedicates this important work to al-Mu'tasim may be regarded, as Dr. Richard Walzer has shown (Greek into Arabic, p. 176), as "external evidence" of al-Kindi's theological kinship to the Mu'tazilites. It is possible that Part I of this metaphysical work was written during the last years of al-Mu'tasim's reign and that the opposition of the succeeding caliph, al-Mutawakkil, to the Mu'tazilites might have made al-Kindi abandon his plans to write Part II because of the danger to his life this would have entailed.
- 55 Abu Rīdah, op. cit. p. 97. Al-Kindi's description of philosophy as an art (ṣinā'at) and his definition of it as the knowledge of things as they are ('ilm al-ashyā' bi-haqāiqihā) are in line with the Hellenistic tradition which gave to philosophy the practical meaning of an art, based upon scientific principles (Cf. Seneca, Epistle 89). The Arabic term 'ilm has a wider connotation than the English word 'knowledge.' With the advent of Greek philosophy in the Islamic world, 'ilm acquired the meaning of 'scientific' and thus it is more akin to the German term Wissenschaft. The definition of philosophy as 'ilm of things as they are, therefore, must be understood to signify the methodical work of thought through which we come to know reality. In his Treatise "On the definitions and Descriptions of Things," al-Kindi lists six definitions of philosophy that were known to the ancients (al-qudamā'): (a) Love of wisdom, (b) Imitation of God in His works for the purpose of attaining perfection in virtue, (c) Elimination of lusts, (d) Self-knowledge, (f) Knowledge of eternal, universal things - their existences, substances and causes (Abu Rīdah, op. cit. p. 172f). Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1005b 6f where philosophy is conceived as the study of the nature of all substances.
- 56 Abu Rīdah, op. cit. 97
- 57 Ibid., p. 97. Al-Kindi's division of philosophy into theory ('ilm) and practice ('amal) appears also at the beginning of his Treatise "On the Five Substances" which has come down to us in its Latin translation "liber de quinque essentitis." (Professor Abu Rīdah has included this work and an Arabic retranslation of it in Vol. II of Rasā'il al-Kindi al-falsafiyyah, p. 8ff). In this work, al-Kindi states that the division of philosophy into theoretical and practical corresponds to the division of the sōul into mind and senses, thought and sensation (op. cit. p. 8). Cf. Franz Rosenthal, "From Arabic Books and Manuscripts, VI," Journal of the American Oriental Society,

Vol. 76 (1956), pp. 27-31. In this article, Dr. Rosenthal quotes a brief statement by al-Kindi "On Theory and Practice" (al-'ilm wa-al-'amal) which appears in a MS. in Istanbul (kitāb al-Mūsīqī by Hasan Ibn Ahmad Ibn 'Alī al-Kālib). After stating that "theory and practice are the beginning of virtues" (awwal al-fadā'il), al-Kindi goes on to divide 'theory' ('ilm) into the physical, mathematical and theological divisions, and 'practice' ('amal) into ethics, economics and politics. The theoretical subdivisions, as Dr. Rosenthal has pointed out, correspond to the well-known Aristotelian classification of the sciences (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1026a 19). The practical subdivisions appear in the later Aristotelian literature but not in Aristotle's own writings.

58 Al-Kindi seems to be in disagreement here with Aristotle who considered theoretical contemplation (theoria) as the highest and noblest activity of man. However, the distinction in objectives between "theoretical" and "practical" knowledge which al-Kindi stresses echoes Aristotle's statement that "the end of theoretical knowledge is truth, while that of practical knowledge is action" (Metaphysics 993b 20f).

59 Abu Rīdah, op. cit. p. 97. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 993b 23 where it is said that "we do not know a truth without its cause," and 994b 30-31 "For we think we know only when we have ascertained the causes. Cf. also Posterior Analytics 71b 9-12, 94a 20.

60 Abu Rīdah, op. cit. p. 98

61 Ibid., p. 101

62 Ibid., p. 101. Aristotle discusses these four causes or inquiries in his Metaphysics 1013a 24f. Cf. also Posterior Analytics, Book II, 89b 21-26 and 94a 21-23.

63 Ibid., p. 101

64 Ibid., p. 103

65 Ibid., p. 102. This is basically Aristotle's attitude. Cf. Metaphysics 993a 31ff

66 Ibid., p. 104

67 Ibid., p. 104

68 Ibid., p. 103. This procedure is reminiscent of Aristotle (Metaphysics).

69 Ibid., p. 104

70 Ibid., p. 104

71 Ibid., p. 105

- 72 Ibid., p. 105. According to Richard Walzer ("The Rise of Islamic Philosophy," Oriens, Vol. 3 (1950), p. 9), this argument of the inescapable necessity to use philosophical knowledge has its origin in Aristotle's lost work Protrepticus which was imitated in the Hortensius of Cicero. This work, in turn, influenced St. Augustine's religious development. The same argument was used in similar circumstances by Clement of Alexandria (Strom. VI, 18 (p. 515, 31ff. Stählin). Cf. M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa (Göttingen, 1948), p. 415; II (1949), p. 200. Cf. also Aristotle's concept of "the necessary," (Metaphysics 1015a 20-1015b 16).
- 73 Abu Rīdah, op. cit. p. 105. Al-Kindi must be referring here to the adherents of rival religions, particularly the Manichaeans and the Christians. Cf. Ibn al-Nadīm, Fihrist No. 167-169; T. J. de Boer, "Kindi wider die Trinität," Orientalische Studien: Festschrift für Theodor Noeldeke, Giessen (1906), Vol. I, pp. 279-281; and Yahya Ibn 'Adi's Reply to al-Kindi (al-radd 'ala al-Kindi) in defense of the doctrine of the Trinity (in Arabic), MS. Vat. Arabo, 123 and 127, pp. 99-110, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Rome.
- 74 Abu Rīdah, op. cit. p. 106. Al-Kindi is most probably the only Muslim philosopher who uses the term "wujūd" to signify 'cognition' and 'knowing'. The word is derived from the root 'wajada,' 'to find'. Thus "wujūd" has the connotation of 'finding' (Cf. the Arabic dictionary al-munjid which states that 'wajada' (to find) is also used to connote 'alima (to know)). The later Muslim philosophers use 'wujūd' for 'being' and 'existence' as well as the 'universe.' To determine whether al-Kindi identifies 'existence' and 'cognition,' in the Berkeleyian sense (For George Berkeley, "to be is to be perceived," esse is percipi - cf. his Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge - 1710 - sec. 33) would require further study of al-Kindi's epistemology. 'Al-wujūd al-burhānī' (Abu Rīdah, op. cit. p. 111) is used by al-Kindi to signify 'demonstrative knowledge.'
- 75 Abu Rīdah, op. cit. p. 107
- 76 Ibid., p. 107
- 77 Ibid., p. 107
- 78 Ibid., p. 108ff
- 79 Richard Kroner, Speculation and Revelation in Modern Philosophy (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1961), p. 173ff, 194ff.
- 80 Abu Rīdah, op. cit. p. 107

- 81 Ibid., p. 109
- 82 Ibid., p. 109f. Al-Kindi's argument in refutation of the existence of the Void does not differ from that of Aristotle's dealing with the same problem in his Physics, Book IV, Section B (213a-214b). That space is not perceived by sense but by the mind is an argument that appears in Plato's Timaeus (B. Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato, New York: Random House, 1937, p. 32). Cf. also Raphael Demos, "The Receptacle," Philosophical Review, Vol. XLV (1936), p. 535ff.
- 83 Abu Rīdah, op. cit. p. 106. Cf. Aristotle's De Anima, Book III, Sections 3, 8 (427b 27-429a 9 and 431b 20-432a 13).
- 84 Ibid., p. 108
- 85 Ibid., p. 110
- 86 Ibid., p. 112
- 87 Ibid., pp. 353-362, 293-311
- 88 Ibid., p. 295ff. Imagination is considered by al-Kindi as a secondary source of cognition. It receives the images of sense perception and deposits them in the memory for eventual use by the mind. The imagination also registers the mental images of the mind and stores them in the memory. The recollective function of the imagination consists of reproducing both the sensory and mental images from the memory and placing them at the disposal of the mind for its organizing and synthesizing work. What al-Kindi says about the nature of dreaming as a form of symbolic thinking and about the interpretation of dreams might be of interest to psychoanalysis.
- 89 In order to understand the place and importance of intuition as a source of knowledge we must turn to al-Kindi's "Treatise on the Quantity of Aristotle's Books and what is required for the attainment of Philosophy" (kammiyyat kutub Aristutālīs wa-ma yuhtāju fi taḥṣīl al-falsafah), Abu Rīdah, op. cit. pp. 372-376. Here he seems to conceive of intuition as a radar-like function of the mind that is capable of receiving hidden realities (al-umūr al-khafiyyah al-ḥaqiqiyah), that is, transcendental truth. The context in which al-Kindi deals with this matter is quite significant. Into the survey of the Aristotelean syllabus as it existed then, he injects rather abruptly a discussion on the fundamental distinction between the "human sciences" (al-'ulūm al-insāniyyah) and "divine knowledge" or theology (al-'ilm al-ilāhi), the distinction, in other words, between philosophic and religious knowledge. The former, as exemplified by the works of Aristotle, al-Kindi points out, is attained through

systematic investigation and deliberate effort (talab wa-takalluf). Much of religious knowledge, he goes on to say, is attained by reason but only through a long and weary detour of philosophic inquiry. There are, however, certain transcendental truths of religion which the mind can neither reach nor comprehend. These truths are apprehended by intuition and without strenuous research and time-consuming methods (bila talab wa-la takalluf wa-la bihīlah bashariyyah wa-la zamān). But this avenue of cognition is not open to all, according to al-Kindi. It is limited to the prophets whose religious knowledge is communicated to them without the human devices (hiyal) of logic and mathematics and is received directly and immediately. The conditions which the prophets must meet to qualify and prepare for the receptivity of these hidden truths are not intellectual but moral and spiritual, namely, the purification (tathīr) and illumination (inārah) of their souls. But this preparatory process takes place through God's support (ta'yīd) and help (tasdīd) and by inspiration (ilhām) and messages (rasā'il). Al-Kindi cites two tenets of Islam which confronted the Greek mind with insurmountable difficulties, namely, the resurrection of the body and the creation of the world out of nothing. Certainty about such truths, he stresses, is directly imparted by God to the minds of the prophets.

90 Abu Rīdah, op. cit. p. 111

91 Ibid., p. 113. The term 'laysa' is a composite of 'lā' (not or none) and 'aysa' (to be, being). As Soheil Afnan says, al-Kindi has "a passionate attachment" to these terms, aysa and laysa and words that are derived from them such as aysiyyah, laysiyyah, ta'yīs, mu'ayyis and al-aysāt (Philosophical Terminology in Arabic and Persian, Leiden: E. J. Brill (1964), p. 97f). The first appearance of the root aysa is found in the Arabic translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics which was performed by Ustāth for al-Kindi (Soheil Afnan, op. cit. p. 97). Most probably, al-Kindi took the term from the Syriac ayth. Its use after al-Kindi was short-lived.

92 Abu Rīdah, op. cit. p. 116

93 Ibid., pp. 186-192

94 Ibid., pp. 194-198

95 Ibid., pp. 201-207

96 Ibid., p. 117. Cf. Richard McKeon, The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941), Physics 219b 2. Al-Kindi does not give the definition in its entirety and omits the words "in respect of 'before' and 'after'." Cf. also Aristotle's Metaphysics 986a 17 where reference is made to the Pythagoreans with respect to their theory of numbers.

- 97 Abu Rīdah, op. cit. pp. 214-237. This important Treatise opens with the teleological argument for the existence of God. In the phenomenal world we see the evidence (*dalālah*) for the planned designing of a First Designer (*tadbīr mudabbir awwal*). In the course of his discussion, al-Kindi refers a few times to his First Philosophy and identifies God as *al-Inniyyat al-Haqq* (the True Being or True Existence) who is never non-being but is always Being (p. 215). God is also called *al-Hayy al-Wāhid* (the Living One) who is never plurality. He is also *al'illat al-Ūlah* (the First Cause), the Efficient and Final Cause as well as the Creator of all things *ex nihilo* (*al-mu'ayyis al-kull 'an laysa*) (p. 215, 219). Only at the very end of his "Treatise on First Philosophy," al-Kindi equates the First Cause with the True One (*al-wāhid al-haqq*), Abu Rīdah, op. cit. p. 161. He is the Primary Cause of Creation and motion (p. 162). In his essay "On the First, True, Perfect Agent and on the imperfect (one) that is an agent only metaphorically" (*al-fā'il al-haqq al-awwal, al-tāmm wa-mā al-fā'il al-nāqis alladhi huwa bi-al-majāz*), he identifies the First Cause as the Creator (*al-mubdi'*), the exalted One (p. 183).
- 98 Abu Rīdah, op. cit. p. 118f
- 99 *Ibid.*, p. 120. There is no general agreement as to the origin of the term *inniyyah*. Abu al-Baqā', in his work *al-kulliyyat* (The Universals), Cairo, 1903, p. 76, derives the word from *inna*, the Arabic particle of emphasis which stresses the actual existence of an object. Some mystics pronounced the word *aniyyah* and derived it from *ana*, the first person singular. This is what 'Abd al-Karīm al-Djili (died about 1417 A.D.) does in his book *al-Insān al-kāmil fi ma'rifat al-awākhir wa-al-awā'il* (The Perfect Man as conceived by Modern and Ancient People), chapter 27. In line with this, Muhammad Iqbāl in *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia* (p. 153) translates the term "I-ness." Dr. Abd al-Rahmān Badawī, who pronounces the word *āniyah*, is of the opinion that it is the arabization of the Greek term *ἐἶναι* (to be). As Abu Rīdah has convincingly shown (op. cit. p. 98f), this is not likely and the resemblance of terms is only coincidental. T. J. de Boer believes that the word *āniyah* represents the Platonic "being" or "existence" (*οὐσία, ὅν*) as the highest category but that it takes its name from the Aristotelian "thatness" (*ὅτι*), existence as distinguished from the "whatness" (Arabic: *māhiyyah*) (*The Encyclopedia of Islam*, Supplement 1938, E. J. Brill, Leiden & Luzac, p. 24f). The plural *inniyyāt* is used by al-Kindi to signify 'individual created being and things' (Abu Rīdah, op. cit. p. 97). Since al-Fārābī, the words *wujūd* and *mawjūd* were used in philosophical language to denote "being" and "existing."
- 100 Abu Rīdah, op. cit. p. 121f
- 101 *Ibid.*, p. 123

- 102 Ibid., p. 124
- 103 Ibid., p. 124
- 104 Ibid., p. 125
- 105 Ibid., p. 125
- 106 Ibid., p. 126
- 107 J. Obermann, "Das Problem der Kausalität bei den Arabern," (Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, Vol. 29 - 1915), p. 325
- 108 Abu Rīdah, op. cit. p. 162
- 109 Ibid., pp. 127-131
- 110 Ibid., p. 128
- 111 Ibid., p. 132
- 112 Ibid., pp. 133-136
- 113 Ibid., pp. 136-140
- 114 Ibid., p. 140. Al-Kindi's highly formalized dialectical argument is reminiscent of Plato's Parmenides which ends with what has been called the 'portentous conclusion' that "whether one is or is not, one and the others (the many) in relation to themselves and one another, all of them, in every way, are and are not, and appear to be and appear not to be." (B. Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato, p. 140)
- 115 Abu Rīdah, op. cit. 142
- 116 Ibid., p. 143. Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, VI, 9: "The One is not absent from anything, and yet it is separated from all things, so that it is present and yet not present with them." Dr. Richard Walzer is probably right in his contention that "al-Kindi has his ultimate philosophical roots in the Athenian school of Proclus" (Greek into Arabic, Harvard University Press, 1962, p. 202), although it is not possible at the present to determine the connecting link. The fact that al-Kindi accepts the validity of astrology, says Walzer, places him in the vicinity of the same Neoplatonic trend which has its source in Proclus. Cf. E. R. Dodds, Proclus, The Elements of Theology, Oxford 1933, p. 107 ff.
- 117 Abu Rīdah, op. cit. pp. 143-146
- 118 Ibid., pp. 146-151
- 119 Ibid., p. 149
- 120 Ibid., p. 153

- 121 Ibid., p. 154
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- 123 Ibid., p. 160
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- 127 Ibid., p. 162
- 128 Ibid., p. 162
- 129 Ibid., p. 358
- 130 Julius Guttman, Philosophies of Judaism (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964), p. 29
- 131 Ibid., p. 63
- 132 Richard Walzer, "The Rise of Islamic Philosophy." Oriens, Vol. 3 (1950), p. 5
- 133 M. M. Sharif, op.cit. p. 454ff
- 134 Muhsin Mahdi, Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle (trans. with Introduction) (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Division of the Macmillan Company, 1962), p. 44f
- 135 Abu Rīdah, op. cit. 155f, pp. 353-358
- 136 Ibid., p. 354ff
- 137 Enneads, I, 2, 5
- 138 Wilhelm Windelband, A History of Philosophy (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1901), trans. by James H. Tufts, p. 462
- 139 Abu Rīdah, op. cit. pp. 353-358
- 140 Richard Kroner, Speculation in Pre-Christian Philosophy (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1956), p. 181
- 141 Windelband, op. cit. p. 236f
- 142 Apology, I, 61ff

- 143 Enneads, V, 9, 6
- 144 Enneads, V, 3
- 145 Philippus Villiers Pistorius, Plotinus and Neoplatonism (Cambridge: Bowes & Bowes, 1952), p. 4
- 146 Enneads, V, 5, 2
- 147 Michael E. Marmura and John M. Rist, "Al-Kindi's Discussion of Divine Existence and Oneness." Mediaeval Studies, Vol. 25 (1963), p. 347f
- 148 Abu Rīdah, op. cit. p. 135
- 149 B. Jowett (trans.), The Dialogues of Plato (Random House, New York, 1937), Vol. II, Philebus, p. 346
- 150 Ibid., p. 348
- 151 Ibid., p. 355f
- 152 Ibid., p. 359
- 153 Ibid., p. 347
- 154 Philippus V. Pistorius, op. cit. p. 2, 17
- 155 Abu Rīdah, op. cit. pp. 363-384
- 156 Saadia b. Joseph, kitāb al-amānāt wa-al-i'tiqadāt (Book of Beliefs and Opinions), Arabic Text (edited by S. Landauer), p. 63f
- 157 Bahya ibn Pakuda, kitāb al-hidāyah ilā farā'id al-qulūb (Book of Guidance to the Duties of the Heart), Arabic Text (edited by A. S. Yahuda), 56
- 158 Ibid., p. 63
- 159 Moses Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed (hidāyat al-ḥā'irīn). Munk's Arabic edition. Vol. II, p. 25
- 160 Julius Guttman, op. cit. p. 165
- 161 Abu Rīdah, op. cit. 168 (definition of 'irādah - Will), 252
- 162 For the possible dependence of al-Kindi on John Philoponus in this respect Cf. Richard Walzer, Greek into Arabic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 190ff

- 163 Al-Fārābī, Risālah fi Ārā' Ahl al-Madīnat al-Fāḍilah (Essay on the Opinions of the Noble City), Leiden, 1895, pp. 5-10
- 164 Ibid., pp. 58-59
- 165 Al-Fārābī excelled as a political philosopher and was greatly influenced in this respect by Plato's Republic. His interest in political theory was stimulated by the pressing problems of his times particularly concerning the khilāfah (succession) and the ideal ruler. In his work, quoted in the preceding notes, al-Fārābī discusses the characteristics of the ideal state and the necessity of its being ruled by the philosopher-king.
- 166 Simon van den Bergh, Averroes' Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954). In this work we find the substance of al-Ghazālī's arguments which Averroes (Ibn Rushd) states and attempts to refute.
- 167 Ibid., p. xi
- 168 M. M. Sharif, op. cit. p. 427
- 169 Al-Kindi wrote a "Treatise on the Definitions and Descriptions of Things" (Risālah fi ḥudūd al-ashyā' wa-rusūmihā), Abu Rīdah, op. cit. pp. 353-358, which deals essentially with philosophical terms. Cf. S. M. Stern, "Notes on al-Kindi's Treatise on Definitions," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1959), pp. 32-43.
- 170 Richard Walzer, "The Rise of Islamic Philosophy," p. 10
- 171 Ibid., p. 10. Another work through which Neo-Platonic thought reached the Arabs was the pseudo-Aristotelian De causis, an abridgment of Proclus' Elements of Theology (Richard Walzer, Greek into Arabic, p. 9, 209 note 2).

A GLOSSARY OF PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS

آتي الزمان	the future
أثر	effect
مؤثر	cause
إتلاف	assimilation, coordination, harmony
الدَّائِي	the eternal
إِيَّة	existence, being
الدَّوَالِ الْعَقْلِيَّة	<u>a priori</u> , rational or first principles
أيس	to bring into being, to create, generate
تأسيس ، أَيْسِيَّة	generation, creation
أَيَّْةُ الشَّيْءِ	what a thing is, identity
تباين	disparity, difference
بَحْث (أبحاث)	research, investigation, inquiry, study
بَحْث	chance
إبداع	bringing something out of nothing, creation <u>ex nihilo</u>
المبتدع	the Creator
بدعة	innovation
تبدل	transformation, exchange
برهان	demonstration, proof
برهان حسي	empirical evidence
بسيط	simple
بطلان	invalidity, nullity
بعد	dimension, distance
بين	prove, delineate, explicate

تَمَام	perfection, completion
مَتَمِّم	perfecting, final (cause)
ثَبَات	constancy, permanence, stability
تَثْبِيْت	substantiation, confirmation, proving
إِسْتِثْنَاء	exception
جِسْم (اجْزَام)	body, corporeal object
جُزْءٌ ، جُزْئِي (اجْزَاء)	part, particular
مُجْزِئ	divisible
جِسْم (اَجْسَام)	body, organism
جِسْم الكُل	the all, totality of being, cosmos
جَامِع	integrative, collective
الْجَوَامِغُ الْفِكْرِيَّةُ	discursive reasoning
جَوْهَر (جَوَاهِر)	substance, essence
مُجَازِي	metaphorical
مُحَال	impossible, illogical
لَا مُحَالَة	inevitable
إِسْتِحَالَة	transformation, alteration
مُجَّة (مُجْج)	proof, argument
حَدَّ (حُدُود)	definition
مُحْدُود	definite, finite
حَرَكَة (حَرَكَات)	motion, movement
حَرَكَة مَكَائِيَّة	locomotion
الْمُحَرِّك	the mover
الْحِسَّ	sensation
الْمُحْسُوس (الْمُحْسُوسَات)	sensory object, perceptible

الحَقُّ	the truth
الحَقُّ الأوَّل	Primary Truth
الحَقِيقَةُ (الحَقَائِقُ)	reality, true nature (of things)
حِفْظُ	memorization, retention
الحَاوِظَةُ	memory
المَحْمُولُ	predicate, object
الاحْتِمَالُ (الاحتمالات)	contingency, possibility
خَاصَّةٌ	property
الْخَلَاءُ	the void, empty space
الْخَلَاءُ الْمُطْلَقُ	the absolute void
خُلْفٌ	contradiction, inconsistency
إِخْتِلَافٌ	contrariety, the opposite
دَائِمٌ	continuous, permanent, constant
إِذْرَاكٌ	realization, comprehension, apprehension
دَهْرٌ	time, eternity, destiny
ذَاتٌ	essence, self; essential, intrinsic
ذَاتِي (غَيْرِ ذَاتِي)	essential (non-essential, contingent)
رَأْيٌ (أَرَاءُ)	opinion, view, notion, proposal
رُبُوبِيَّةٌ	divinity, lordship
عِلْمُ الرُّبُوبِيَّةِ	theology, religious knowledge
مُرَادِفٌ (مُتَرَادِفَاتٌ)	synonymous
مُرْسَلٌ	absolute
رَسْمٌ (رُسُومٌ)	description, image
مُرَكَّبٌ	compounded, composite, complex
تَرْكِيبٌ (تَرْكَيبٌ)	compound, composition

رُكْن (أَرْكَان)	basic element, constituent
رَفْزِي	symbolic, representative
الرِّيَاضِيَّات	mathematics
زَمَان (اِزْمَان)	time
بَدَ زَمَان	immediate, instant
زَوَال	disappearance, cessation, vanishing
لَمْ يَزَلْ	eternal, permanent
سَاكِن	at rest, motionless
مُسَاوَاة ، تَسَاوِي	equality, equivalence
شَبِيهِ	similar
شَرْط (شَرَاْطُ)	condition, provision
إِشْتِرَاك	participation, having in common
شَخْص (اشْخَاص)	individual, particular, specific
شَكْل (اشْكَال)	shape, form
الصِّدْق	truthfulness
مُصَدَّق	verified, established, proven
صَوْرَة	form
مُصَوَّرَة	imagination
التَّصَوُّر	conceptualization, abstraction
الِإِضَافَة	correlation, relation
مُضَاف	correlated, relative
ضِدّ	opposite, contrary
ضَرُورَة	necessity
اِضْمِحْدَال	disintegration, dissolution
طَبِيعَة	nature, reality

بِالطَّبْعِ	by nature, inherent, intrinsic
عِلْمُ الطَّبِيعِيَّاتِ	physics
عِلْمٌ مَا فَوْقَ الطَّبِيعَةِ	first philosophy, metaphysics
مَطْلُوبٌ (مَطْلُوبَاتٌ)	problem, inquiry
ظَنٌّ	assumption, belief
عَدَمٌ	non-being, nonexistence, nothingness
عَارِضٌ (اعراض)	accident, contingency
عَرَضِيٌّ	accidental, non-essential, contingent
مَعْرِفَةٌ	knowledge
عَظَمٌ	magnitude
العَقْلُ	intellect, mind, reason
العَقْلُ الْمُسْتَفَادُ	the acquired intellect
العَقْلُ الظَّاهِرُ	the apparent, visible or practical intellect
العَقْلُ بِالْقُوَّةِ	the potential intellect
العَقْلُ بِالْفِعْلِ	the active intellect
مَحْقُولٌ (مَحْقُولَاتٌ)	intelligible, comprehensible
العَكْسُ	the opposite, antithesis
عَكْسِيٌّ	antithetical, inverse
عِلَّةٌ (عِلَلٌ)	cause
العِلَّةُ الْأُولَى	first cause
العِلَّةُ الْغَضَرِيَّةُ	material cause
العِلَّةُ الصُّورِيَّةُ	formal cause
العِلَّةُ الْفَاعِلَةُ	efficient cause
العِلَّةُ الْمَتَمِّمَةُ	final cause
عِلَّةٌ كَوْنَ ذَاتِهِ	the cause of itself, self-caused

مَحْلُول (مَعْلُولَات)	caused, effect
عِلْمُ الْأَشْيَاءِ بِحَقَائِقِهَا	knowledge of the nature of things, knowledge of things as they actually are
مَعْلُوم (مَعْلُومَات)	known, intelligible
تَعْلِيمِي	mathematical
عُنْصُر (عُنْصُرَات)	matter
مَعْنَى (مَعْنَاي)	meaning, connotation
مُتَغَايِر	mutable, changeable
غَيْرِيَّة	otherness, alterity
فَرَضَ	to assume
فُرُضَ (فُرُوض)	assumption, hypothesis
فَرَاغ	void, vacuum
فَرْق	difference, incongruity, disparity
مُفَرِّق	differentiative
فَسَاد	corruption, decay
فَضْل (فَضَائِل)	differentia
مَفْصُول	disconnected
فَاعِل	agent
بِالْفِعْلِ	in actuality
فَلَسَفَة	philosophy
الْفَلَسَفَة الْأُولَى	first philosophy, metaphysics
فَيْض	emanation, outflow
قَدَر	magnitude
مُقَدِّمَة (مُقَدِّمَات)	premise

قَمَعَ	refutation, disproof
قُوَّة (قُوَى)	faculty, force, potentiality
بِالْقُوَّة	in potentiality, potentially
إِقْنَاع	persuasion
قَوْل (أَقْوَال)	proposition, statement, hypothesis
مَقُول (مَقُولَات)	predicable
قَوِّم	to constitute
تَقْوِيم	constitution
قَوَام	existence, sustenance
كثرة	plurality, multiplicity
كثير	many
كُل ، كُلِّي (كُلِّيَّات)	whole, general, universal
كُون	coming into being, generation
كُون عَنْ لَيْسَ	creation <u>ex nihilo</u>
كَمَال	perfection, entelechy
كَمِّيَّة	quantity
كَمِّ	quantitative
كَيْفِيَّة	quality, modality, state
كَيْف	qualitative
إِلْتِبَاس	ambiguity, equivocation
لَا حَقَّة	consequence, aftereffect
لَيْسَ	non-being, nothing, nonexistence
مِثَال (أَمْثَلَة ، مِثْل)	image, picture, model
مِثَالِي	symbolical, allegorical, representative
مُتَمَاشٍ	similar, homogeneous, resembling

مُحْضَرٌ	absolute, pure, genuine
مُدَّةٌ	duration, interval
مُحْسِنٌ	sustainer, upholder
مَاضِي الزَّمَانِ	the past
مَكَانٌ (امْكِنَةٌ)	space, place
مُتَمَكِّنٌ (مُتَمَكِّنَاتٌ)	occupant
مُمْكِنٌ	possible, contingent
إِمْكَانٌ (امْكَانِيَّاتٌ)	possibility, contingency
المَلَأَ	occupied or filled space
مُحْتَنِعٌ	impossible, prohibited
مَائِيَّةٌ (مَائِيَّاتٌ)	essence, substance
مَاهِيَّةٌ (مَاهِيَّاتٌ)	essence, quiddity
نِحْلَةٌ (نِحْلٌ)	school of thought
نِسْبَةٌ (نِسَبٌ)	relation, proportion, affinity
نَظَرٌ	speculation
نَاطِرٌ (نَاطِرُونَ)	speculator, thinker
الْعِلْمُ النَّظَرِيُّ	the speculative science
النَّظَرُ التَّمْيِيزِيُّ	analytical speculation
نَفْيٌ	negation, nonentity
إِنْتِقَاضٌ	obliteration, disintegration
تَنَاقُضٌ (تَنَاقُضَاتٌ)	contradiction, inconsistency
نِهَايَةٌ	finitude, end
مُتَنَاهٍ	finite, definite, limited
بِدَ نِهَايَةٍ ، غَيْرُ مُتَنَاهٍ	infinity, limitless

نُوع (أَنْوَع)	species
هو	being, existing
لا هو	non-being, nothing, nonexisting
هُوِيَّة	existence, identity, he-ness, it-ness
تَهْوِيَّة أَيْسَ عَنْ لَيْسَ	coming into being out of nothing
وُجُوب	necessity
وَاجِب	necessary, imperative, duty
وجود	cognition, knowledge, universe
وجود الحواس	sense perception
وجود العقل	conception
الوَاحِدُ الْحَقُّ	the True One
وَحْدَةٌ (وَحْدَات)	unity, unit
وَحدَانِيَّة	oneness
الوَحْدَةُ الْحَقُّ	the True Unity
وَحدَةٌ مُخَصَّصَةٌ	pure or absolute unity
إِتِّحَاد	union, unification, amalgamation
إِيضَاح	delineation, elucidation
وَضْع (اَوْضَاع)	circumstance, position, convention
مَوْضُوع	subject
يَقِين	truth, certainty

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بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

وما توفيق إلا بالله

كتاب الكندي إلى المعتصم بالله

في الفلسفة الأولى

أطال الله بقاءك ! يا ابن ذرى السادات وعزى السعادات ، الذين من
استمسك بهديهم سعد في دار الدنيا ودار الأبد ؛ وزينتك بجميع ملابس الفضيلة ،
وطهرتك من جميع طبع ^(١) الرذيلة !

إن أعلى الصناعات الإنسانية منزلةً وأشرفها مرتبةً صناعةُ الفلسفة ، التي
حدّتها علم الأشياء بمقائقتها بقدر طاقة الإنسان ؛ لأن غرض الفيلسوف في علمه
إصابة الحق وفي عمله العمل بالحق ، لا الفعل سرمداً ، لإنا نمسك ، ويتصرّم
الفعل ، إذا انتهينا إلى الحق .

واسنأ نجد مطلوباتنا من الحق من غير علة ؛ وعلة وجود كل شيء وثباته
الحق ، لأن كل ماله إنسيّة ^(٢) له حقيقة ؛ فالحق اضطراباً موجود ، إذن ،
لإنسيّات موجودة .

(١) هذه الكلمة غير منقوطة في الأصل ، ومعناها بفتح الباء الدنس .

(٢) في الأصل انية دون شكل ولا مد ولا تشديد ؛ وهذا اصطلاح فلسفي قديم ، يُعرف
مدلوله ، وإن كان ضبطه بالشكل وأصله غير معروفين على التحقيق ؛ فإذا تابعتنا النسخة المطبوعة
الكتاب التعريفات للجرجاني وجدنا الكلمة مضبوطة هكذا : آنية ؛ وهي تدل عند الجرجاني
على الوجود العيني ، يعني المتحقق أمام الحس ، وذلك خصوصاً في مقابلة الماهية ، أعني ما يُعقل
من الشيء (راجع مادتي إنية وماهية في التعريفات للجرجاني) .

أما أصل هذا الاصطلاح فهو غامض ، وإن كان بعض مؤلفي العرب مثل أبي البقاء في كتابه
الكليات (ط . القاهرة ١٢٨١ هـ ص ٧٦) يقول إنه مشتق من إن التي تفيد في اللغة العربية
التأكيد وتقوية الوجود ؛ فالإنية ، إذن ، هي كون الشيء موجوداً وجوداً يستمد قوته من أنه
محسوس مشاهد . وربما بدا رأي أبي البقاء متكلفاً ؛ ولكننا نجد في لسان العرب (مادة إن)

وأشرف الفلسفة وأعلاها مرتبة الفلسفة الأولى ، أعنى علم الحق الأول الذى هو علة كل حق ؛ ولذلك يجب أن يكون الفيلسوف التام الأشرف هو المرء المحيط

== أنه بحسب رأى النحويين القدماء قد تكون فى كلمة إن هاء مضمرة ، وذلك فى مثل قول القرآن : « إن هذان لاسحران » ، على تقدير : « إنه هذان لاسحران » ، وذلك فى لغة بعض قبائل العرب . وقد يأتى بأن الضمير ، اجتزاء عن ذكر الشئ ، مثل قول ابن قيس الرقيات :

وقالسن : شب قد علا لك ، وقد كبرت ، فقلت : إنه

أى : إنه قد كان . ويقر أبو عبيد هذا على أنه « اختصار من كلام العرب يكفى منه بالضمير ، لأنه قد علم معناه » . وإذن فقد يكون الجواب عن سؤال السائل : هل كذا موجود ؟ أن قول باختصار : إنه ، أى إنه موجود ؛ فقد يجوز أنه قد صيغ من هذه الكلمة المصدر السماعى أعنى الإينية .

على أن الدكتور عبد الرحمن بدوى يعتبر أن رأى أبى البقاء تخطيط ، ويقول (كتاب الزمان الوجودى ص ٤ - ٥) : إن من الظاهر أن الكلمة العربية — وهو يختار أن يقرأها آتية — « تعريب دقيق » لمصدر الكينونة اليونانى (*εἶναι*) ، تنطق : *أَيْسَى* ، وتقابل *to be* الإنجليزية ، و *être* الفرنسية) ؛ ولكن الدكتور بدوى لم يبين لماذا اختير المصدر للتعريب ، مع أنه لا يبدو غالباً أن يكون صيغة لغوية محايدة ، وأنه ، حتى من حيث هو اصطلاح فلسفى فى الدلالة على الوجود ، غير مشهور ؛ ولا هو أبان كيفية التعريب ولا ذكر مراجع لذلك . ولا بد أن يتساءل الباحث لماذا يعرب المصدر الدال على الكينونة فى اليونانية ، وينسب إليه فى نفس الوقت على طريقة العرب ، من غير أن يكون تعريب المصدر أولاً أو تعريب كلمة أخرى تدل على الوجود خطوة أولى طبيعية . وأخيراً لماذا لم تعرب كلمات أخرى يونانية دالة على الوجود ؟ مثل : *ὄν* ، (تنطق : *أُون* ، ومعناها الوجود ، أو الموجود) ؛ ومثل *ὅν* (تنطق : *أُون* ، ومعناها السكان ، فهى اسم التفاعل من المصدر اليونانى) ؛ أو مثل *οὐσία* (تنطق : *أوزيا* = الماهية ، الجوهر . الموجود) ، على اختلاف معانى هذه الكلمات عند مختلف الفلاسفة .

وإذا كان العرب قد صاغوا كلمة *كُون* من *كان* ، أفلا يجوز أن الترجمين — إذا كان لابد من الرجوع إلى أصل أجنبى — قد أخذوا لفظ إينية من كلمة *ἦν* (تنطق : *إين*) اليونانية التى معناها فى اللغة اليونانية كان أو وجد ؟ وقد يكون هذا هو الأشبه بالصواب الذى قد يبرر ضبط الكلمة العربية : إينية ، بكسر الهمزة .

وإذا كان قد يخلل للانسان أن كلمة *εἶναι* اليونانية كان تعريبها من طريق *أَيْسَيْيَّة* ، ثم فالت الياء ألدأ وأدغمت فيها قبلها . فصار آتية ، فإن هذا كله أشبه بالتعسف والتكلف ، خصوصاً لأنه يؤدى إلى الالتباس بكلمة الآية التى هى نسبة إلى الآن الزمنى . ولا بد على كل حال من الرجوع إلى اللغة السريانية التى كان الترجمون يترجمون عنها فى الغالب ، لترى هل كان فى الاصطلاح القلدى السريانى لفظ يقابل الإينية فى لغة العرب .

== ولم يكن العرب بحاجة إلى تعريب كلمة تعبر عن الوجود ، خصوصاً وأنهم منذ العصر المبكر لمهدم بالفلسفة قد استعملوا لفظ *السكون* فى الدلالة على : (١) الوجود ، وعلى (٢) العالم فى مجموعته . وعلى (٣) وجود أو حدوث ما يوجد أو يحدث ، وعلى (٤) أحوال الموجود بالنسبة لداته والمكان ، وهذه الأحوال هى ماسمونه *الأكران* الأربعة ، أعنى الاجتماع والافتراق والحركة والسكون (راجع كتابنا عن إبراهيم الطام ص ١٣٥ وما بعدها ، ومادة *كون* عند الجرجاني فى تعريفاته ، ومقال هورتن عن معنى *السكون* من حيث هو اصطلاح فلسفى فى مجلة جماعة المستشرقين الألمان *Was bedeutet al-kaun als philosophischer Terminus ? Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlaendischen Gesellschaft*, Bd. 65, 539-549

والسكندى نفسه يستعمل لفظ *السكون* بمعنى الوجود أو الحدوث ، كما تدل على ذلك رسائله التى بين أيدينا ، خصوصاً عناون الرسائل التى تتناول مسائل طبيعية ، إذا صرفنا النظر عن استعماله لمعنى *السكون* فى مواضع كثيرة جداً من رسائله .

وإذن فقد كان للعرب مندوحة عن تعريب المصدر اليونانى الدال على الوجود ، لأنه كان عديم اللفظ العربى المقابل له والذى يسمح بصيغ مختلفة مثل : *كون* ، *كونية* ، *كائنية* ، *لاسيما* أن العرب كانوا حريصين على استعمال ألفاظ عربية ما أمكن . ويدل على ذلك الاصطلاحات التى يستعملها السكندى نفسه ، هذا إذا صرفنا النظر عن استعمالهم كلمات عربية صميعة فى الدلالة على بعض الأسماء والاصطلاحات اليونانية ، حتى قبل السكندى بكثير (راجع ما ذكره مثلاً كراوس فى مقاله عن ابن المقفع فى مجلة الدراسات الشرقية التى تصدر فى روما ، مجلد ١٤ (١٩٣٢ - ١٩٣٤) ص ١ - ١٠ : فتجد كلمة *οὐσία* يقابلها كلمة : عين (جوهر فيما بعد) ، وكلمة *ὑποκαίμενον* يقابلها كلمة متاع (موضوع فيما بعد) ، وكلمة *μिताφيريقي* يقابلها : علم القيب (علم ما بعد الطبيعة أو العلم الإلهى فيما بعد ، وهكذا) .

هذا إلى أنهم لم يعربوا الكلمات الدالة على المقولات وعلى كثير غيرها — مع شدة حاجتهم إلى التعريب — نظراً لوجود المقابلات العربية ؛ بل نجدهم بصوغون المصدر السماعى من اللفظ العربى ، فيقولون مثلاً : *كمية* ، *كيفية* ، *مائية* (ماهية) ، *هوية* ، بل هم استعملوا ألفاظاً من بعض الأسماء والضمائر مثل *ينبعض* (من بعض) ، و *يتهورى* (من هو) و *أَيْسَى* الآيات ، أى أوجد الموجودات (من الأيس ، راجع التعليق على هذه الكلمة فى رسالة السكندى فى التفاعل الحق ... الخ) .

وإذا كنا نلاحظ أن السكندى هنا يستعمل لفظ الإينية فى الدلالة على ما يقابل الحقيقة فهو يستعمل الماهية فى معنى حقيقة الشئ فى مواضع أخرى من رسائله (تعريفه للفلسفة فى رسالة حدود الأشياء ورسومها) .

أما دى بور فهو ، تابعة لديترسى ، يضبط الكلمة هكذا : *أَيْسَيْيَّة* ، ويقول إنه يمكن إيضاح هذه الصيغة إذا نحن مزجنا طريقة أفلاطون فى التفكير وطريقة أرسطو فى التعبير : هى تدل على الوجود عند أفلاطون (*οὐσία, ὄν*) ؛ لكن نسبة هذا الوجود إلى محسوس طريقة أرسطو ، يعنى ==

== استعماله للفظ ὅτι (تنطق هوتي = أن ، بالعربية) ؛ أو هي تدل على الوجود في مقابل الماهية ؛
ويقول دى بور إن هذا الاستعمال انتشر بين العرب من كتاب العلل (liber de causis) ،
وهو مختارات من كتاب لبرقلس ، ولكنه نسب إلى أرسطو ، نشره Bardenhewer ،
(١٨٨١) ومن كتاب الربوبية المنسوب لأرسطو . وإذا كان دى بور يجد في كتاب الربوبية
(ص ١٠٨ من النص العربى الذى نشره ديتريسى Fr. Dieterici) ذكر ستة أوائل (مبادئ
للكون) هي : العقل والأنية والغيرية والهوية والحركة والسكون ، فهو يرى أن العقل أول
مخلوق لله ؛ أما الخمسة الباقية فهي تقابل في رأيه المقولات الخمس الكبرى في محاوره السوفسطائى
لأفلاطون ، أعني : ὄν, θάτερον, ταυτόν, κίνησις, στασις ؛ ويقول دى بور إنه
في كتاب العلل (14 - § 1) يسمى الله العلة الأولى والأنية الخاصة المطلقة التي هي والوجود شيء
واحد ، وعنه تصدر الأنية التي هي أقل كمالاً من العلة الأولى ، ثم يليها العقل وهكذا . لكن يوجد
في كتاب العلل بعد ذلك (§ 22) أن العقل هو المخلوق الأول كما يوجد (§ 10) كلام عن
الهوية دون تمييز واضح بينها وبين الأنية . وبعد أن يشير دى بور إلى أن الفارابى في كتاب
الفصوص يستعمل الأنية مساوية للهوية يقول إن الأنية فيما يتعلق بالمخلوقات تدل على
الوجود في مقابل الماهية . ويذكر أن الأشياء والدوات تسمى أنيات ، لأن لها وجوداً
جزئياً (τὸ δε τι = الموجود الجزئى) بحسب مرتبتها في الوجود العقلى أو الجسمانى . وإذا
كانت الأنيات المعقولة باقية ثابتة فالأنيات الجسمية فانية (راجع مقالة دى بور عن الأنية في دائرة
المعارف الإسلامية ، المجلد الملحق ص ٢٤ (مادة Anniya) .

أما الباحثة الفرنسية الآنسة جواشون فقد جمعت في قاموسها للاصطلاح الفلسفى عند ابن سينا
(A. — M. Goichon : Lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sina ,
ط . باريس ١٩٣٨ ص ٨ — ١١) مادة قيعة عن لفظ الإنية عند ابن سينا . وهي تتابع أبا
البقاء ودى بور بعض الشيء بأن تشير إلى استعمال حرف التوكيد : « إن » في تأكيد وجود
موضوع القضية وإلى أنه من هذه الكلمة المؤكدة التي لها معنى الكلمة اليونانية ὅτι
(= أن ، بالعربية) أو معنى الـ ὄν (= الموجود) ، كما يقترح الأستاذ ماسينيون استناداً
إلى قول مؤلف عربى ، استعمل كلمة إن بمعنى الموجود . وتستند الباحثة في رأيها هذا إلى نص
في كتاب النجاة والشفاء لابن سينا وهو : « الصفة الأولى لواجب الوجود أنه إن وموجود » .
وهي تضبط الكلمة على هذا الوجه ، وإن كان هذا الضبط قد يحتاج إلى مزيد بيان . وهي
تنقل عن ابن سينا نصاً آخر هو : « لاماهاية لواجب الوجود غير أنه واجب ، وهذه هي الإنية » .
ومهما كان ما يمكن أن يستنبط من هذين النصين مجلياً لاستعمال كلمة إنية عند الكندى
الذى يقول في موضع من رسائله إن الله « هو الإنية الحق » (كتاب الكندى في الإبانة عن
العله الفاعلة القرينة ... إلخ) ، فإن الكلام عن أصل هذه الكلمة وعن اشتقاقها غير نهائى .
وإذا كان الكندى هنا يستعمل لفظ الإنية في الدلالة على ما يقابل الحقيقة فهو يستعملها إلى
جانب الماهية في مواضع أخرى من رسائله . وليراجع الفارابى فهرس مصطلحات الكندى
في آخر الكتاب فيما يتعلق بالإنية والماهية والهوية ...

١٠١ — بهذا العلم الأشرف ، لأن علم العلة أشرف من علم^(١) المعلول ؛ لأننا إنما نعلم كل
واحد من المعلومات علماً تاماً ، إذا نحن أحطنا بعلم علته .

لأن كل علة إما أن تكون عنصراً ؛ وإما صورة ؛ وإما فاعلة ، أعنى ما منه
مبدأ الحركة ؛ وإما مُتَمِّمَةٌ ، أعنى ما من أجله كان الشيء .

والمطالب العامة أربعة ، كما حددنا في غير موضع من أقوالنا الفلسفية :

إما : « هل »^(٢) ؛ وإما : « ما » ؛ وإما : « أى » ؛ وإما : « لِمَ » .
فأما « هل » فإنها باحثة عن الإنية فقط .

فأما كل إنية لها جنس فإن الـ « ما » تبحث عن جنسها ؛

و « أى » تبحث عن فصلها ،

و « ما » و « أى » جميعاً تبحثان عن نوعها ،

و « لِمَ » عن علتها التامة ، إذ هي باحثة عن العلة المطلقة .

وبيننا متى أحطنا بعلم عنصرها فقد أحطنا بعلم جنسها ؛ ومتى أحطنا بعلم
صورتها فقد أحطنا بعلم نوعها ؛ وفي علم النوع علم الفصل ، فإذا أحطنا بعلم عنصرها
وصورتها وعلتها التامة فقد أحطنا بعلم حدها ، وكل محدود حقيقته في حده .

فبحق ما سمي علم العلة الأولى : « الفلسفة الأولى » ، إذ جميع باقى الفلسفة
منسوط في علمها ، وإذ هي أول بالشرف ، وأول بالجنس ، وأول بالترتيب من
جهة الشيء الأيقن علمية^(٣) ، وأول بالزمان ، إذ هي علة الزمان .

== أما عند بعض الصوفية فالإنية ترتبط بـ « أنا » ، وذلك فيما يتعلق بالذات الإلهية في مثل قوله
تعالى : « إني أنا الله لا إله إلا أنا » ؛ وإذا كانت الهوية فيما يتعلق بالله تطلق على الذات المغيية
فإن الإنية تطلق على معقول العبد لها (أنظر كتاب الإنسان الكامل في معرفة الأواخر والأوائل
لعبد الكريم الجيلانى ط . القاهرة ١٣١٦ ص ٥٩ — ٦٠) .

(١) في الأصل : علة ، وهو خطأ ظاهر .

(٢) يذكر الخوارزمى في مفاتيح العلوم في الفصل الأول الخاص بمواضع التشكيمات ، فيما
يتعلق بالموجود ، أنه هو الذى يصح أن يسأل عنه السائل : هل يُعَدُّم ؟ إلى أن يجاب عنه بلا
ونعم ؛ وفيما يتعلق بالمعدوم ، أنه هو الذى يصح عنه سؤال السائل : هل يوجد ؟ وقد يكون
في هذا ما يدل — دلالة ما — على قصد الكندى من ذكره مطلب « هل » بين المطالب
العامة ، وهو أنها تبحث عن إنية الشيء ، أعنى هل هو موجود أو غير موجود . ويوجد مجال
للنظر في العلاقة بين المطالب العامة الأربعة وبين البحث في العلل الأربعة .

(٣) عليها في الأصل علامة — إشارة إلى تصحيح أو إلى قراءة أخرى لعلها : علماً .

ومن أوجب الحق ألا ندّم من كان أحد أسباب منافعنا الصغار الهزلية ،
فكيف بالذين هم أكبر^(١) أسباب منافعنا العظام الحقيقية الجدية ؛ فإنهم ، وإن
قصرنا عن بعض الحق ، فقد كانوا لنا أنساباً وشركاء فيما أفادونا من ثمار فكرهم
التي صارت لنا سُبُلًا وآلات مؤدية إلى علم كثير مما قصرنا عن^(٢) نيل حقيقته ،
و[لا] سيما إذ هو بين عندنا وعند المبرزين من المتفلسفين قبلنا من غير أهل لساننا أنه
لم يَنَلْ الحق — بما يستأهل الحق — أحد من الناس بجهد طلبه ، ولا أحاط [بـ] به
جميعهم ؛ بل كل واحد منهم ، إما لم يَنَلْ منه شيئاً ، وإما نال منه شيئاً يسيراً ،
بالإضافة إلى ما يستأهل الحق . فإذا جُمع يسير ما نال كل واحد من النائلين الحق
منهم ، اجتمع من ذلك شيء له قدرٌ جليل .

فينبغي أن يعظم شكرنا للآتين بيسير الحق ، فضلاً عن آتى^(٣) بكثير من
الحق ، إذ أشركونا في ثمار فكرهم وسهّلوا لنا المطالب الحقية الخفية ، بما أفادونا
من المقدمات المُسهّلة لنا سُبُلَ الحق ؛ فإنهم ، لو لم يكونوا ، لم يجتمع لنا ، مع
شدة البحث في مددنا كلها ، هذه الأوائل الحقيقية^(٤) التي بها تخرّجنا^(٥) إلى
الأواخر من مطلوباتنا الخفية^(٦) ؛ فان ذلك إنما اجتمع في الأعصار السالفة المتقدمة
عصراً بعد عصر إلى زماننا هذا ، مع شدة البحث ولزوم الدأب وإيثار التعب
في ذلك .

وغير ممكن أن يجتمع في زمن المرء الواحد ، وإن اتسعت مدّته ، واشتدّت
بحثه ، وأطّيف نظره ، وآثر الدأب ، ما اجتمع بمثل ذلك^(٧) من شدة البحث
والطاف النظر وإيثار الدأب في أضعاف ذلك من الزمان الأضعاف الكثيرة .

(١) في الأصل غير منقوطة ، فحائر أن تكون أكبر أو أكثر .

(٢) في الأصل : من .

(٣) في الأصل : أنا .

(٤) غير منقوطة ، وقد قرأناها : الخفية ؛ تحشياً مع الفكرة .

(٥) يمكن أن نضبطها : تخرّجنا ؛ أو تخرّجنا ؛ والمعنى مفهوم في الحالين .

(٦) على هذه الكلمة نقطة واحدة ، رجعت لى قراءتها : الخفية ، وهو ما يلائم
السياق أيضاً .

(٧) هكذا في الأصل بعد كلمة : اجتمع ، نجد كلمتين يمكن قراءتهما : بمثل ذلك ؛ وبجائز
أنهما كلمتان زائدتان ، ولا ضرورة لهما بالنسبة للمعنى ، على أي حال .

فأما أرسطوطالس ، مبرز اليونانيين في الفلسفة ، فقال : ينبغي لنا أن نشكر
آباء الذين أتوا بشيء من الحق ، إذ كانوا سبب كونهم ، فضلاً عنهم ، إذ هم سبب
لهم ، وإذ هم سبب لنا إلى نيل الحق — فما أحسن ما قال في ذلك !
وينبغي لنا أن لا نستحي من استحسان الحق واقتناء الحق من أين أتى ،
وإن أتى من الأجناس القاصية عنا والأمم المباينة [لنا]^(١) ، فانه لا شيء أولى
بطالب الحق من الحق ، وليس [ينبغي]^(٢) بنحس الحق ، ولا تصغير بقائله ولا
بالآتى به ؛ ولا أحد بنحس بالحق ، بل كل يشرفه الحق .

فحسن بنا — إذ كنّا حراساً على تميم نوعنا ، إذ الحق في ذلك^(٣) — أن
نلزم في كتابنا هذا عاداتنا في جميع موضوعاتنا من إحضار ما قال القدماء في ذلك
قولاً تاماً ، على أقصد سبيله وأسهلها سلوكاً على أبناء هذه السبيل ، وتتميم ما لم
يقولوا فيه قولاً تاماً ، على مجرى عادة اللسان وسنة الزمان ، وبقدر طاقتنا ، مع العلة
العارضة لنا في ذلك ، من الانحصار عن الاتساع في القول المحلل لعقد العويص
الملتبسة^(٤) ، توقياً سوء تأويل كثير من المتسمين بالنظر في دهرنا ، من أهل الغربة
عن الحق ، وإن تتوجوا بتيجان الحق من غير استحقاق ، لضيق فطنهم عن
أساليب الحق وقلة معرفتهم بما يستحق ذوو^(٥) الجلالة في الرأي ، والاجتهاد^(٦) في

(١) زدتها إكمالاً للتقابل في الكلام .

(٢) زدتها ، لأنني أشعر أن الكلام ناقص ، حتى في المواضع التالية مباشرة ؛ والكلام غير
منقوطة قطعاً كاملاً ، فالقراءة اجتهادية .

(٣) يجوز أنه قد سقط كلام هنا ، أو أن هنا كلاماً وضع في غير موضعه مثل جملة :
« إذ الحق في ذلك » ، إن لم تكن مجرد جملة اعتراضية ، كما هو جائز ، خصوصاً وأن قوله :
أن نلزم ، يصلح جواباً لقوله : حسن . وإلا فيجوز أن يكون قد سقط كلام بعد قوله : فحسن
بنا ، أو بعد كلمة : نوعنا . وإنني إلى افتراض سقوط كلام أميل ؛ لأن بعض رسائل هذا المخطوط
قد صحح بزيادات موضحة مكملّة في مواضع كثيرة ؛ أما في رسالة الفلسفة الأولى فلا نجد من
ذلك إلا القليل جداً بالنسبة لطولها . ولا أريد أن أفرط في دلاء الفجوات ، ما دام المعنى
الإجمالي واضحاً .

(٤) هكذا في الأصل ، ولم أغبر شيئاً من النص ، لأنه مفهوم كما هو .

(٥) في الأصل : ذو ، وقد صححتها طبقاً لما يلي .

(٦) إنني أميل إلى اعتبار هذه الكلمة معطوفة على كلمة لضيق ، على أن يكون ذلك لإحصاء
لمساويء القوم .

فواجب إذن التمسك بهذه القضية النفيسة عند ذوى الحق وأن نسعى في طلبها بنائية جهدا ، لما قدمنا ولما نحن قائلون الآن .
وذلك أنه باضطراب يجب على السنة المضادين لها اقتناؤها ^(١) ؛ وذلك أنهم لا يخلون من أن يقولوا إن اقتناؤها ^(٢) يجب أو لا يجب .
فإن قالوا إنه يجب وجب طلبها عليهم .
وإن قالوا إنها لا تجب وجب عاينهم أن يحضروا عاة ذلك ، وأن يؤملوا على ذلك برهاناً .

وإعطاء العاة والبرهان من قضية علم الأشياء بجهالتها :
فواجب إذن طلب هذه القضية بالسنتهم ، والتمسك بها اضطراب ^(٤) عليهم .
فنحن نسأل المطلاع على سرائرنا ، والعالم اجتبادنا في تثبيت الحجة على ربوبيته ، وإيضاح وحدانيته ، وذب المعاندين له الكافرين به عن ذلك بالجميع القائمة لكفرهم والهاكة لسجوف ^(٥) فضائحهم ، والخبرة عن عورات خلعهم المزدية ، أن يحوطنا ومن سلك سبيلنا بحسن عزه الذي لا ترام ، وأن يلبسنا سرايل جفنته الراقية ، ويهب لنا نصره غروب ^(٦) أسلحته النافذة ، والتأييد بعز قوته الغالبة ، حتى يبلغنا بذلك نهاية نيتنا من نصرة الحق وتأييد الصدق ، ويبلغنا بذلك درجة من ارضى نيتيه ، وقبول فعله ، ووهب له الفلاح ^(٧) والظفر على أصداده الكافرين بوعده والمخادعين ^(٨) عن سبيل الحق المرتضاة عنده .
ولنكمل الآن هذا الفن بتأييد ولي الخيرات وقابل الحسنات .

- (١) و (٢) في الأصل : اقتناها .
- (٣) هكذا في الأصل ، ويحسن أن تكون العبارة : وإن قالوا إنه لا يجب . الخ .
- (٤) هكذا في الأصل ، وعلى في هذه الحالة خبر لكلمة التمسك ، والجملة كلها عطف على الجملة المتقدمة عليها . على أنه قد يجوز أن أصل كلمة اضطراب هو : اضطراباً ؛ وإذا ن تكون محالاً ، وتكون كلمة التمسك معطوفة على كلمة طلب .
- (٥) يمكن أيضاً أن تقرأ في الأصل : سيجوف .
- (٦) غرب السلاح حده .
- (٧) هكذا في الأصل ، والفتح ، يتصرف اللام ، وكذلك الفلاح أيضاً ، بمعنى الفوز .
- (٨) في الأصل : المايدين ، وهو تحريف في التاليف .

الانتفاع ^(١) العامة السكل الشاملة لهم ، ولدلارانه ^(٢) الحسد المتمكن من انقسام البرهية والمالجب بسد ^(٣) سجيوفه أبحار فكفرهم عن نور الحق ، ووضعهم ذوى الفضائل الإنسانية التي قصروا عن نيلها ، وكانوا منها في الأطراف الشامة ، بوضع الأعداء الجبرية الواترة ^(٤) ، ذباً عن كراسيمهم المزورة التي نصبوها عن غير استحقاق ، بل للترؤس ^(٥) والتجارة بالدين ، وهم عديماء الدين ، لأن من تجر شيء باعه ومن باع شيئاً لم يكن له ، فمن تجر بالدين لم يكن له دين ، ويحق أن يتعزى ^(٦) من الدين من عاند قضية علم الأشياء بجهالتها ، وسأها كفوياً .

لأن في علم الأشياء بجهالتها علم الربوبية ، وعلم الوحداية ، وعلم الفضيلة وجملة علم كل نافع والسبيل إليه ، والبعده عن كل ضار والاحتباس منه ؛ واقتناء هذه جميعاً هو الذي أتت به الرسل الصادقة عن الله ، جل ثناؤه .
فإن الرسل الصادقة صلوات الله عليها إنما أتت بالإقرار بربوبية الله وحده ، ولزوم الفضائل المرتضاة عنده ، وترك الرذائل المضادة للفضائل في ذواتها ، وإشارها ^(٧) .

- (١) غير متقوطة ؛ وقد قرأها اجتباداً ، على أن تكون جمع فتح ، ولعله يقصد أن يقوم بها فتون على المنافع العادية التي ليست شأن العلماء .
- (٢) هكذا تبدو الكلمة ؛ وأميل إلى اعتبارها معطوفة على كلمة : لفيق . وفي اللغة درن الجلد والتوب يدرب درنا ، وأدرن أيضاً بمعنى السخ وتلطخ .
- (٣) السدوف والسدنة بمعنى الظلمة .
- (٤) هكذا في الأصل ، وللتعود ، والجريشة المتدبة . والوار هو الذي يجب غيره بظلم مومج . والأصل لإيهم بإظهار العزرات .
- (٥) في الأصل : للتراس .
- (٦) في الأصل : يتعزى .
- (٧) غير متقوطة في الأصل ، وعلى في رأي معطوفة على كلمة لزوم ، وقد يجوز أنها تحريف لكلمة آثارها ، وفي هذه الحالة تكون معطوفة على ذواتها ، على معنى أن الرذائل المضادة للفضائل في ذواتها وفي آثارها وتأثيرها .

فاذ قدمنا ما يجب تقديمه في صدر كتابنا هذا فلمنتل ذلك بما يتلوه نكولاً طبيعياً ، فنقول :

إن الوجود الإنساني وجودان :

أحدهما أقرب منا وأبعد عند الطبيعة ، وهو وجود^(١) الحواس التي هي لنا ، منذ بدء نشونا ، وللجنس العام لنا ولكثير من غيرنا ، أعني الحي العام لجميع الحيوان ؛ فإن وجودنا^(٢) بالحواس ، عند مباشرة الحس محسوسه ، بلازمان^(٣) ولا مؤونة ؛ وهو غير ثابت لزوال ما نباشر وسيلانه وتبدله في كل حال بأحد أنواع الحركات ، وتفاضل الكمية فيه بالأكثر والأقل والتساوى وغير التساوى ، وتغاير الكيفية فيه بالشبه وغير الشبه ، والأشد والأضعف ؛ فهو الدهر في زوال دائم ، وتبدل غير منفصل ؛ وهو الذي ثبت صورته في الصورة^(٤) ، فتؤديها إلى الحفظ ؛ فهو^(٥) متمثل ومتصور في نفس الحى ؛ فهو وإن كان لا ثبات له في الطبيعة ، فبعد عندها ، وخفي لذلك ، فهو قريب من الحاس جداً ، لوجدانه^(٦) بالحس مع مباشرة الحس إياه .

(١) يقصد في الواقع وجود الحواس لما تتجده ، يعني إدراكها ما تدركه ؛ والوجود هنا وفي رسائل أخرى للسكندى (أنظر مثلاً رسالة في ماهية النوم والرؤيا) لا بمعنى الوجود المقابل لعدم . بل بمعنى الوجدان والإدراك .

(٢) يمكن أن نزيد هنا كلمة : الأشياء ، لتوضيح المقصود .

(٣) بلا زمان ، هذا هو خبر إن .

(٤) في الأصل : الصور ، وقد أثرت قراءتها : الصورة ، على سبيل التصحيح ، وقرأت ما بعد ما : فتؤديها ، وإن كانت غير منقوطة أصلاً . والصورة قوة نفسية يشكلم عنها السكندى في رسالة النوم والرؤيا .

(٥) يعود الضمير على ما تتجده الحواس وما تباشره .

(٦) أى لإدراكه أو كونه مدركاً .

والمحسوس كله ذو هيولى أبدأ ، فالمحسوس أبدأ جرم وبالجرم^(١) .
والآخر أقرب من الطبيعة^(٢) وأبعد عندنا ، وهو وجود العقل .

وبحق ما كان الوجود وجودين^(٣) : وجود حسى ووجود عقلى .
إذ الأشياء كلية وجزئية ، أعنى بالكلية الأجناس للأشياء ، والأشياء للأشخاص ؛ وأعنى بالجزئية الأشخاص للأشياء .

والأشخاص الجزئية الهيولانية واقعة تحت الحواس ؛ وأما الأجناس والأشياء فغير واقعة تحت الحواس ولا موجودة وجوداً حسياً ، بل تحت قوة من قوى النفس التامة ، أعنى الإنسانية ، هي المسماة العقل الإنساني .

وإذ الحواس واجدة^(٤) الأشخاص ، فكل متمثل في النفس من المحسوسات فهو للقوة المستعملة الحواس .

فأما كل معنى نوعى وما فوق النوع فليس متمثلاً^(٥) للنفس ، لأن المثل^(٦) كلها محسوسة ؛ بل [هو]^(٧) مصدق في النفس محقق متيقن بصديق^(٨) الأوائل العقلية المعقولة اضطراراً ، كهو لا هو^(٩) غير صادقين في شىء بعينه ليس

(١) هنا بياض قليل في الأصل .

(٢) المقصود من الطبيعة هنا والمقصود منها عند أول التقسيم هو حقائق الأشياء وماهياتها المعقولة ، وهو ما يدل عليه الكلام بوجه عام .

(٣) في الأصل : وجودان .

(٤) يعنى مدركة .

(٥) في الأصل : متمثل .

(٦) الكلمة عسيرة القراءة ، وشبه أن تكون قد صححت هكذا ؛ فإن لم يكن هنا شىء من التناقض ، فيجب أن نفهم المثل لا بالمعنى الحاس لهذه الكلمة كما نعرفه من مذهب أفلاطون ، بل بمعنى ما يتمثل في النفس على الوجه المطلق ، وهى جمع مثال ؛ ولعله يقصد أن الأنواع وما فوقها ليست مثلاً أو تمثلاً قائمة في الصورة ، بحيث تكون أشبه بالمحسوسة ، بل هى حقائق وماهيات معقولة ، كالبداهات العقلية ، ويدل على هذا كلامه بعد ذلك مباشرة .

(٧) زيادة للإيضاح .

(٨) يقصد أن صدق الأوائل العقلية مصدق له ؛ وإلا فيمكن أن تكون الكلمة تحريفاً عن : كصدق .

(٩) يقصد الحكم على الشىء نفسه بأنه كذا ولا كذا في وقت واحد ؛ وهذا غير ممكن ، وهو معلوم بالضرورة العقلية . والجملة مختصرة تفصيلها أن نقول : كالقول بأن الشىء كذا وبأنه لا كذا في وقت واحد ، فهما لا يصدقان معاً .

بوجوب ذلك اضطراباً ، كقولنا إن جسم الشكل ليس خارجاً^(١) منه خلافاً
ولا ملاء^(٢) . أعني الفراغ ولا جسم ؛ وهذا القول لا يتشبه في النفس ، لأن
«لا خلاء ولا ملاء» شيء لم يدركه الحس ، ولا لحق الحس ، فيسكون له في النفس
مثال^(٣) أو يُظن له مثال ؛ وإنما هو شيء يجده العقل اضطراباً بهذه القدمات
التي تقدم^(٤)

وذلك أن تقول في البحث عن ذلك إن معنى الخلاء مكان لا مئة . يمكن
فيه ؛ والسكان وللممكن من المضاف الذي لا يسبق بعضه بعضاً ؛ فإن كان مكان
كان متمكناً اضطراباً ، وإن كان متمكناً كان مكان^(٥) اضطراباً — فليس
إذن يمكن أن يكون مكان بلا متمكن ؛ ويعني بخلاء مكان^(٦) بلا متمكن ،
فليس يمكن إذن أن يكون للخلاء المطلق وجود^(٧) .
تقول : والملاء إذا كان هو جسماً^(٨) .

فأما أن يكون جسم الشكل^(٩) لاهيأه له في الكمية .
وإذا أن يكون متناهى الكمية .

وليس يمكن أن يكون شيء لاهيأه له بالفعل ، كما سنبين بعد قليل .
فليس يمكن أن يكون جسم الشكل لاهيأه له في الكمية — فليس بعد

جسم الشكل ملاء .
لأنه إن كان بعده ملاء ، كان ذلك الملاء جسماً ؛ فإن كان ذلك الملاء بعده

(١) في الأصل : خارج .

(٢) عبارة « لا خلاء ولا ملاء » يجب أن تفهم على أنها مبررة عن شيء واحد . أعني

القول بلا خلاء ولا ملاء .

(٣) في الأصل : مثلاً ، وهو خطأ من حيث المعنى واللغة معاً .

(٤) غير منقولة ولا مشكوكة في الأصل .

(٥) في الأصل : مكان .

(٦) في الأصل مكاناً ؛ وهو جائز إذا قرأنا : نعتي بدلاً من يعنى ، ومعنى غير منقولة على

كل حال .

(٧) في الأصل : جسم .

(٨) الشكل هنا يعني السكون أو المالم في مجموعه ، وكذلك في مواضع كثيرة من رسائل

الكوسمدي .

(١) ؛ فإن هذا وجود^(٢) للنفس لاحسي ، اضطرابي^(٣) ، لا يحتاج إلى
بغيري^(٤) ، وليس يتمثل لهذا مثال في النفس ؛ لأنه لا مثال [له] ، لأنه لا لون
متوسط^(٥) ، ولا صوت ولا طعم ولا رائحة ولا ملموس [له] ، بل [هو] إدراك لا مثالي .
وكل ما كان هيو لاينياً^(٦) فإنه مثالي ، يتمله الحس الشكلي في النفس ؛
وكل ما هو لاهيولاني ، وقد يوجد مع الهيولاني ، كالشكل الموجود باللون ، إذ
هو نهاية اللون ، فيعرض بالحس البصري أن يوجد الشكل ، إذ هو نهاية للمدرك
بالحس البصري .

وقد يُظن أنه يتمثل في النفس باجتلاب الحس الشكلي له ، ويتمله في نفس
الإنسان لاحقة تلحق المثال اللوني ، كاللاحقة التي تلحق اللون أنه نهاية للون ؛
فوجود النهاية التي هي الشكل ، وجود عقلي عرض بالحس لا محسوس بالحقيقة ؛
فالذات كل الالائي^(٧) لاهيولي لها وتوجد مع الهيولي قدير مُظن أنها تمثل^(٨) في
النفس ، وإنما تمثّل من المحسوس لا يتمثل^(٩) ؛ فأما الالائي لاهيولي لها ولا تقارن
الهيولي ، فليس تمثل في النفس تبساً ، ولا تظن أنها تمثل ، وإنما يُقتر بها^(١٠) لما

(١) غير منقولة في الأصل ، وقوله : ليس بغيري ، تأكيد لقوله : بعينه — يعني بعينه ، غير
معاير لنفسه بوجه من الوجود .

(٢) ي إدراك .

(٣) في الأصل : اضطرابي ؛ وقد صححتها : اضطرابي ، تشبهاً مع المعنى ؛ والقصود أن

البدهييات بالنسبة للنفس مدركة مباشرة . وإدراك النفس لها إدراك غير حسي ، وهو اضطرابي ،
ولا يحتاج إلى مثال ... الخ . وربما كان يحظر لي نظراً للنفس أن أمل إلى قراءة : اضطرابي ؛
اضطراباً ، أي لا يحتاج ... الخ ؛ والمعنى واحد على كل حال .

(٤) في الأصل موسط .

(٥) زيادات موضحة .

(٦) في الأصل هيولاني .

(٧) في الأصل الائي .

(٨) هكذا في الأصل ، لكن بدون قطع ؛ ويمكن ضبطها وتغييرها الثانية ، بالشكل

على أكثر من وجه .

(٩) الباء والهاء غير منقولتين ، وأظن قراءتها هكذا صحيحة ، على معنى أنها تعقل دون
أن يكون لها مثال حسي في النفس .

(١٠) غير منقولة ولا مشكوكة .

(١) لأن ذلك إنما ينبغي أن يكون فيما لا هيولى له ، لأن المهيولى موضوعه التعليمي
للافعال ، فهي متحركة ، والطبيعة عالة أولية لكل متحرك ساكن (٢)

فإن كل طبعي فذو هيولى ؛ فإذا لم يمكن أن يستعمل في وجود الأشياء الطبيعية الفحص الرياضي ، إذ هو (٣) خاصة ما لا هيولى له ، فإنّ هو كذلك في الفحص به على ما ليس بطبعي (٤) ؛ فمن استعمالها في البحث عن الطبيعيات حار وعدم الحق .

فذلك يجب على كل باحث علم من العلوم أن يبحث أولاً ما عالة الواقع تحت ذلك العلم ؛ فإذا إن بحثنا ما عالة الطبايع الذي هو عالة الأشياء الطبيعية وجدناه كما قد قلنا في أوائل الطبيعة : هي عالة كل حركة — إذن (٥) فالطبعي هو كل متحرك ؛ فإن علم الطبيعيات هو علم كل متحرك ، فإن ما فوق الطبيعيات هو لا متحرك ، لأنه ليس يمكن أن يكون الشيء عالة كون ذاته ، كما سنبين بعد قليل ؛ فإنّ ليس عالة الحركة ولا عالة المتحرك متحركاً (٦) — فإن ما فوق الطبيعيات ليس بمتحرك ؛ فإن قد وضع أن علم ما فوق الطبيعيات هو علم ما لا يتحرك .

وقد ينبغي أن لا يطلب في إدراك كل مطالب الوجود البرهاني ؛ فإنه ليس كل مطلوب عقلي موجوداً بالبرهان ، لأنه ليس لكل شيء برهان ، إذ البرهان

(١) يقصد الفحص الرياضي القائم على النظر الاستنباطي غالباً .

(٢) في الأصل : حاد ، ولعلها تحريف .

(٣) راجع تعريف الكندي للطبيعة في رسائله في حدود الأشياء ورسومها .

(٤) في الأصل : هي ؛ وهو غير منسجم مع المعنى .

(٥) في الأصل : فإذا هي كذلك في الفحص بها على ما ليس بطبعي ؛ وقد صححت العبارة تبعاً مع المفكرة ، لأنه يقول إن النهج الرياضي لإصلاح في بحث الأشياء الطبيعية ، لأنها لا ليس المادة ؛ فهو لإصلاح أيضاً للدراسة ما بعد الطبيعة ، لأن ما بعد الطبيعة لا هيولى له . ويجب الاحتراز عند فهم هذه العبارة ؛ فالتألب أنه يقصد من قوله : فإنّ هو كذلك ، أن النهج الرياضي يمكن أن يستعمل فيما بعد الطبيعة ، لأن المانع من استعماله في الطبيعة هو أنها تبحث فيه له مبرور ؛ فيجوز استعماله إذن فيما بعد الطبيعة .

(٦) في الأصل : إذا .

(٧) في الأصل : متحرك .

ملاء ، وبعد كل ملاء ملاء ، كان ملاء بلا نهاية ؛ فوجب حسم بلا نهاية في السككية ، فوجب لانهاية بالتعل ؛ ولا نهاية بالتعل بمنع أن يكون .

فإن جسم الشكل لا ملاء بعده ، لأنه لا جسم بعده ، ولا خلاه بعده ، كما بينا .

فإذا واجب اضطراباً ، وليست له صورة في النفس ؛ إنما هو وجود عقلي اضطرابي .

فمن بحث الأشياء التي فوق الطبيعة ، أعني التي لا هيولى لها ولا تقارن المهيولى ، فإن يجد لها مثلاً (١) في النفس ، بل يجدها بالأبحاث العقلية .

فاحفظ ، حفظ الله عليك جميع الفضائل ، وصانك عن جميع الرذائل ؛ هذه المقدمة لتسكون لك دليلاً قاصداً سواء الخلق ، وشهاباً حاسراً عن عين عقالك ظلم الجبل وكدر الجبرات .

فإن برهائين السبيلين (٢) كان الحق من جهة سهلاً ومن جهة صعباً ؛ لأن من طلب تمثل المقول ليحدّه بذلك ، مع وضوحه في العقل ، يحس عنه كمشاء عين الوطواط عن نبل الأشخاص الديانة الواضحة إنما في شعاع الشمس .

ولحدّ العلة تحيّر كثير من الناظرين في الأشياء التي فوق الطبيعة ، إذ استعمالها في البحث عنها تمكّلها في النفس على قدر عاداتهم للحس ، مثل الصبي ؛

فإن التعليم إنما يكون سهلاً في المتعادات ؛ ومن الدليل على ذلك سرعة التعلمين من الخطيب والرسائل أو الشعر أو القصص ، أي ما كان حديثاً ، لعادتهم للحديث والخرافات من بدء النشور ؛ وفي الأشياء الطبيعية (٣) ، إذ (٤) استعمالوا الفحص

(١) التل يفتح الميم والناء لمة في التل بكسر الميم وسكون الناء .

(٢) هذه السككيات غير منقوطة في الأصل .

(٣) قوله : وفي الأشياء الطبيعية معطوف على قوله : في الأشياء التي فوق الطبيعة ، يعني أن التعبير وقع في المبدأين بسبب خطأ النهج .

(٤) في الأصل : إذا — وهي خطأ ، وتصحيحها بحسب المعنى وقاسا على النسخ السابق مباشرة .

[في] ^(١) بعض الأشياء ؛ وليس للبرهان برهان ، لأن هذا يكون بلا نهاية ، إن كان لكل برهان برهان - فلا يكون لشيء وجود البتة ، لأن ما لا ينتهي إلى علم أوائله فليس بمعلوم ، فلا يكون علماً ألبتة ، لأننا إن رُمنا علم ما الإنسان ، الذي هو الحى الناطق الميت - ولم نعلم ما الحى وما الناطق ، وما الميت - أم ^(٢) نعلم ما الإنسان إذن ^(٣) .

وكذلك ينبغي أن [لا] نطلب الإقناع في العلوم الرياضية ، بل البرهان ؛ فأما إن استعملنا الإقناع في العلم الرياضى كانت إحاطتنا به ظنية لاعلمية . وكذلك لكل نظر تمييزي ^(٤) وجود خاص غير وجود الآخر ؛ ولذلك ضل ^(٥) أيضاً كثير من الناظرين في الأشياء التمييزية ، لأن منهم من جرى على عادة طلب الإقناع وبعضهم جرى على عادة الأمثال ، وبعضهم جرى على عادة شهادات الأخبار ، وبعضهم جرى على عادة الحس ، وبعضهم جرى على عادة البرهان ، لما قصرُوا عن تمييز المطلوبات ، وبعضهم أراد استعمال ذلك في وجود ^(٦) مطلوبه ، إما للتقصير عن علم أساليب المطلوبات ، وإما للعشق للتكثير من سبل الحق - فينبغى أن نقصد بكل مطلوب ما يجب ، ولا نطلب في العلم الرياضى إقناعاً ، ولا في العلم الإلهى حساً ولا تمثيلاً ، ولا في أوائل العلم الطبيعي الجوامع الفكرية ^(٧) ، ولا في البلاغة برهاناً ، ولا في أوائل البرهان برهاناً - فإننا إن تحفظنا هذه الشرائط سهلت علينا المطالب المقصودة ، وإن خالفنا ذلك أخطأنا أغراضنا من مطالبنا ، وعسر علينا وجدان ^(٨) مقصوداتنا .

فإذا تقدمت هذه الوصايا فينبغى أن تقدم الفوايد ^(٩) التي نحتاج إلى استعمالها في هذه الصناعة ، فنقول :

(١) زيادة بتطلبها المعنى .

(٢) في الأصل : فلم .

(٣) في الأصل : إذا .

(٤) و (٥) قراءة اجتهدية .

(٦) ، (٨) يعنى البحث عن المطلوب والوصول إليه .

(٧) ربما يقصد الأقيسة وأنواع الاستدلال ، وهذا ما يمكن أن نفهمه من رسالته في كمية كتب أرسطو .

(٩) يشبه أن يكون في هذه الكلمة تصحيح في الأصل ، وقراءتها هكذا أقرب الوجوه .

إن الأزلى هو الذى لم يجب ليس هو مطلقاً ^(١) ؛ فالأزلى لا قبل كونياً ^(٢) لهويته ؛ فالأزلى هو لا قوامه من غيره ؛ فالأزلى لا علة له ؛ فالأزلى لا موضوع له ، ولا محمول ، ولا فاعل ، ولا سبب - أعنى ما من أجله كان - لأن العلل المقدمة ليست غير هذه .

فالأزلى لا جنس له ، لأنه إن كان له جنس ^(٣) فهو نوع ، والنوع مركب من جنسه العامي ^(٤) له ولغيره ومن فصل ليس في غيره ؛ فله موضوع هو الجنس القابل لصورته وصورة غيره ، ومحمول هو الصورة الخاصة له دون غيره ؛ فله موضوع ومحمول .

وقد كان تبين أنه لا موضوع ولا محمول له ، وهذا محال لا يمكن ؛ فالأزلى لا جنس له .

فالأزلى لا يفسد ، لأن الفساد إنما هو تبدل المحمول لا الحامل الأول ، فأما الحامل الأول الذى هو الأيس ^(٥) فليس يتبدل ، لأن الفاسد ليس فساداً بتأسيس أيسيته ^(٦) ، وكل متبدل فإنما تبدل بضده الأقرب - أعنى الذى معه في جنس واحد ، كالحرارة المتبدلة بالبرودة ، لأننا لانعد من المقابلة كالحرارة باليبس ^(٧) أو بالخلابة أو بالطول ، أو ما كان كذلك ، والأضداد المتقاربة هي جنس واحد .

(١) هكذا النص ؛ وفي رسالة الكندى « في حدود الأشياء ورسومها » ، نجده يعرف أزلى بأنه هو « الذى لم يكن ليس (= لم يكن معدوماً) ، وليس يحتاج في قوامه إلى غيره ؛ الذى لا يحتاج في قوامه إلى غيره فلا علة له ، وما لعله له فدايم أبداً » ويجوز أن تكون كلمة وب تحريفاً من الناسخ عن : يحز - يعنى أن الأزلى لا يجوز بوجه من الوجوه أن يكون ثابراً معدوماً .

(٢) في الأصل : كونى . ويجب لغويًا أن تكون كما صححنا ، ولا سيما أن المخطوط في كثير من الأحيان لا يراعى النحو . والمعنى أن الأزلى ليس لذاته قبل وجودى ، لأنه موجود أزلاً .

(٣) في الأصل : جنسا ، وهو خطأ لغوى .

(٤) هكذا في الأصل - وهو ، كما يلى أحيانا ، بمعنى العام . راجع ص ١٢٤ ، ١٢٦ .

(٥) أى الوجود .

(٦) أى إيجاد وجوده - راجع في كلتى الأيس والتأسيس التعليق على رسالة الكندى

في الفاعل الحق الأول التام والفاعل الناقص الذى هو بالمجاز .

(٧) يعنى : لانعد من التبدل الى الضد ما يكون مثل تبدل الحرارة بيبوسة الخ .

فالفاسد جنس ، فإن فسد الأزل فله جنس ؛ وهو لا جنس له — هذا خلف لا يمكن ، فالأزلى لا يمكن أن يفسد .

والاستحالة^(١) تبدل ؛ فالأزلى لا يستحيل ، لأنه لا يتبدل ولا ينتقل من النقص إلى التمام ، فالانتقال استحالة^(٢) ما ؛ فالأزلى لا ينتقل^(٣) إلى تمام ، لأنه لا يستحيل ؛ والتام هو الذى له^(٤) حال ثابتة ، يكون بها فاضلا ، والناقص هو الذى لا حال له ثابتة يكون بها فاضلا ؛ فالأزلى لا يمكن أن يكون ناقصا ، لأنه لا يمكن أن ينتقل إلى حال فيكون بها فاضلا — لأنه لا يمكن أن يستحيل إلى أفضل منه ولا إلى أنقص منه بنية ، فالأزلى تام اضطرابا ؛ وإذا الجرم ذو جنس وأنواع — والأزلى لا جنس له — فالجرم [ليس هو^(٥)] الأزلى .

فلنقل الآن إنه لا يمكن أن يكون جرم أزلى ولا غيره ، مما له كمية أو كيفية ، لا نهاية له بالفعل^(٦) ، وإن [ما] لا نهاية له إنما هو فى القوة ؛ فأقول^(٧) :

إن من المقدمات الأول الحقيقة المعقولة بلا توسط : (١) أن كل الأجرام التى ليس منها شيء أعظم من شيء ، متساوية ؛ (ب) والمتساوية أبعاد ما بين نهاياتها متساوية بالفعل والقوة ؛ (ج) وذو النهاية ليس لا نهاية [له] ؛ (د) وكل الأجرام المتساوية إذا زيد على واحد منها جرم كان أعظمها ، وكان أعظم مما كان ، قبل أن يزداد عليه ذلك الجرم ؛ (هـ) وكل جرمين متناهيي العظم ، إذا جمعا ، كان الجرم الكائن عنهما متناهي العظم — وهذا واجب أيضا فى كل عظم وفى كل ذى عظم ؛ (و) وأن الأصغر من كل شيئين متجانسين بعنة الأكبر منهما أو بعنة بعضه .

(١) يعنى التغير .

(٢) فى الأصل : ينقص ، وهو خطأ .

(٣) فى الأصل : ليست له ؛ وهو خطأ بلا شك ، لأنه لا ينفق مع المعنى .

(٤) بياض فى الأصل ، وقد زدتها اجتهدا .

(٥) جملة : « لانهاية له بالفعل » هى خبر يكون .

(٦) من هنا نجد المطابقة حرفية تقريبا مع رسالة السكندى فى وحدانية الله وتناهى

جرم العالم .

فإن كان جرم لا نهاية له ، فإنه ، إذا فصل منه جرم متناهى العظم ، فإن الباقي منه : إما أن يكون متناهى العظم ، وإما لا متناهى العظم .

فإن كان الباقي منه متناهى العظم ، فإنه إذا زيد عليه المفصول منه المتناهى العظم ، كان الجرم الكائن عنهما جميعا متناهى العظم ؛ والذى كان عنهما هو الذى كان — قبل أن يفصل منه شيء — لا متناهى العظم .

فهو إذن متناه لا متناه ، وهذا خلف لا يمكن .

وإن كان الباقي لا متناهى العظم ، فإنه إذا زيد عليه ما أخذ منه ، صار أعظم مما كان قبل أن يزداد عليه أو مساويا له .

فإن كان أعظم مما كان فقد صار ما لا نهاية له أعظم مما لا نهاية [له] ، وأصغر الشئين بعد أعظمهما أو بعد بعضه ،

فأصغر الجرمين اللذين لا نهاية لهما بعد أعظمهما أو بعد بعضه ، وإن كان بعده فهو بعد بعضه لا محالة ،

فأصغرهما مساو بعض أعظمهما .

والمساويان هما اللذان متشابهتهما^(١) أبعاد ما بين نهاياتهما واحدة ؛ فهما إذن ذوات نهايات — لأن الأجرام المتساوية التى ليست متشابهة ، هى التى يعدّها جرم واحد عددا واحدا ، وتختلف نهاياتها بالكثرة أو الكيف أو معا ، فهما متناهيان^(٢) —

فالذى لا نهاية له الأصغر متناه ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ، فليس أحدهما أعظم من الآخر ؛

(١) فى الأصل هكذا ، وكذلك فى « رسالة فى وحدانية الله وتناهى جرم العالم » ونجد فى رسالة « فى مائة ما لا يمكن أن يكون لا نهاية له — الخ : « والأشياء المتشابهة هى التى أبعاد نهاياتها المتشابهة متساوية » — والمعنى بعد هذا مفهوم .

(٢) يعنى أن عدد أجزائها ، بحسب وحدة العدد ، واحد ، لكنها تختلف فيما عدا ذلك . والدليل على هذا الرأى أن كلمة « جزء » تدكر بدلا من كلمة « جرم » فى « رسالة فى وحدانية الله — الخ » . وفيما يلى (س ١٢٧) نجد السكندى يقول ان الجزء هو « ماعد الكل » ، وقسمه بأقدار متساوية .

وإن كان ليس بأعظم مما [كان^(١)] قبل أن يُزاد عليه ، فقد زيد على جرم جرم^(٢) ، فلم يُزد شيئاً ، وصار جميع ذلك مساوياً له وحده ، وهو وحده جزء له ولجزءه اللذين اجتماعاً ؛

فالجزء مثل الكل — هذا خلف لا يمكن ؛

فقد تبين أنه لا يمكن أن يكون جرم^(٢) لا نهاية له . وبهذا التدبير تبين أنه لا يمكن شيء^(٣) من الكميات أن تكون لا نهاية لها بالفعل .

والزمان كميّة ، فليس يمكن أن يكون زمان^(٤) لا نهاية له بالفعل ؛ فالزمان ذو أول متناه ؛

والأشياء أيضاً المحمولة في المنتهى متناهية اضطراباً ؛

فكل محمول في الجرم من كم أو مكان أو حركة أو زمان — الذي هو مفصول بالحركة — وجملة كل ما هو محمول في الجرم بالفعل ، فمتناه أيضاً ، إذ الجرم متناه .

الجرم الكل متناه . وكل محمول فيه بعده^(٥) أيضاً .

وإذ جرم الكل ممكن أن يُزاد فيه بالوهم زيادة دائمة ، [ب] أن تتوهم أعظم منه ، ثم أعظم من ذلك دائماً — فإنه لا نهاية في التزايد من جهة الإمكان — فهو بالقوة بلا نهاية ، إذ القوة ليست شيئاً^(٦) غير الإمكان ، [أعنى] أن يكون الشيء المقول هو بالقوة ؛

فكل ما في الذي لا نهاية له بالقوة هو أيضاً بالقوة لا نهاية له ؛ ومن ذلك الحركة والزمان . فإذا^(٧) الذي لا نهاية له إنما هو في القوة — فأمّا بالفعل فليس يمكن أن يكون شيء لا نهاية له ، لما قدمنا —

(١) هذه الزيادة بحسب الرسالة الأخرى .

(٢) في الأصل : جرمًا .

(٣) هكذا في الأصل ، ولكن بدون شكل — وهو صحيح منطقيًا .

(٤) في الأصل : والزمان .

(٥) يعني أصغر منه ، وفي الأصل : بعد ؛ ويجوز أن تكون : يُعَدّ .

(٦) في الأصل : شيء .

(٧) في الرسالة الأخرى : فإن .

وإذ^(١) ذلك واجب ، فقد اتضح أنه لا يمكن أن يكون زمان^(٢) بالفعل لا نهاية له ؛

والزمان زمان جرم الكل ، أعنى مدته ؛ فإن كان الزمان متناهياً فإن إنية الجرم متناهية ، إذ الزمان ليس بموجود ؛

ولا جرم بلا زمان ، لأن الزمان إنما هو عدد الحركة ، أعنى أنه مدة تملؤها الحركة ، فإن كانت حركة كان زمان^(٢) ، وإن لم تكن حركة لم يكن زمان^(٣) ؛

والحركة إنما هي حركة الجرم ، فإن كان جرم كانت حركة وإلا لم تكن حركة ؛ والحركة هي تبدل ما ، فتبدل^(٤) مكان أجزاء الجرم ومركزه أو كل

أجزاء الجرم فقط ، هي الحركة المكانية ؛ وتبدل المكان الذي ينتهي إليه الجرم بنهاياته ، إما بالقرب من مركزه وإما بالبعد منه ، هو الربو والاضمحلال ؛ وتبدل

كيفياته المحمولة فقط هو الاستحالة ؛ وتبدل جوهره هو الكون والفساد ؛ وكل تبدل فهو عايد مدة الجرم ، فكل تبدل فهو لذي الزمان ؛ فإن

كانت حركة كان جرم اضطراباً ، وإن كان جرم وجب أن تكون حركة اضطراباً ، أو لا تكون حركة ؛

فإن كان جرم [و] لم تكن حركة ، فإما أن لا تكون حركة بته ، وإما أن لا تكون ، ويمكن أن تكون ؛

فإن لم تكن بته ، فالحركة ليس بموجودة ، إذ الجرم موجود^(٦) ، وهي موجودة^(٧) ، وهذا خلف لا يمكن ،

(١) في الرسالة الأخرى : وإن .

(٢) و (٣) في الأصل : زمانا ، وهو خطأ ، ويخالف طريقة تفكير الكندي في رسائل أخرى له ، راجع « رسالته في وحدانية الله وتناهي جرم العالم » .

(٤) في الأصل قد تبدل ؛ وفي رسالة الوجدانية : والحركة هي تبدل الأحوال ، فتبدل مكان كل أجزاء الجرم ومركزه أو كل أجزاء الجرم فقط هو الحركة المكانية . وقد صححت طبقاً للرسالة الأخرى .

(٥) زيادة مقترحة .

(٦) في الأصل : موجودة ، وهو خطأ واضح .

(٧) لعله يقصد ما تقدم ، وهو أن الحركة ملازمة للجرم بوجه عام ، لأن الجرم في زمان حتماً

فليس يمكن أن يكون — إن كان جرمٌ موجوداً — لا حركةً بتة . وإن كان ، إذا كان جرمٌ موجوداً ، ممكننا أن يكون حركةً موجودة ، فإن الحركة بالاضطرار موجودة في بعض الأجرام ، لأن الممكن له الشيء هو الموجود ذلك الشيء في بعض ذوات جوهره ، كالكتابة موجودة^(١) بالإمكان لمحمد ، وليست فيه بالفعل ، إذ هي موجودة في بعض جوهر الإنسان ، أعني في آخر من الناس ؛ فالحركة باضطرار موجودة في بعض الأجرام ، فهي موجودة في الجرم المطلق ، فهي موجودة اضطراراً في الجرم المطلق ، فإذا^(٢) الجرم موجود فالحركة موجودة .

وقد قيل أن الحركة لا تكون ، إذا كان الجرم موجوداً ؛ فهي إذن تكون ، إذا كان الجرم موجوداً ، لا تكون ، إذا كان الجرم موجوداً ؛ وهذا محال وخلف لا يمكن ؛

فليس يمكن أن يكون جرمٌ ولا حركة ؛

فإذن متى كان جرم كانت حركة اضطراراً .

وقد نظن أنه يمكن أن يكون جرمٌ الكل كان ساكناً أولاً ، وكان ممكناً أن يتحرك ، ثم تحرك .

وهذا ظن كاذب اضطراراً ؛ لأن جرم الكل ، إن كان أولاً ساكناً ، ثم تحرك ، فلا يخلو من أن يكون جرمٌ الكل كونهً عن ليس^(٣) ، أو لم يزل^(٤) ؛ فإن كان كونهً عن ليس ، فإن تهويته أينساعن^(٥) ليس فكون^(٦) ؛ فتَهْوِيَه حركة ، كما قدمنا ، حيث وصفنا^(٧) الحركة : أن أحد أنواع الحركة هو الكون ،

(١) في الأصل موجبة ، وقد صححتها تمشياً مع المعنى .

(٢) في الأصل : فإذا ، وهو جائز على كل حال .

(٣) يعني جرم العالم : أن يكون موجوداً عن عدم .

(٤) أو هو قديم .

(٥) يشتق الكندي من كلمة « هو » فعلاً (يتهوى) يستعمله في معنى الوجود — راجع الفهرس الحاس بالمصطلحات .

(٦) هكذا في الأصل ويكون المعنى أوضح لو أسقطنا الفاء .

(٧) في الأصل صنفنا ، وهي غير منقوطة ، ونظراً لأن الكندي قل أن يستعمل هذه الكلمة فاعلمنا محرفة عن : وصفنا .

فإذا لم يسبق الجرم [الكون] كان [الكون] ذاته ، فإذا^(١) لم يسبق كون الجرم الحركة بتة ؛

وقد قيل إنه كان أولاً ولا حركة ؛ فهو ولا حركة ، ولم يكن ولا حركة ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ؛ فليس يمكن ، إن كان الجرم كونهً عن ليس ، أن يسبق الحركة ؛

فإن كان الجرم لم يزل ساكناً ، ثم تحرك لأنه كان ممكناً له أن يتحرك ، فقد استحال جرم الكل — الذي لم يزل — من السكون بالفعل إلى الحركة بالفعل ؛ والذي لم يزل لا يستحيل ، كما قدمنا بيان ذلك ؛

فهو إذن مستحيل لامستحيل ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ، فليس يمكن أن يكون جرمٌ الكل لم يزل ساكناً بالفعل ، ثم استحال متحركاً بالفعل .

والحركة فيه موجودة ؛ فإذا^(٢) لم يسبق الحركة بتة .

فإذا^(٣) إن كانت حركة كان جرمٌ اضطراراً ، وإن كان جرمٌ كانت حركة اضطراراً ؛

وقد تقدم أن الزمان لا يسبق الحركة ، فالزمان لا يسبق الجرم اضطراراً ، إذ لا زمان إلا بحركة ، وإذا لا جرم إلا وحركة ، ولا حركة إلا وجرم ، ولا جرم بلا^(٤) مدة ، إذ المدة هي ما هو فيه هويته ، أعني ما هو فيه هو ما [هو]^(٥) ؛

ولا مدة جرم إلا وحركة ، إذ الجرم مع حركة أبداً ، كما قد اتضح ؛ فمدة الجرم اللازمة للجرم أبداً تعمدتها حركة الجرم اللازمة للجرم أبداً ، فالجرم لا يسبق الزمان أبداً ؛

فالجرم والحركة والزمان لا يسبق بعضها بعضاً أبداً .

(١) في الأصل : فإذا .

(٢) في الأصل : فإذا .

(٣) في الأصل : إلا بلا ، ولا شك أنه خطأ في النسخ أو في الكتابة ، لأنه لا يتفق مع المعنى .

(٤) زدتها للبيان ، وإن كان الكندي لا يهتم بهذه الزيادة ، كما نرى منه فيما بعد —

راجع أول هذه الرسالة .

فإذن قد اتضح أنه لا يمكن أن يكون زمان لا نهاية له ، إذ لا يمكن أن يكون كمية أو ذوكية لا نهاية له بالفعل ؛ فكل زمان فذو نهاية بالفعل .

والجزم لا يسبق الزمان ، فليس يمكن أن يكون جرم الكل لا نهاية له — لإينيته^(١) ؛ فإننية جرم الكل متناهية اضطراباً ، فجرم الكل لا يمكن أن يكون لم يزل . ونبين ذلك بقول آخر ، بعد إذ اتضح بما قلنا ، يزيد الناظرين في هذه السبيل تمهراً بتوابعها^(٢) ، فنقول :

إن من التبدل التركيب والانتلاف ، لأن ذلك جمع أشياء ونظمها . والجزم جوهر طويل عريض عميق ، أى ذو أبعاد ثلاثة ، فهو مركب من الجوهر الذى هو جنسه ومن الطويل العريض العميق الذى هو فصله ؛ وهو المركب من هبولى وصورة ؛

والتركيب تبدل الحالة التى هى لا تركيب ، والتركيب حركة ، فإن لم تكن الحركة لم يكن التركيب ؛

والجزم مركب ، فإن لم [يكن] ^(٣) حركة لم يكن جرم ^(٤) ؛

فالجزم والحركة لم يسبق بعضها بعضاً ؛

وبالحركة الزمان ، لأن الحركة تبدل ، والتبدل عدد مدة المتبدل ، فالحركة عادة مدة المتبدل ؛

والزمان مدة تعدّها الحركة ؛ ولكل جرم مدة ، كما قدمنا ، أى ما هو فيه إنسية ، أعنى ما هو فيه هوما ؛

والجزم لا يسبق الحركة ، كما أوضحنا ، فالجزم لا يسبق مدة تعدّها الحركة ، فالجزم والحركة والزمان لا يسبق بعضها بعضاً فى الإنسية ، فهى معاً فى الإنسية ؛ فإذا كان الزمان ذا نهاية بالفعل ، فإنية الجرم ذات نهاية بالفعل اضطراباً ، إن

(١) هكذا فى الأصل .

(٢) كلمة لم أستطع قراءتها الا بعد العثور على استعمال السكندى لكلمة « التولج » فى رسالته فى دفع الأحزان .

(٣) زدتها ، لإكمال المعنى .

(٤) فى الأصل : جرم ، وهو خطأ .

كان التركيب والتأليف تبدلاً ما ؛ وإن لم يكن التركيب والتأليف تبدلاً ، فليست هذه النتيجة بواجبة .

ولنوضح الآن بنوع آخر أنه لا يمكن أن يكون زمان لا نهاية له بالفعل فى ماضيه ولا آتیه ، فنقول :

إن قبل كل فصل من الزمان فصلاً إلى أن ننتهى إلى فصل من الزمان لا يكون فصل قبله ، أعنى إلى مدة مفصولة ليست قبلها مدة مفصولة — لا يمكن غير ذلك ؛

فإن أمكن ذلك ^(١) فإن خلف كل فصل من الزمان فصلاً ^(٢) بلا نهاية ؛

فإذن لا ينتهى ^(٣) إلى زمن مفروض ، أبداً ، لأن من لا نهاية فى القدمة إلى هذا الزمن المفروض مساوى للمدة للمدة التى من هذا الزمن المفروض فصاعداً ^(٤) فى الأزمنة إلى ما لا نهاية له ؛

وإن كان من لا نهاية إلى زمن محدود معلوم ^(٥) ، فإن من ذلك الزمن المعلوم إلى ما لا نهاية له من الزمان معلوماً ^(٦) ؛

فيكون إذن ^(٧) لا متناه متناهياً ، وهذا خلف لا يمكن .

وأيضاً إن كان لا ينتهى إلى الزمان المحدود حتى ينتهى إلى زمن قبله ، ولا إلى الذى قبله حتى ينتهى إلى زمن قبله ، وكذلك بلا نهاية — وما لا نهاية له لا تقطع مسافته ، ولا يؤتى على آخرها ، فإنه لا يقطع ما لا نهاية له من الزمان ، حتى

(١) هكذا فى الأصل ، وأيضاً فى رسالة وحدانية الله وتناهى جرم العالم ؛ فإن لم تكن كلمة « ذلك » ، « غير ذلك » فيجب أن تشير إلى الذى هو غير ذلك ، بحسب المعنى .

(٢) فى الأصل : فصل ، كما فى رسالة الوحدانية — والكلام كله غير مشكول . وقد صححتها ، لأن الأصل لا يعنى بالنحو . ويجوز أن نعتبر خلف فعلاً ، ويستقيم المعنى واللفظ أيضاً .

(٣) غير منقوطة فى الأصل ، ويجوز أن تكون : تنتهى .

(٤) فى الأصل : مصاعداً .

(٥) شكل اجتهدى ، يعنى : زمن معلوم .

(٦) فى الأصل : معلوم .

(٧) فى الأصل : إذا ؛ والكلمة التالية إما أن تكون اسماً لسكان وإما أن تصحح ::

لا متناهياً .

ينتهي إلى زمن محدود، بته — والاشتهاء إلى زمن محدود موجود به، فليس الزمان فصلا من لا نهاية، بل من نهاية اضطراراً؛ فليست مدة الجرم بلا نهاية.

وليس يمكن أن يكون جرمٌ بلا مدة، فإنَّية الجرم ليست لانهاية لها، فإنَّية الجرم متناهية، فممتنع أن يكون جرمٌ لم يزل.

وليس يمكن أن يكون آتى الزمان لا نهاية له بالفعل، لأنه إن كان الزمان الماضي إلى زمن محدود ممتنعاً أن يكون لا نهاية له، كما قدمنا، والأزمنة متتالية، زمان بعد زمان — فإنه كلما زيد على الزمان المتناهي المحدود زمانٌ كانت جملة الزمان المحدود والمزيد عليه محدوداً — فإن لم تصر الجملة محدودة، فقد زيد شيءٌ محدود الكمية على شيء محدود الكمية، فاجتمع منهما شيء لا نهاية له في الكمية؛

والزمان من الكمية المتصلة، أعني أن له فصلاً مشتركاً للماضي منه والآتى؛ وفصله المشترك هو الآن الذى هو نهاية الزمان الماضى الأخيرة ونهاية الزمان الآتى الأولى؛

ولكل زمان محدود نهايتان: نهاية أولى ونهاية آخرة^(١)، فإن اتصل زمانان محدودان بنهاية واحدة مشتركة لهما، فإن نهاية كل واحد منهما الباقية محدودة معلومة؛ وقد كان قيل إنه تصير جملة الزمانين محدودة^(٢) فهى لا محدودة النهايات؛ وهى محدودة النهايات،

وهذا خلف لا يمكن؛ فليس يمكن، إن زيد^(٣) على الزمن المحدود زمانٌ محدود، أن تكون الجملة لا محدودة؛ فكلما^(٤) زيد على الزمن المحدود زمان محدود، فكله محدود النهاية من آخره؛ فليس يمكن أن يكون الزمان الآتى لا نهاية له بالفعل؛

فلنكمل الآن هذا الفن الثانى.

(١) فى الأصل بلا شكل ولا تقبيل، ويجوز أن تكون: أخيرة أو آخرة.

(٢) فى الأصل: المحدودة.

(٣) بد هذه الكلمة فى الأصل: ما زيد؛ وهى زائدة بلا شك.

(٤) فى الأصل: فكل ما.

الفن الثالث

من الجزء الأول

وقد يتلو ما قدّمنا، البحث عن الشيء، هل يمكن أن يكون علة كونه ذاته أم لا يمكن ذلك؛ فنقول إنه ليس ممكننا^(١) أن يكون الشيء علة كونه ذاته، أعني يكون^(٢) ذاته تهوياً^(٣) من شيء أو لا من شيء — فإنه قد يقال: كونه، فى مواضع آخر، للكائن من شيء خاصة — لأنه لا يخلو من أن يكون أيساً وذاته ليس، أو^(٤) يكون ليسا وذاته أيس، أو يكون ليسا وذاته ليس أو يكون أيسا وذاته أيس؛

فإن كان ليسا، وذاته ليس، فهو لا شيء وذاته لا شيء؛ ولا شيء^(٥) لاعلة ولا معلول؛ لأن العلة والمعلول إنما هما مقولان على شيء له وجود ما؛ فهو إذن لاعلة كونه ذاته، إذ ليس هو علة مطلقاً^(٦)؛ وقد قيل إنه علة كونه ذاته — وهذا خلف لا يمكن، فليس يمكن أن يكون غلة كونه ذاته، إن كان ليسا وذاته ليس.

وكذلك يعرض إن كان ليسا وذاته أيس؛ لأنه أيضاً، إذ هو ليس، لا شيء؛ ولا شيء لاعلة ولا معلول، كما قدمنا؛ فهو لا علة كونه ذاته؛

وقد تقدم أنه علة كونه ذاته — وهذا خلف لا يمكن، فليس يمكن أن يكون علة كونه ذاته، إن كان ليسا وذاته أيس.

ويعرض من ذلك أيضاً أن يكون ذاته غيره، لأن المتغيرات هى التى يمكن

(١) فى الأصل: ممكن.

(٢) فى الأصل غير منقوطة.

(٣) فى الأصل مهوية — وهو غير مستقيم، لأن التهوى، عند الكندى، هو صيرورة الشيء هوىة.

(٤) فى الأصل: و.

(٥) معنى لا شيء هنا وقبل ذلك وبعده أنه معدوم.

(٦) فى الأصل: مطلقاً.

أن يعرض لأحدها^(١) مالا يعرض للأخر؛ فإذا عرض له أن يكون ليسا وعرض لذاته أن يكون أيسا، فذاته هي لاهو؛

وكل شيء فذاته هي هو؛ فهو لاهو، وهو هو؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن أيضا. وكذلك يعرض إن كان أيسا وذاته ليس، أعني أن تكون ذاته غيره، إذ عرض له غير ما عرض لذاته؛ فيجب من ذلك، كما قدمنا، أن يكون هو هو، وهو [لا] هو^(٢)؛ هذا خلف لا يمكن أيضا، فليس إذن يمكن أن يكون أيسا، وذاته ليس.

وكذلك أيضا يعرض إن كان أيسا، وذاته أيسس، وكان علة كون ذاته؛ لأنه إن كان علة ذاته المكونة لها، فذاته معلولته؛ والعلة غير المعلول، فقد عرض له إذن أن يكون علة ذاته، وعرض لذاته أن تكون معلولته؛ فذاته هي لاهو، وكل شيء فذاته هي هو؛ فيجب إذن من هذا الفن أن يكون هو لاهو، وهو هو — وهذا خلف لا يمكن؛ فليس يمكن أن يكون أيسا، وذاته أيسس، وهو علة كون ذاته.

ومثل هذا أيضا يعرض، إن كان أيسسا، وذاته ليس، وهو علة ذاته، وذاته معلولة أيضا: أن يكون هو هو، وهو لاهو؛ فليس يمكن إذن أن يكون شيء علة كون ذاته، وذلك ما أردنا أن نوضح.

وإذ قد تبين ذلك فنقول إن كل لفظ فلا يخلو من أن يكون ذا معنى أو غير ذي معنى؛ فما لا معنى له فلا مطلوب فيه؛ والفلسفة إنما تعتمد ما كان فيه مطلوب — فليس من شأن الفلسفة استعمال مالا مطلوب فيه.

وما كان له معنى لا يخلو^(٣) من أن يكون كلياً أو جزئياً؛ والفلسفة لا تطلب الأشياء الجزئية، لأن الجزئيات ليست^(٤) بمتناهية، وما لم يكن متناهياً لم يحيط به علم؛

(١) في الأصل: لاحدهما.

(٢) في الأصل: وهو هو، وهذا لا يتفق مع المعنى.

(٣) في الأصل: يخلو.

(٤) في الأصل: ليس.

والفلسفة عالمة بالأشياء التي لها علمها بحقائقها؛ فهي إذن إنما تطلب الأشياء الكلية المتناهية، المحيط بها العلم كمال^(١) علم حقائقها؛

والأشياء الكلية العامة^(٢) لا تخلو من أن تكون ذاتية أو غير ذاتية؛ أعني بالذاتي ما هو مقسوم ذات الشيء، وهو الذي بوجوده قوام كون الشيء وثباته وبعده انتقاض الشيء وفساده، كالحياة التي بها قوام الحي وثباته، وبعدها مساد الحي وانتفاضه؛

فالحياة ذاتية في الحي، والذاتي هو المسمى جوهرية، لأن به قوام جوهر الشيء؛ والجوهرى لا يخلو من أن يكون جامعا أو مفترقا؛

أما الجامع فالواقع على أشياء كثيرة يعطى كل واحد منها حده واسمه، فهو يجمعها بذلك؛

والواقع على أشياء كثيرة بأن يعطى كل واحد منها اسمه^(٣) وحده؛ إما أن يقع على أشخاص كالإنسان الواقع على كل واحد من أوحاد الناس، أعني على كل شخص إنساني؛ وهذا هو المسمى صورة، إذ هي صورة واحدة واقعة على كل واحد من هذه الأشخاص؛

وإما أن يقع على صور^(٤) كثيرة كالحي الواقع على كل صورة من صور الحي، كالإنسان والفرس، وهذا هو المسمى جنسا، إذ هو بجنس واحد^(٥) واقع كل واحد من هذه الصور.

وأما الجوهرى المفرق، فهو الفارق بين حدود الأشياء، كالناطق الفاصل لبعض الحي من بعض؛ وهذا هو المسمى فصلا، لفصله بعض الأشياء من بعض. وأما الذي ليس بذاتي فهو ضد هذا المتقدم وصفه، وهو الذي قوامه بالشيء

(١) قراءة اجتهدية.

(٢) مكذا في الأصل.

(٣) غير واضحة تماما في الأصل.

(٤) في الأصل: صورة؛ وهو خطأ في النسخ.

(٥) هكذا في الأصل، ولعله يقصد: من جهة واحدة أو على نحو واحد.

الموضوع له ، وثبأته به ، وعدمه بعدم الشيء الموضوع له ؛ فهو إذن في الجوهر الموضوع [له] ^(١) ، وليس بجوهرى ، بل عارض ^(٢) الجوهر ، فسمى لذلك عرضاً ؛ وهو الذى في الجوهر لا يخلو من :

أن يكون في شيء واحد منفرداً به خاصاً له دون غيره ، كالضحك في الإنسان والنهيق في الحمار ، فيسمى لذلك خاصة ، لأنه يخص شيئاً واحداً ؛ أو يكون في أشياء كثيرة يعمها كالبياض في الورق والقطن ، فسمى لذلك عرضاً عاماً على حاله ، لأنه يعرض ^(٣) لأشياء كثيرة .

فكل ملفوظ له معنى :

إما أن يكون جنساً وإما صورة وإما شخصا وإما فصلاً وإما خاصة وإما عارضاً عاماً —

وهذه جميعاً يجمعها شيان : هما الجوهر والعرض — فالجنس والصورة والشخص والفصل جوهرية ؛ والخاصة والعرض العام عرضية .

وإما كلاً وإما جزءاً ، وإما مجتمعا وإما مفترقا .

وإذا قد تقدم ذلك فلنقل على كم نوع يُقال الواحد ؛ فنقول : إن الواحد يُقال على كل متصل ، وعلى ما لم يقبل الكثرة أيضاً ؛ فهو يُقال إذن ^(٤) على أنواع شتى ، منها الجنس والصورة والشخص والفصل والخاصة والعرض العام ؛ وعلى جميع ما قد قدم .

والشخص إما أن يكون :

طبيعياً كالحيوان أو النبات ^(٥) وما أشبه ذلك ،

(١) زيادة بحسب النص المتقدم مباشرة .

(٢) غير مشكولة في الأصل ؛ فإذا لم تكن فعلاً ، فلعله قد سقطت كلمة : في ، بعد كلمة عارض ، بحيث يكون النص : وليس بجوهرى ، بل عارض [في] الجوهر ، فسمى لذلك عرضاً ... الخ

(٣) في الأصل : لا يعرض ، وهو يخالف المعنى .

(٤) في الأصل : إذا .

(٥) غير منقوطة ، وقد اخترت قراءتها هكذا

وإما صناعياً كالييت وما أشبه ذلك ، فإن البيت متصل بالطبع ، وتركيبه متصل بعرض ، أعنى بالمهنة ^(١) ؛ فهو واحد بالطبع ، وتركيبه واحد بالمهنة ؛ لأنه إنما صار واحداً بالاتحاد ^(٢) العرضى ، فأما البيت عينه فبالاتحاد الطبيعى .

ويقال ^(٣) أيضاً على الكل ويقال على الجزء ، ويقال على الجميع ويقال على

البعض ؛

وقد يظن أن الكل لا فصل بينه وبين الجميع ^(٤) ،

لأن الكل يُقال على المشتبه ^(٥) الأجزاء وعلى [الأشياء] ^(٦) الالآتى ليست بمشتبهة الأجزاء ، كقولنا : كل الماء — والماء من المشتبهة الأجزاء — وكل البدن ، المركب من عظم ولحم ، ومالحق ذلك من المختلفة الأجزاء ، وكل الجليل ، وهى أشخاص مختلفة ؛

فأما الجميع فلا يُقال على المشتبهة الأجزاء ؛ فلا يقال : جميع الماء ؛ لأن الجميع أيضاً يقال على جمع مختلفات بعرض ، أو أن تكون موحدة ^(٧) بمعنى ما ، وكل واحد منها قائم بطباعه غير الآخر ، فيقع عليها اسم المجموعة ؛ فأما الكل فيقال على كل متحد بأى نوع كان الاتحاد ، فلذلك لا يقال : جميع الماء ، إذ ليس هو أشياء مختلفة قائم كل واحد بطباعه ^(٨) ، بل يقال كل الماء ، إذ هو متحد .

وكذلك بين الجزء والبعض فرق ^(٩) ؛

(١) هكذا في الأصل ، ولعله يقصد فعل البانى له .

(٢) هذه الكلمة التى بعدها غير منقوطة ، ولكن اخترت قراءتها هكذا بحسب العبارات التالية .

(٣) الضمير يعود هنا على الواحد .

(٤) راجع تعريف الكل والجميع في رسالة في حدود الأشياء ورسومها ؛ وهو يطابق .

ما هنا ، في تعريف الكل .

(٥) هكذا في الأصل .

(٦) زيادة للإيضاح .

(٧) هكذا في الأصل ، وقد يجوز أن تكون : موجدة ، وهذا يلتئم مع المعنى أيضاً .

من وجه .

(٨) في الأصل : قائم على كل واحد بطباعها ؛ وقد أصلحته طبقاً لما قبله بقليل .

(٩) راجع تعريف الجزء والبعض في رسالة في حدود الأشياء ورسومها .

لأن الجزء يُقال على ما عدَّ (١) الكلّ ، فقسّمه بأقدار متساوية ؛
والبعض يُقال على ما لم يعدّ الكلّ ، فقسّمه بأقدار ليست بمتساوية ؛
فبعضه ، ولم يُساو بين أبعاضه — فيكون جزءاً له .

فالواحد إذن (٢) يُقال على كل واحد من المقولات والكائن من المقولات بأنه
جنس ، وبأنه نوع ، وبأنه شخص ، وبأنه فصل ، وبأنه خاصة ، وبأنه عرض
عام وبأنه كلّ وبأنه جزء ، وبأنه جميع ، وبأنه بعض .

ولأن (٣) الجنس هو في كل واحد من أنواعه ، إذ هو مقول على كل واحد
من أنواعه قولاً متواطئاً ؛

والنوع هو في كل واحد من أخصاؤه ، إذ هو مقول على كل واحد من
أخصاؤه قولاً متواطئاً ؛

والشخص إنما هو واحد من جهة الوضع (٤) ، لأن كل شخص فنقسم ؛ فهو
إذن [ليس واحداً] (٥) بالذات ، فالوحدة الشخصية مفارقة للشخص ، فهو غير
واحد الذات ، فالوحدة التي فيه — التي هي بالوضع — لا ذاتية فيه ، فليست
إذن وحدة له بالحقيقة ،

وما لم يكن في الشيء لحقيقته (٦) ذاتياً ، فهو فيه بنوع عرضي ؛ والعارض للشيء
من غيره ؛ فالعارض أثر في المعروض فيه ، والأثر من المضاف ، والأثر من مؤثر ،
فالوحدة في الشخص أثر من مؤثر اضطراباً .

والنوع هو المقول على كثير مختلفين بالأشخاص ؛ وهو كثير ، لأنه ذو
أشخاص كثيرة ، ولأنه مركب من أشياء أيضاً ؛ لأنه مركب من جنس وفصل ،

(١) في الأصل : عدا .

(٢) في الأصل : إذا .

(٣) جواب لأن فيما بعد .

(٤) يعني بالوضع والتسمية لا بالطبع والحقيقة .

(٥) زدتها لأجل المعنى ، وإلا فرمما كانت جملة : « فهو إذن بالذات » زائدة . ولا بد
من إصلاحها لأنها تنافي كل ما يلي .

(٦) يمكن أن تقرأ : بحقيقته . ويجوز أنها : بحقيقة ، وما بعدها بيان لها لغوياً ومنطقياً .

كنوع الانسان الذي هو مركب من حيّ ومن ناطق ومن ميت ؛ فالنوع بالذات
كثير من جهة أخصاؤه ومن جهة تركيبه ، والوحدة التي له إنما هي بالوضع من
جهة لا ذاتية ؛ فليست الوحدة له إذن (١) بحقيقة (٢) ؛ فهي إذن فيه بنوع
عرضي ، والعارض للشيء من غيره ، فالعرض أثر في المعروض فيه ، والأثر من
المضاف ، فالأثر من مؤثر ، فالوحدة في النوع أثر من مؤثر اضطراباً ، أيضاً .

والجنس هو المقول على كثيرين مختلفين بالنوع المنبئ (٣) عن مائة الشيء ؛
فهو كثير ، لأنه ذو أنواع كثيرة ؛ وكل نوع من أنواعه فهو « هو هو » (٤) ، وكل
نوع من أنواعه فهو أشخاص كثيرة ، وكل شخص من أخصاؤه « فهو هو » أيضاً ،
فهو كثير من هذه الجهة ؛ فالوحدة فيه أيضاً ليست بحقيقية ، فهي فيه إذن بنوع
عرضي ، والعارض للشيء من غيره ، فالعرض أثر في المعروض فيه ، والأثر من المضاف ،
فالأثر من مؤثر ؛ فالوحدة في الجنس أثر من مؤثر اضطراباً أيضاً .

والفصل هو المقول على كثير ، مختلفين بالنوع ، منبئ (٥) عن أيّية (٦)
الشيء ؛ فهو مقول على كل واحد من أشخاص الأنواع التي يقال عايمها الفصل ،
منبئ عن أيّيتها (٧) ؛ فهو كثير من جهة الأنواع والأشخاص التي تقال عليها تلك
الأنواع ، فالوحدة فيه أيضاً ليست بحقيقية ، فهي فيه إذن بنوع عرضي ؛ والعارض

(١) في الأصل : إذا .

(٢) هكذا في الأصل ، ويجوز أن تكون تحريفاً عن : بحقيقة .

(٣) في الأصل ، منبئ ، وقد صحّحتها هكذا ، ويجوز أن يكون أصلها منبئاً (على أن
تكون حالاً) ، ولكنها لم يُراع فيها النحو ، كما هو في كثير من المواضع .

(٤) هكذا في الأصل ، ولعله يقصد : فهو « هو هو » ، أي فهو هوية ، يعني شيئاً
فإنما بذاته .

(٥) هكذا في الأصل ، وهو جائز .

(٦) هكذا في الأصل ، دون علامات التشديد ، فلهذا يقصد ، أي شيء هو ، تحت
الجنس ، كما في أول الرسالة حيث يقول المؤلف إن « أي » تبحث عن الفصل ، و « ما » عن
الجنس بحيث تكون « أي » و « ما » معاً منبئين عن النوع . وقد كنت ميلاً إلى قراءة
هذه السكامة والسكامة الأخرى بعد قليل على أنها إنبئة ، ثم عدلت لما ذكرته .

(٧) ليس على هذه السكامة إلا نقطتان فوق التاء ، وقد قرأتها هكذا (أنظر الهامش
المتقدم ، ويجوز أيضاً أن تكون : إنبتها ، ولهذا وجه .

للشيء من غيره ، فالعرض أثر في المعروض فيه ، والأثر من المضاف ، فالأثر من مؤثر ، فالوحدة في الفصل أثر من مؤثر أيضا .

والخاصة هي المقولة على نوع واحد وعلى كل واحد من أشخاصه ، منبهة عن إنية ^(١) الشيء ، وليس بجزء لما أنبأت ^(٢) عن إنيته ^(٣) ، فهي كثير لأنها موجودة في أشخاص كثيرة ، ولأنها حركة والحركة متجزئة ؛ فالوحدة أيضا فيها ليست بحقيقية ؛ فهي إذن ^(٤) بنوع عرضي ؛ والعارض للشيء من غيره ، فالعرض أثر في المعروض فيه ، والأثر من المضاف ، فالأثر من مؤثر ، فالوحدة في الخاصة أثر من مؤثر أيضا ؛

والعرض العام أيضا مَقُولٌ على أشخاص كثيرة ؛ فهو كثير ، لأنه موجود في أشخاص كثيرة ؛ وإما أن يكون كمية ، فيقبل الزيادة والنقص ، فهو متجزئ ؛ وإما أن يكون كيفية ، فيقبل الشبيه ولا شبيهه ، والأشد والأضعف ، فيقبل الاختلاف ؛ فهو كثير ، فالوحدة فيه أيضا ليست بحقيقية ؛ فهي إذن فيه بنوع عرضي ؛ والعارض ، كما قدمنا ، أثر من مؤثر ؛ فالوحدة في العرض العام أثر من مؤثر أيضا .

والكل المقول على المقولات ذو أبعاد ، لأن كل واحد من المقولات بعض له ؛ والكل المقول على مقولة واحدة ذو أبعاد أيضا ، لأن كل مقولة جنس ؛ فكل مقولة ذات صور ، وكل صورة ذات أشخاص ، فالكل إذن كثير ، لأنه ذو أقسام كثيرة ؛ فالوحدة فيه أيضا ليست بحقيقية ، ^(٥) فهي إذن فيه بنوع عرضي ؛ فهي إذن من مؤثر ، كما قدمنا ، فيما ^(٦) كان بنوع عرضي .

وكذلك الجميع أيضا ، لأن الجميع يقال على أشياء كثيرة مجتمعة ؛ فهو

(١) ، (٣) هاتان الكلمتان على الأولى نقطة النون وعلى الثانية نقط النون والياء ، ولذلك تركتهما هكذا ، ولهما وجه من حيث المعنى ، وإن كان تفكير الكدى غير دقيق بحسب ما تقدم

(٢) في الأصل : أنبت .

(٤) في الأصل : اذا .

(٥) في الأصل : بحقيقة .

(٦) في الأصل : في ما .

كثير ، فالوحدة فيه أيضا ليست بحقيقية ؛ فهي فيه بنوع عرضي ؛ فهي إذن ^(١) فيه أثر من مؤثر ، كما قدمنا .

والجزء إما أن يكون جوهريا ، وإما عرضيا ؛

والجوهرى إما مشتبه الأجزاء وإما لا مشتبه الأجزاء ؛

والمشتبه الأجزاء كالماء ، الذى جزؤه ماء بكأله ، وكل ماء فهو قابل للتجزئة ، فجزء الماء ، إذ هو ماء بكأله ، كثير ؛

وأما لا مشتبه الأجزاء ؛ أعنى مختلف الأجزاء فكبدن الحيوان الذى هو من لحم ، وجلد ، وعصب ، وعروق ، وأوردة ، ورُبُط ^(٢) وصفاق ^(٣) ، وحجب وعظم ، ومخ ، ودم ، ومرة ، وبلغم ، وجميع ما ركب منه بدن الحى ، التى ليست بمشتبهة ؛ وكل واحد مما ذكرنا من بدن الحى فقابل للتجزئة ، فهو كثير أيضا .

وأما الجزء العرضى فمحمول فى الجزء الجوهرى ، أعنى كالطول والعرض والعمق فى اللحم والعظم وغير ذلك من أجزاء البدن الحى ، واللون والطعم وغير ذلك من الأعراض ، فهو منقسم بانقسام الجوهرى ؛ فهو إذن ذو أجزاء ، فهو كثير أيضا ، فالوحدة فى الجزء أيضا ليست بحقيقية .

والمتصل الطبيعى والمتصل العرضى كل واحد منهما ذو أجزاء — كالبيت ، فإن اتصاله الطبيعى شكله ، وهو ذو جهات ؛ واتصاله العرضى — أعنى الصناعى — باجتماع ما ركب منه كحجارته وملاطه وأجزاء جرمه ؛ فهو كثير أيضا ، فالوحدة فيه ليست بحقيقية .

وقد يقال الواحد أيضا بالإضافة إلى غيره ببعض هذه التى قدمنا ذكرها ، كالليل ، فانه يقال : ميل واحد ، إذ هو كل للغلوات ^(٤) ، وجزء للفرسخ ، ولأنه متصل ومجتمع ، لأن غلواته متصلة ومجمعة ؛ فهو جميع لغلواته ، ولأنه منفصل من

(١) فى الأصل : اذا .

(٢) جمع رباط ، ويظهر أن المؤلف يقصد الأعصاب التى تربط أجزاء البدن

(٣) الصفاق هو الجلد الذى تحت الجلد ، أو هو ما بين الجلد والصران .

(٤) جمع غلوة ، وهى مقياس للمسافات ، يختلف فى تقديره

أميال آخر ، أعني اللاتي جميعها فرسخ ؛ فليست الوحدة في ذلك أيضا بحقيقة ، بل [هي] عرض .

فليست الوحدة في شيء مما حددنا بحقيقة ، بل إنما هي في كل واحد منها بأنها لا تنقسم من حيث وجدت ، فالوحدة فيها بنوع عرضي ، والعارض للشيء لا من ذاته ، فالعارض للشيء من غيره ، فالعارض إذن ^(١) في المعارض فيه مستفاد من غيره ، فهو مستفاد من مُفيد ، فهو أثر في المعارض فيه ، والأثر من مؤثر ، لأن الأثر والمؤثر من المضاف الذي لا يسبق بعضه بعضا ؛

وأیضا كل شيء كان في شيء آخر عرضا ، فهو في شيء آخر ذاتي ؛ لأن كل شيء كان في شيء بعرض ، فهو في شيء آخر بالذات ؛ وإذ قد بينا أن الوحدة في هذه جميعا بعرض ^(٢) ، فهي لا جزء [لا] بالذات ، بل بعرض ^(٣) ؛ فالوحدة فيما هي فيه بعرض ^(٤) مستفادة الوحدة له مما هي فيه بالذات ؛

فإذن ^(٥) ها هنا واحد حق اضطرابا لا معلول الوحدة ؛ فلنبين ذلك بأكثر مما تقدم ، فنقول :

لا نخلو طباع كل مقول فيما عليه القول ، أعني كل ما أدركه الحس وأحاط بمائتته العقل من أن يكون :

واحدا أو كثيرا ،

أو واحدا وكثيرا معا ،

أو بعض هذه الأشياء واحدا لا كثيرا ^(٦) بنية ،

(١) في الأصل : اذا

(٢) و (٣) و (٤) الكلمة غير منقوطة ، ويمكن أن تقرأ على وجه آخر ، أعني على أن تكون فعلا ، والمعنى يستقيم بهذا أيضا ومعنى بعرض هو أن الوحدة ليست بالذات .

(٣) في الأصل : فهي لا جزء بالذات لا بعرض ؛ والمعنى غير مفهوم ، لذلك أصلحتها ، وأقصد من ذلك أن يكون المعنى المراد : فهي (يعني الأشياء) لا جزء (يعني واحدة) [لا] بذاتها بل بأمر آخر عرض لها ، هو فعل المؤثر ، وهذا يتفق مع الفكرة الأساسية لما تقدم .

(٥) في الأصل : اذا

(٦) في الأصل : كثير

أو بعضها ^(١) كثيرا لا واحدا بنية .

فإن كان طباع كل مقول الكثرة فقط ، فلا اتفاق اشتراك في حال واحدة أو معنى واحد ؛

والاتفاق موجود ، أعني الاشتراك في حال واحدة أو معنى واحد ؛

فالوحدة موجودة مع الكثرة ؛

وقد فرضنا أن الوحدة ليست بموجودة ؛

فالوحدة أئس ليس ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن .

وأیضا إن كان كل مقول كثرة فقط ، فلا شيء يخالف الكثرة ، لأن خلاف الكثرة الوحدة ؛ فلا خلاف ؛ فإن لم يكن خلاف في المقولات فهي متفقة وهي لا متفقة ، لأن الاتفاق اشتراك في حال واحدة أو معنى واحد ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ، فليس يمكن إلا أن تكون الوحدة .

وأیضا إن كانت كثرة فقط بلا وحدة ، فهي لا متشابهة ، لأن المتشابهة لها شيء واحد يعُمها ، تشابهه به ؛ ولا واحد مع الكثرة ، كما فرضنا ؛ فلا واحد يعُمها ، فهي لا متشابهة وهي متشابهة بعدمها الوحدة ، فهي متشابهة لا متشابهة معا ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ، فليس يمكن إلا أن تكون وحدة .

وأیضا إن كانت كثرة فقط بلا وحدة ، كانت متحركة ؛ لأنه إن لم تكن وحدة ، لم تكن حال واحدة ؛ وإن لم تكن حال واحدة ، لم يكن ساكن ؛ لأن الساكن ما كان بحال واحدة ، غير متغير ولا منتقل ؛ وإن لم يكن ساكن ، لم يكن ساكن ؛ وإن لم يكن ساكن كان متحرك ^(٢) .

وإن كانت كثرة فقط ، كانت أيضا غير متحركة ، لأن الحركة تبدل ؛ إنما بمكان ، وإما بكم ، وإما بكيف ، وإما بجوهر ؛ وكل تبدل فإلى غير ؛

(١) في الأصل : وبعضها

(٢) في الأصل : متحركا

وغير الكثرة فالوحدة؛ فإن لم يكن وحدة، فلا تبدل للكثرة؛ وقد فرضنا أن وحدة ليس^(١)، فتبدل كثرة ليس^(٢)، فحركة ليس^(٣)؛ فإن كانت كثرة فقط بلا وحدة، فليست بمتحركة أيضاً ولا ساكنة، كما قد تقدم؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن، فليس يمكن إلا أن تكون وحدة.

وأيضاً إن كانت كثرة فقط، فلا يخلو من أن تكون ذات أشخاص، أو لا ذات أشخاص بثة؛

فإن كانت ذات أشخاص، فإما أن تكون أشخاص الكثرة إما آحاداً وإما أن لا تكون آحاداً؛ فإن لم تكن آحاداً، ولم تنتقص إلى آحاد بثة، فهي كثرة بلا نهاية؛

وإذا فصل مما لا يتناهى قسم، وكل مقسوم أعظم مما يفصل منه، فالفصل متناهى الكثرة أو لا متناهى الكثرة؛

فإن كان متناهى الكثرة، وقد كان فرض لا متناهى الكثرة، فهو إذن متناهى الكثرة لا متناهى الكثرة؛

وهذا خلف لا يمكن؛

وإن كان لا متناهى الكثرة، وهو أصغر من المقسوم، فلا متناهى أعظم من لا متناهى؛

وهذا خلف لا يمكن، كما قدمنا؛

فهي إذن^(٤) أشخاص الكثرة، آحاداً^(٥) اضطراراً؛ فالوحدة موجودة إذن^(٦)، لأن كل شخص واحد، فهي إذن^(٧) كثرة فقط، وهي لا كثرة فقط، لأن الوحدة معها موجودة؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن، فإن كانت ليست ذات أشخاص ولا كثرة بثة، لأن معنى الكثرة هي الأشخاص المجتمعة، فهو لا كثرة وهو كثرة معاً؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن، فليس يمكن إلا أن يكون وحدة.

(١) و (٢) و (٣) ليس أى معدوم أو غير موجود

(٤) في الأصل : اذا

(٥) في الأصل آحادا

(٦) و (٧) في الأصل اذا

وأيضاً إن كانت كثرة فقط بلا وحدة، فإن كل شخص من أشخاص الكثرة غير محدود؛ لأن الحد واحد يقع على معنى واحد؛ فإن لم يكن في الكثرة واحد فلا^(١) محدود؛ وإذا لم يكن محدود فلا حد؛ وأشخاص الكثرة محدودة؛ فهي محدودة، وهي لا محدودة؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن، فليس يمكن أن لا تكون وحدة.

وأيضاً إن كانت كثرة فقط بلا وحدة، لم تقبل الكثرة العدد؛ لأن أوائل العدد الآحاد، لأن العدد كثرة مركبة من آحاد^(٢)، وتفاضل بعض الكثرة على بعض بآحاد؛

فإن لم يكن آحاداً لم يكن عدد؛ وإن كانت كثرة بلا آحاد، لم تكن معدودة؛

والكثرة معدودة، فالآحاد مع الكثرة؛

وقد كنا فرضنا أنه لا آحاد معها؛ فهذا خلف لا يمكن؛ فليس يمكن أن لا تكون آحاداً^(٣).

وأيضاً إن كانت كثرة فقط بلا واحد لم تكن معرفة؛ لأن المعرفة برسم^(٤) المعروف في نفس العارف بحال واحدة، لأنها إن لم تكن بحال واحدة تتحد بها نفس العارف ورسم المعروف، فلا معرفة؛ والمعرفة موجودة، فالحال الواحدة موجودة، فالوحدة موجودة؛ وقد كنا فرضنا أنها لا موجودة؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن، فليس يمكن أن لا تكون وحدة.

وأيضاً إن كانت كثرة فقط بلا واحد، فكل مقول إما أن يكون شيئاً، وإما أن لا يكون شيئاً؛ فإن كان شيئاً، فهو واحد؛ فالوحدة موجودة مع الكثرة؛ وقد كنا فرضنا أنه كثرة فقط، فهو كثرة فقط بلا وحدة، وهو كثرة ووحدة؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن؛

(١) في الأصل : ولا (٢) في الأصل ١١ حاد

(٣) هكذا في الأصل — ولهذا وجه . ولكن الأفضل أن نصحبها آحاد .

(٤) الكلمتان غير منقوطين ، ويمكن القراءة على وجه آخر، وقد يجوز أن تكون الكلمة

الأولى زائدة

وإن لم يكن شيئا فليس يأتلف منه كثرة ، ولا هو كثرة أيضا ؛ وقد فرض أنه كثرة ؛

فهو كثرة لا كثرة ؛ هذا خلف لا يمكن ، فليس يمكن أن لا يكون وحدة .
وهناك يتبين ^(١) أنه لا يمكن أن يكون بعض الأشياء كثرة فقط ؛ لأنه لا يمكن أن يكون شيء كثرة فقط ، لأنه إما أن يكون شيئا ، وإما أن لا يكون شيئا ؛ فإن كان شيئا فهو واحد ؛

وإن لم يكن شيئا ، فليس هو كثرة ؛
[فهو ليس كثرة] ^(٢) وهو كثرة ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ، فليس يمكن أن يكون بعض الأشياء كثرة فقط بلا وحدة .

وقد تبين من جميع هذه الأبحاث أنه لا يمكن أن تكون الأشياء كثرة بلا وحدة ، لأنه لا يمكن أن يكون بعض الأشياء كثرة بلا وحدة ؛ وكذلك تبين أنه لا يمكن أن يكون وحدة بلا كثرة ، ولا بعض الأشياء وحدة بلا كثرة ؛

فنتقول إنه إن كانت وحدة فقط بلا كثرة ، لم تكن مضادة ؛ لأن الضدَّ غيرُه الضدُّ ؛ والغريبة أقلُّ ما تقع في الاثنين ^(٣) . والاثنان كثرة ؛ فإن لم تكن كثرة لم تكن مضادة ، وإن كانت مضادة كانت كثرة ؛

والمضادة موجودة ، فالكثرة موجودة ؛ وقد فرضنا أنها ليست بموجودة ، فهي أينس أينس ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ، فليس يمكن أن لا تكون كثرة .

وأیضا إن كانت وحدة فقط بلا كثرة ، فلا استثناء ؛ لأن الاستثناء إنما يكون لواحد أو لأكثر من واحد دون أشياء غير المستثناة ^(٤) ؛

(١) في الأصل : تبين ،

(٢) بدلى أن هذه الزيادة ضرورية لسير الاستدلال ، وقوله : وإن لم يكن شيئا فليس بكثرة ، يشتمل على واحدة من النتيجتين لكونه ليس شيئا . وعلى كل حال فهذا الاصلاح اجتهادى .

(٣) يعنى أن الاثنين أقل ما لا بد منه للغريبة .

(٤) في الأصل : المستثناة

فإن كان استثناء فالكثرة موجودة ، والاستثناء والمستثنى موجودان ، فالكثرة موجودة ؛

وقد فرضنا أنها ليس ، فهي ^(١) أينس ليس ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ، فليس يمكن أن لا تكون كثرة .

وأیضا إن كانت وحدة فقط بلا كثرة ، فلا تبين ؛ لأن أقل ما فيه التباين اثنان ؛ والاثنان وما فوقهما كثرة ؛

فإن لم تكن كثرة ، لم يكن تبين ؛ وإن كان تبين ، فالكثرة موجودة ؛
والتباين موجود ، فالكثرة موجودة ^(٢) .

وأیضا قد فرضنا أنها ليست موجودة ، فهي أينس ليس ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ، فليس يمكن أن لا تكون كثرة .

وأیضا إن كانت وحدة فقط بلا كثرة فلا اتفاق ولا اختلاف ، ولا اتصال ولا افتراق ؛ لأن أقل ما يكون الاتفاق والافتراق والاختلاف والاتصال ^(٣) ، في اثنين . فالاثنان كثرة ، فإن لم تكن كثرة لم يكن اتفاق ^(٤) ولا اختلاف ولا اتفاق ^(٥) ؛

والاتفاق والاختلاف موجودان .

فالكثرة موجودة ؛ وقد كنا فرضنا أنها لا موجودة ، فهي أينس ليس ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ، [فليس يمكن] ^(٦) أن لا تكون كثرة .

وأیضا إن كانت وحدة فقط بلا كثرة ، فلا ابتداء ولا توسط ^(٧) ولا آخر له ، لأن ذلك لا يكون إلا في ذى أجزاء ^(٨) ؛

(١) في الأصل : وهي

(٢) هذه الكلمة في الأصل مكررة

(٣) في الأصل على هذا الترتيب ، ولم أعير

(٤) في الأصل : اتفاقا

(٥) كلمة : ولا اتفاق ، زائدة ، في الغالب

(٦) زيادة يتطلبها المعنى (٧) هكذا ، وهو مفهوم

(٨) في الأصل : احرا

والواحد لا ابتداء ولا وسط ولا آخر له ؛
والابتداء والوسط والآخر موجود ، فذو الأجزاء موجود ، وكل ذى أجزاء
أكثر من واحد ؛ فالكثرة موجودة فيه ؛
وقد كننا فرضنا أنها لا موجودة ، وهذا خلف لا يمكن ، فليس يمكن أن
لا تكون كثرة .

وأیضا إن كانت وحدة فقط بلا كثرة فلا^(١) شكل ، لأن الأشكال إما من
قسي وإما من أوتار ، وإما من مركبة من قسي وأوتار ، أو من سطوح قوسية
أو وترية ، أو مركبة منهما ؛
فالمستدير والكروي لهما مركز وإحاطة ؛ والمركب من قسي أو قوسية ، أو
خط أو خطية ، أو من قسي أو قوسى ، أو وتر أو وترى معا ، لها^(٢) زوايا وأطراف ،
ففيها كثرة ؛

فإن كانت الأشكال موجودة ، فالكثرة موجودة ؛ والشكل موجود ،
فالكثرة موجودة ؛
وقد كننا فرضنا أنها لا موجودة ، فالكثرة أيس ليس ، وهذا خلف لا يمكن ،
فليس يمكن أن لا تكون كثرة .

وأیضا إن كانت وحدة فقط بلا كثرة ، فهي لا متحركة ولا ساكنة ، لأن
المتحرك يتحرك بانتقال إلى غير : إما مكان ، وإما كم ، وإما كيف ، وإما جوهر —
وهذه كثرة ؛

والساكن ساكن فى مكان ، وأیضا بعض أجزائه فى بعض ؛ والمكان والأجزاء
كل واحد منهما كثرة ، لأن الأجزاء أكثر من جزء ، والمكان علو وسفل
وأمام ووراء ويمين وشمال ؛

والمكان بطباعه یوجب كثرة ، لأن المكان غیر المتمكن ، ومكان المتمكن
[یوجب متمكنا]^(٣) .

(١) فى الأصل : ولا

(٢) لعل الضمير يعود على جملة ما يسبقه

(٣) زدت ما بين القوسين ظنا أنه قد سقط من ناسخ الأصل ما يشبه ذلك .

والربو یوجب رايا ، والنقص یوجب ناقصا ، والاستحالة توجب مستحيلا ،
والكون یوجب كائنا ، والفساد یوجب فاسدا ؛

ونفى هذه جمیعها یوجب كثرة ، لأن لا كائن لا فاسد لا راب^(١) لا مضمحل^(٢)
لا مستحيل^(٣) ، موضوع ومحمول : موضوع محمول عليه النفى لأشیاء محدودة^(٤) ؛

فإن كان السكون كانت كثرة ، فإن لم يكن كثرة لم يكن سكون ولا حركة ؛
والسكون والحركة موجودان ، فالكثرة موجودة ؛

وقد كننا فرضنا أنها لا موجودة ، فهي أيس ليس ؛ هذا خلف لا يمكن ،
فليس يمكن أن لا تكون كثرة .

وهناك يتبين^(٥) أنه لا يمكن أن يكون ولا واحد من الأشياء ليس فيه كثرة ؛
لأنه إن لم تكن فيه كثرة ، لم يكن متحركا ولا ساكنا ؛ وليس يخلو شيء من نوع
حركة وسكون من المحسوسة وما يلحق المحسوسة ، فليس يمكن أن يكون شيء^(٦)
واحد لا كثرة فيه .

وأیضا إن كانت وحدة فقط بلا كثرة لم يكن جزء^(٧) ؛ ولا كل^(٨) ؛ لأن
الكل جامع الأجزاء ، وأقل ما يكون المجتمع اثنان ، والاثنان كثرة ؛ فإن لم تكن
كثرة لم يكن كل ، وإن لم يكن كل لم يكن جزء ، لأن الكل والجزء من
المضاف الذى يجب كل واحد من طرفيه بوجود الآخر وأيهما^(٩) بطل ، بطل
بيطلانه الآخر ؛

فلا كل ولا جزء إذن^(١٠) للأشياء ؛ والأشياء كل وجزء ، فالكل والجزء
أيس ليس ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن .

(١) فى الأصل : رابى (٢) هكذا النص

(٣) فى الأصل : تبين

(٤) فى الأصل : جزءا

(٥) فى الأصل : أو أيهما ، وهو جائز

(٦) فى الأصل : اذا

فيبقى إذن^(١) أيضاً أن تكون الوحدة مشاركة للكثرة أى مشاركة لها في جميع المحسوسات وما يلحق المحسوسات ، أى أن ما فيه الكثرة منها فقيه الوحدة ، وما فيه الوحدة فقيه الكثرة ؛

فاذاً قد تبين أن اشتراك الكثرة والوحدة في كل محسوس وما يلحق المحسوس ، فلا يخلو ذلك الاشتراك من أن يكون بالبخت ، أى الاتفاق ، بلا علة ، أو بعلة ؛

فإن كان بالبخت فقد كانت متباينة ، فيلزمها الحالات التي لزمتم في الاتحاد^(٢) ، إذاً بحثنا عن وجود كثرة بلا وحدة ؛

وكيف يمكن أن تكون كثرة ووحدة معاً ، وهما متباينتان ؟ والكثرة إنما هي كثرة الآحاد ، أى جماعة وحدانيات ؛

فع الكثرة الوحدة اضطراراً ، لا يمكن غير ذلك . وكيف يمكن أن يكون — إذاً هما متباينان — وحدة فقط ، وهما شيئان ، وشيئان كثرة ؟

فليس يمكن أن يكونا كذلك . وقد يمكن أن نرجع^(٣) إلى ما كانت علة بالبخت من التباين ، وهى إنيات ؛

١٥ فيلزم فيها أيضاً ما قدمنا من الخلف ؛ فليس يمكن أن تكون كانت متباينة ، ثم اتفقت بالبخت ، أعني بغير علة ؛

فبقى إذن أن يكون اشتراكها بعلة منذ بدء كونها ؛ فاذاً قد تبين أن اشتراكها بعلة ، فلا تخلو العلة من أن تكون من ذاتها أو

يكون لاشتراكها علة أخرى من غير ذاتها ، خارجة بآئنة عنها ؛ فإن كانت علة اشتراكها من ذاتها فهى بعضها ، فذلك البعض أقدم من

باقيها ، ولأن العلة قبل المعلول بالذات ، كما بينا في كتابنا على المباشرة ؛ فيكون الشيء الذى هو أحد المحسوسات أو ما يلحق المحسوسات ، أعني جميع الأشياء ؛

(١) في الأصل : اذا

(٢) هذه الكلمة عسيرة القراءة ، وقراءتى لها اجتهدية

(٣) فقطها اجتهدا وكذلك كلمة : علة ، ويمكن قراءة العبارة بعد نقطتها على نحو آخر .

والجزء أيضاً جزء واحد ، فإن كان جزء^(١) كانت الوحدة ، وإن كان جزء^(٢) كان كل ، فإن لم يكن جزء لم يكن كل ، وإن لم يكن جزء ولا كل فلا شيء ؛ وإن لم يكن شيء فلا محسوس ولا معقول بآئنة ، ولا وحدة في محسوس ولا معقول بآئنة ؛

فإن لم يكن جزء ولا وحدة ، فاذاً^(٣) لا جزء ولا كل ، فلا وحدة ؛ وقد كنا فرضنا أن [شئ] وحدة ؛ فالوحدة أينس كئيس ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن أيضاً ، فليس يمكن أن لا تكون كثرة .

وهناك يتبين^(٤) أنه لا يمكن أن يكون شيء من التي ذكرنا وحدة بلا كثرة ، لأنه لا يكون لا جزء ولا كل ، كما قدمنا ؛

فقد تبين من جميع هذه الأبحاث أنه لا يمكن أن تكون كثرة بلا وحدة في شيء مما ذكرنا ، ومن بعضها أنه لا يمكن أن يكون منها شيء وحدة بلا كثرة بآئنة .

فقد اتضح أنه لا يمكن أن تكون وحدة فقط بلا كثرة ، ولا كثرة فقط بلا وحدة ، ولا يعزى شيء مما ذكرنا من كثرة ولا وحدة ؛

فواجب إذن^(٥) أن تكون الأشياء التي ذكرنا كثيرة وواحدة . وأيضاً فاذاً قد تبين أن طباع الأشياء وحدة وكثرة ، فلا تخلو الوحدة من أن تكون مباينة للكثرة أو مشاركة لها ؛

فإن كانت الوحدة مباينة للكثرة ، وجب أن يلزم ما كان وحدة فقط ما لزم الوحدة التي قدمنا ذكرها من الخلف ، و [أن يلزم] ما كان كثرة فقط ما لزم الكثرة التي قدمنا ذكرها ؛

(١) في الأصل : جزا

(٢) هكذا في الأصل ، ويجوز أن تكون : فاذن

(٣) زيادة للإيضاح

(٤) في الأصل : تبين

(٥) في الأصل : اذا

(٦) زدتها للإيضاح

إما وحدة فقط ؛

وإما كثرة فقط ؛

وإما كثرة مع وحدة مشتركة .

ويلحق في وحدة فقط ما لحق في الكثرة والوحدة التي قدمنا البحث عنهما ؛

فينبغي أن تكون وحدة وكثرة مشتركة ، ويكون اشتراكهما بالبحث أو

بعلة منهما أو من غيرهما ؛ فيلحق في البحث ما قدمنا من الخلف ،

و [يلحق] ^(١) في اشتراكهما من ذاتهما أن يكون الاشتراك علة من الذات ،

ويخرج هذا بلا نهاية ، فتكون علة لعلة ، وعلة لعلة إلى ما لا نهاية ؛

وقد تبين أنه لا يمكن أن يكون شيء بالفعل بلا نهاية ؛ فليس يمكن أن

يكون اشتراك الوحدة والكثرة بعلة من ذاتهما ؛

فلم يبق إلا أن يكون لاشتراكهما علة أخرى غير ذاتهما ، أرفع وأشرف

منهما وأقدم ، إذ العلة قبل المعلول بالذات — كما قدمنا في المقالات التي قلنا فيها على

المباينة — وليست بمشاركة لهما ، لأن المشاركة تجب في المشتركات — كما قدمنا —

بعلة خارجة عن المشتركات ؛ فإن كانت كذلك خرجت العلل بلا نهاية ، ولا نهاية

في العلل ممتنع — كما قدمنا ، إذ ليس يمكن أن يكون شيء بالفعل لا نهاية له .

وأيضاً ليست بمجانسة لهما ، لأن اللواتي في جنس واحد ليس منها شيء أقدم

من شيء بالذات ، كالإنسانية والفرسية اللتين في جنس الحي ، اللتين ليست واحدة

منهما أقدم من الأخرى بالذات ؛ والعلة أقدم من المعلول بالذات ؛ فليس علة

اشتراك الكثرة والوحدة مع الأشياء الكثيرة الواحدة في جنس ؛

وإذ ليس هي معهما في جنس ، فليست معهما ^(٢) في شبه واحد ، لأن التشابه

في جنس واحد وفي نوع واحد كالجمرة والحجرة والشكل والشكل وما كان كذلك ؛

فليست علة اشتراك الكثرة والوحدة ، مع الأشياء الكثيرة الواحدة ، في جنس ^(٣)

ولا شبه ، ولا مشاكلة ؛ بل هي علة كونها وثباتها ، أعلى وأشرف وأقدم منها .

(١) زدتها للإيضاح (٢) في الأصل : معها

(٣) في جنس — خبر ليست .

فقد تبين أن للأشياء جميعاً علة أولى ، غير مُجانسة ولا مشاكلة ولا مشابهة

ولا مشاركة لها ، بل هي أعلى وأشرف وأقدم منها ، وهي سبب كونها وثباتها ؛

وهذه العلة لا تخلو ^(١) من أن تكون واحدة أو كثيرة :

فإن كانت كثيرة ففيها الوحدة ؛ لأن الكثرة إنما هي جماع أو حاد ، فهي

إذن كثرة ووحدة معاً ؛ فتكون علة الكثرة والوحدة والوحدة والكثرة ؛

فالشئ ^(٢) إذن علة ذاته ؛ والعلة غير المعلول ، فالشئ غير ذاته ؛ وهذا خلف

لا يمكن ، فليس العلة الأولى كثيرة ، ولا كثيرة وواحدة ؛

فلم يبق إلا أن تكون العلة واحدة فقط ، لا كثرة معها بجهة من الجهات .

فإذن ^(٣) اتضح أن العلة الأولى واحدة ، والواحد موجود في الأشياء المعلولة ؛

وقد قدمنا على كم نوع يقال الواحد في الأشياء المحسوسة وما يلحق المحسوسة ؛ فقد

ينبغي أن نبين بأي نوع توجد الوحدة في المعلولات ^(٤) ، وما الوحدة الحق وما الوحدة

بالحجاز لا بالحقيقة ، فيما يتلو هذا الفن ؛ ولنكمل هذا الفن .

الفن الرابع

وهو الجزء الأول — فلنقل الآن بأي نوع توجد الوحدة في المقولات ؟ وما

الواحد بالحق ، وما الواحد بالحجاز لا بالحقيقة ؟

ولنقدم كذلك ما يجب تقديمه ، فنقول :

إن العظيم والصغير ، والطويل والقصير ، والكثير والقليل ، لا يقال شيء

منها على شيء قولاً مرسلًا ، بل بالإضافة ؛ فإنه إنما يقال : عظيم ، عندما هو أصغر

منه ، و [يقال] ^(٥) : صغير ، عندما هو أعظم منه ؛ وكذلك يقال للهبة ^(٦) :

(١) في الأصل : تخلوا

(٢) في الأصل : والشئ

(٣) في الأصل : فإذا

(٤) هكذا في الأصل ، ويجوز أن يكون المقولات ، كما سيأتي بعد قليل

(٥) زدتها للإيضاح

(٦) الهبة الداهية أو الأمر العظيم ، جمعها هنواب . أما الهبات فهي خصال السوء ؛ والغالب

أنها جمع هنة

ظيمة ، إذا أُضيفت إلى هناة أصغر منها ؛ ويقال للجبل : صغير ، إذا أُضيف إلى جبل آخر أعظم منه .

ولو كان يقال العظيم مرسلًا على ما يتال عليه العظيم ، وكذلك الصغير ، لم يكن لما لا نهاية له وجودٌ لا بالفعل ولا بالقوة بته ؛ لأنه لم يكن يمكن أن يكون شيء آخر أعظم من المقول عليه : عظيم ، قولًا مرسلًا ؛ فكان العظيم المرسل ليس لا نهاية له بالفعل ولا بالقوة ، لأنه إن كان شيء آخر أعظم منه بالفعل أو بالقوة فليس هو عظيمًا ^(١) مرسلًا ؛ لأنه قد عرض له أن يكون صغيراً ، إذ آخر أعظم منه .

فإن لم يكن كذلك فالذي هو أعظم منه أصغر منه أو مثله ، وهذا خلف لا يمكن .

فإذن ^(٢) ليس شيء يمكن أن يكون أعظم ^(٣) من العظيم المرسل ، لا بالفعل ولا بالقوة .

فإن ^(٤) قد وُجد عظيم لا ضعف له بالفعل ولا بالقوة .

وتضعيف الشيء تشديده كميته ، وتشديده كميته موجودة بالفعل أو

(١) في الأصل : عظيم

(٢) في الأصل : إذا

(٣) في الأصل : « فإذن ليس شيء يمكن أن يكون شيء آخر أعظم من العظيم المرسل لا بالفعل ولا بالقوة » ؛ وأغلب الظن أن يكون شيء قد سقط من النسخ أو يكون هنا تكرار ، وقد أصلحت النص . ويمكن إصلاحه على وجه آخر : فإذن ليس يمكن أن يكون شيء آخر أعظم من العظيم المرسل ... الخ ؛ والمعنى الذي يريده المؤلف من كلامه منذ أول هذا الفن الرابع واضح ، لولا طريقته في البيان : هو يريد أن يقول إن العظيم والصغير ونحوهما إذا أطلقت على الأشياء لم يكن إطلاقها مرسلًا . يعني غير مقيد ، بل هو بالإضافة إلى شيء آخر ، وإلا لأدى إطلاقها بالمعنى المرسل إلى إنكار أن يكون هناك ، ولو في الذهن ، شيء لا نهاية له هو أساس النسبة والإضافة بين الأشياء ، ثم يستنتج المؤلف النتائج الفاسدة التي تنش من القول بأن العظيم إذا أطلق على شيء كان ذلك إطلاقًا مرسلًا ومن القول بأنه يوجد ؛ بالقوة أو بالفعل ، شيء أعظم من العظيم المرسل ؛ وهو يطبق استدلاله على غير العظيم والصغير من ألفاظ المأثلة (راجع المقدمة التحليلية لهذه الرسالة) .

(٤) في الأصل : فإذا .

بالقوة ؛ فإذن تشديده العظيم المرسل موجودة ^(١) بالفعل أو بالقوة ؛ فإذن ^(٢) للعظيم المرسل ضعف ، والضعف كلٌّ لذي الضعف ، وذو الضعف نصفٌ للضعف ، والنصف جزء الكل ، وذو الضعف جزء الضعف ؛

فإذن ^(٣) العظيم المرسل كلٌّ ، والعظيم المرسل جزءٌ ، فإن لم يكن ضعف العظيم المرسل أعظم من العظيم المرسل فهو مثله أو أصغر منه ؛ فإن كان مثله عرض من ذلك محال شنيع ، وهو أن يكون الكل مثل الجزء ، وهذا خلف لا يمكن ؛ وكذلك يعرض ، إن كان أصغر منه ، أن يكون الكل أصغر من الجزء ، وهذا أشد إحالة وشناعة ؛

فإن ^(٤) الكل أعظم من الجزء ، فإن ضعف العظيم الذي ظن أنه مرسل أعظم من العظيم المظنون أنه العظيم المرسل ؛

والعظيم المرسل إنما يُراد به ما لا شيء أعظم منه ؛

فإذن ^(٥) العظيم المرسل لا عظيم مرسل ^(٦) ؛

فإما أن لا يكون عظيم بته ، وإما أن يكون عظيمًا بالإضافة ، إذ لا يقال عظيم إلا مرسلًا ^(٧) أو بالإضافة ^(٨) ؛

(١) في الأصل : موجود ، وهو جائز ، بمعنى شيء موجود

(٢) و (٣) في الأصل : فإذا وكذلك في أول السطر الأول

(٤) في الأصل فإذا ، واعتقد أن سير الاستدلال يتم إما أن تقرأ : فإذا ، وإما أن تصلح

النص هكذا : فإذا [كان] ... الخ (٥) في الأصل : فإذا

(٦) هذه هي ، فيما يبدو لي ، النتيجة المتناقضة لما تقدم .

(٧) في الأصل : مرسل ، وهو خطأ نحوي

(٨) هذا الكلام من قوله : فإما ألا يكون عظيم بته ... إلى قوله بالإضافة ، في هذا الموضع ، كلام محير ؛ وذلك نظراً لاختلاف أساس التقسيم . وقد بدا لي أن اعتبر في قوله : « فإما أن لا يكون عظيم بته . الخ » ، خطأ نحويًا صحته : فإما أن لا يكون عظيمًا بته ، وإما أن يكون عظيمًا بالإضافة — على أن يعود الكلام على العظيم المرسل ، وأن يكون حصراً للتقسيم بعد التأدي إلى النتيجة الفاسدة ، وهي أن العظيم المرسل ليس عظيمًا مرسلًا ، وذلك كله على أن يكون قوله : « إذ لا يقال عظيم إلا مرسلًا أو بالإضافة » تقريباً عما قبله مباشرة بحسب التضمن الفكري ؛ والكلام بعد ذلك يعود إلى التقسيم الأول بفرعيه . ولكني لم أصلح النص بحسب ما تصورته أنه خطأ عنه ، لأن الفكرة يمكن أن تسير سيراً طبعياً ، إذا اعتبرنا التقسيم الثاني جملة اعتراضية أو تقريباً عما قبله ؛ ويجب على أن اعترف أن هذا الجزء صعب ؛ فاعمل شيئاً سقط منه ،

فإن كان العظيم المرسل لأعظيما فهو لا هو ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ؛
وإن كان العظيم المرسل هو العظيم بالإضافة ، فالمرسل بالإضافة اسمان مترادفان
لشيء واحد ، وهو ما كان شيء آخر أصغر منه ، إذ قد تبين أنه لا يكون شيء
لا شيء أعظم منه لا بالقوة ولا بالفعل بته ؛
وبهذا التدبير ^(١) يتبين أنه لا يكون صغير ^(٢) مرسلا ، وإنما يكون الصغير
بالإضافة أيضاً ؛

والعظيم والصغير يقالان على كل كمية ؛
فأما الطويل والقصير فيقالان على كل كمية متصلة ، خاصان لما دون غيرها
من الكميات ؛
وإنما يقالان بالإضافة أيضاً ، لا قولاً مرسلا ؛ وبيان ذلك بمثل ما قدمنا
في العظيم والصغير .

فأما القليل والكثير فإنهما خاصة للكمية المنفصلة ،
وقد يعرض للكثير ما يعرض للعظيم والصغير والطويل والقصير ، من أنه لا
يقال قولاً مرسلاً [بل] ^(٣) بالإضافة ؛ وبيان ذلك بما قدمنا ، فإن التدبير واحد ؛
فأما القليل فقد يُظن أنه يُقال مرسلاً ؛ وذلك أنه يُظن أنه إن كان أول
العدد اثنين ، وكل عدد غير الاثنين أكبر من الاثنين ، فإن الاثنين أقل الأعداد ؛
فالاثنتان هو القليل المرسل ، إذ ليس هو كثير بته ، إذ لا عدد أقل منه ؛
وإن كان الواحد عدداً ، ولا شيء أقل من الواحد ، فالواحد هو الأقل
المرسل ؛

وهذا ظن ليس بصادق ، لأننا إن قلنا إن الواحد عددٌ نظن أنه يلحقنا من
ذلك شناعة قبيحة جداً ؛ لأنه إن كان الواحد عدداً ، فهو كمية ما ؛ وإن كان
الواحد كمية ، فخاصة الكمية تلحقه وتلزمه ، أعني أنه مساوٍ ولا مساوٍ ^(٤) ؛

(١) يعني على هذا النحو من الاستدلال

(٢) في الأصل : صغيراً ، وما بعدها حاله .

(٣) زدتها لضرورتها للمعنى .

(٤) في الأصل : مساوٍ ولا مساوٍ ، وهو خطأ نحوي .

فإن كان للواحد واحد ، بعضها مساوية له ، وبعضها لامساوية له ، فالواحد
منقسم ، لأن الواحد الأصغر بعد الواحد الأكبر أو بعد بعضه ؛ فالواحد الأكبر
بعض ، فهو منقسم ؛

والواحد لا ينقسم ، فانقسامه أينس ليس ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ، فليس
الواحد إذن ^(١) عدداً .

ولا تذهبن من قولنا : واحد ، إلى هيولى الواحد ، أعني العنصر الذى
يوجد بالواحد ، فصار واحداً ؛ فإن ذلك موجود لا واحداً ، والمؤلفة من ذلك
معدودات لا عدد ، كقولنا : خمسة أفراس ، فإن الأفراس معدودة بالخمس التى هى
عدد لاهيولى له ، وإنما الهيولى فى الأفراس ؛ فلا تذهبن من قولنا : واحد ، إلى
الموحد ^(٢) بالواحد ^(٣) ، بل إلى الوحدة عينها ، فالوحدة لا تنقسم بته ؛

فإن كان الواحد عدداً وليس بكمية ، وباقي الأعداد — أعني الاثنين وما فوقه —
كمية ، فإن الواحد ليس تحت الكمية ، فهو تحت مقولة أخرى ؛ فإذا ^(٤) الواحد
وباقي الأعداد إنما يقال إنها أعداد باشتباه الاسم لا بالطبع ؛

فإذا ^(٥) الواحد ليس بعدد بالطبع ، بل باشتباه الاسم ؛ إذ ليس يقال
الأعداد [إلا] ^(٦) بالإضافة إلى شيء واحد ، فالطبيات إلى الطب والمبررات
إلى البرء ^(٧) ؛

ولكن كيف يمكن أن يكون هذا الظن صادقاً ، أعني أن الواحد ، إن كان
عدداً ، لزمته خاصة الكمية التى هى مساوٍ ولا مساوٍ ، فيكون للواحد آحادٌ ،
بعضها مساوٍ له ، وبعضها أكثر أو أقل ؛ لأنه إن كان هذا يلزم الواحد ، فهو أيضاً

(١) فى الأصل : إذا

(٢) فى الأصل بدون نقط

(٣) يسمح رسم الكلمة أيضاً بأن تقرأها : الواحد

(٤) ، (٥) فى الأصل : فإذا

(٥) فى الأصل : إذا

(٦) زيادة للإيضاح ، والمعنى مستقيم بدونها أيضاً .

(٧) فى الأصل : والمبررات إلى البرء

فإن (١) ليس الواحد عدداً .

ولكن هذا الحد الذي حُدَّ به العدد الفرد يُظن أنه لا يجب إلا بعد أن يبين أن الواحد ليس بعدد ، وإلا فما يمنع من قال : إن الواحد عدد ، من أن يحدَّ العدد الفرد بأنه هو العدد الذي إن انقسم بقسمين فإن قسميه غير متماثلين ؟ فيدخل فيه الواحد ، إذ ليس [ما] (٢) يوجب أنه منقسم اضطراباً ؛

فإن لم يظهر أنه واجب من هذا البحث أن الواحد ليس بعدد فنقول إذن (٣) : إن ركن الشيء الذي يُدعى منه الشيء ، أعني الذي ركب منه الشيء ، ليس هو الشيء — كالخروف الصورية التي ركب منها الكلام ، فإنها ليست هي الكلام ، لأن الكلام صوت مؤلف موضوع دال على شيء مع زمان ، والحرف صوت طباعي لا مؤلف — فإن كان العدد المقتر به (٤) عند الكل مؤلفاً من آحاد ، فالواحد ركن العدد ؛ فليس بعدد ، وليس للواحد ركن ركب منه ، فيكون ركناً لركب من الواحد أيضاً ؛ فيكون الواحد عدداً ، ركنه ركن كل التي يقر (٥) بأنها أعداد ، فيمكن أن يكون الواحد عدداً .

وقد يُظن أن الواحد ركن الاثنين ، والاثنين ركن الثلاثة ؛ إذ في الثلاثة اثنان موجودان ؛ فيُظن لذلك — إذ كان الاثنان ، وهما عدد ، ركن الثلاثة — أن الواحد عدد ، وهو ركن الاثنين ؛ وهذا الظن غير صادق ، لأن الاثنين [مركب] (٦) ؛ بأنه ظن أنه ركن الثلاثة (٧) ، فله ركن ، هو الواحد ؛ والواحد ، وإن كان ركن الاثنين ، فليس له ركن ؛ فهو لامركب ، فقد فارق الاثنين بأنه بسيط ؛ والاثنان مركب ركب من الواحد البسيط ؛ فليس يمكن أن يكون

(١) في الأصل : فإذا

(٢) زدها للإيضاح

(٣) في الأصل : فإذا

(٤) و (٥) غير مشكوكين في الأصل

(٦) حكماً في الأصل ، وهو معطوف على الواحد

(٧) زدها ، لأنها سقطت من الأصل فيما اعتقد

(٨) في الأصل : الثلاثة ، وكذلك ما قبلها .

يلزم كل عدد ، أعني أن يكون له تسمى مساوٍ (١) له وتسمى أقل منه وتسمى أكثر منه ، فتكون الثلاثة ثلاثاً (٢) ، بعضها مساوٍ لها ، وبعضها أقل منها ، وبعضها أكثر منها ؛ وكذلك يجب في كل عدد ؛

فإن كان هذا لا يجب في الأعداد ، التي لا شك فيها ، فليس يجب في الوجدانية ؛ وإن كان معنى قولنا : إن خاصية العدد وجميع الكمية مساوٍ ولا مساوٍ ، أن لكل عدد عدداً مثله وعدداً لا مثله ، أي أكبر منه وأقل منه ، فالاثنتان إذن (٣) لا عدد ، إذ ليس عدد أقل منه ، وإنما له أكبر منه ؛ وإن كان يجب أن يكون الاثنان عدداً ، إذ له مساوٍ ، هو اثنتان آخران ، ولا مساوٍ ، هو أكبر أن يكون الواحد عدداً ، إذ له مساوٍ ، وهو واحد آخر ، ولا مساوٍ ، هو أكبر منه ؛ أعني اثنين وما فوق ذلك ؛ فإن (٤) الواحد كمية ، فالواحد وباقي الأعداد تحت الكمية ؛ فإن ليس الواحد عدداً باشتباه الأيس (٥) ، فإن (٦) هو بالطبع . وأيضاً لا يخلو الواحد من أن يكون عدداً أو لا عدداً (٧) ؛ فإن كان عدداً ، فبما أن يكون زوجاً وإما فرداً ؛ فإن كان زوجاً فهو منقسم قسمين متماثلين (٨)

فالواحديات ؛ والواحد لا ينقسم ؛ فهو لا ينقسم ؛ وهو منقسم ؛ هذا خلف لا يمكن . وأيضاً إن كانت فيه آحاد فهو مركب من آحاد ، فهو مركب من ذاته ، وهو واحد ، وهو آحاد ؛ والواحد واحد فقط لا آحاد ؛ فهو آحاد لا آحاد ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن أيضاً ؛

وإن لم يكن زوجاً فهو فرد ؛ والفرد هو الذي كل قسمين ينقسم إليهما غير متماثلين الوجدانية ؛ فالواحد إذن (٩) هو منقسم لامنتقسم ، وآحاد لا آحاد ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ؛

(١) في الأصل : مساوياً

(٢) في الأصل : الثلاثة ثلاثاً

(٣) و (٤) في الأصل : إذا ، فإذا

(٥) حكماً في الأصل ، والائس الوجود ولها بالاسم ، كما في العبارة المتقدمة :

(٦) في الأصل : فإذا

(٧) في الأصل : لا عدد

(٨) في الأصل : مماثل دون قط . وقد صححتها بحسب ما يلي .

(٩) في الأصل : فإذا

العدد بعضه بسيط ، هو ركنه — أعني بسيط لامركب من شيء — وبعضه مركب من ذلك البسيط .

ولكن قد يُظَنُّ أنه ممكن أن يكون كذلك بالجواهر المركب ، أعني الجسم الذي هو مركب من جوهرين بسيطين ، أعني العنصر والصورة ، لما^(١) قد قيل إن الجواهر ثلاثة : بسيطان ، هما العنصر والصورة ، [و] ^(٢) مركب منهما ، هو العنصر المصور ، أعني الجسم ، فيُظَنُّ أنه يمكن أن يكون العدد أيضاً منه بسيط هو الواحد الذي ركب منه العدد المُقَرَّبُ به ومنه العدد المُقَرَّبُ به ، المركب من الواحد البسيط ؛

وهذا ظن غير صادق ، لأن التمثيل عكس [عكسي ؟] ، وذلك أن الجواهر الأولى البسيطة التي يركب الجسم منها هي العنصر والصورة ، فَعَرَضَ للجسم ، إذ هو مركب [من] ^(٣) جواهر ، العنصر والصورة ، أن يكون جواهر ، إذ هو جواهر فقط ؛ وهو بطباعه جسم ، أعني مركباً من عنصر وأبعاد ، التي هي صورته ؛ ولم يعرض للعنصر وحده ، وللبعد الذي هو صورة وحده ، أن يكون كل واحد منهما جسماً ، إذ كان المركب منهما جسماً .

وكذلك لا يجب أن يكون الواحد ، لأنه ركن العدد المُقَرَّبُ به ، عدداً ؛ بل لأن العدد مركب من آحاد ، فهو آحاد ، كما أن الجسم ، إذ هو مركب من جواهر ، فهو جواهر ؛ وبحق أن الأشياء التي تتركب منها أشياء ، فتكون تلك الأركان أجزاء للمركبة منها ، لشيء يمنع من أن نعطيها أساميها وحدودها ، كالخى في الأحياء والجواهر في الجواهر ، أعني أسماءها الجوهرية لا العرضية ؛

فإذن الواحد ركن العدد ، لا عدد بته .

فإذن قد تبين أن الواحد ليس بعدد فالحد المقول على العدد إذن^(٤) هو محيط

بالعدد ، أعني أنه عظمُ الوجدانيات ، وجميع الوجدانيات ، وتأليف الوجدانيات . فإذا^(١) الاثنان أول العدد ، والاثنان إذا قيل^(٢) بطباعه ، ولم يُتَوَهَّمْ غيره لم يكن بطباعه قليلاً ؛ فإذا^(٣) إنما تلحقه القلة ، إذا أُضيف إلى ما هو أكثر منه ؛ فإذا إنما هو قليل ، إذ جميع الأعداد أكثر منه ؛ فإذا^(٤) إنما هو قليل إذا أُضيف إلى الأعداد ، فأما إذا تَوَهَّمْ طبعه فهو تضعيف الواحد ، فهو جمع من واحدين ، فهو مركب من واحدين ؛ والمركب ذو أجزاء ، فهو كل لأجزائه ؛ والكل أكبر من الجزء ، فليس الاثنان قليلاً بطباعه .

فإذا كان العظيم والصغير ، والطويل والقصير ، والكثير والقليل ، لا يقال واحد منهما مرسلًا ، [بل] ^(٥) بالإضافة ، وإنما يُضاف كل واحد منهما إلى آخر من جنسه ، لا من غير جنسه ؛ كالعظم ، فانه إن كان جسماً فانه إنما يضاف إلى جسم آخر ، لا إلى سطح ، ولا إلى خط ، ولا إلى مكان ، ولا إلى زمان ، ولا إلى عدد ، ولا إلى قول ؛

فانه لا يقال : جسم أعظم أو أصغر من سطح أو خط أو مكان أو زمان أو عدد أو قول ، بل من جسم ؛

فكذلك كل واحد من باقي الأعظام لا يقال : أعظم ولا أصغر مما ليس في جنسه ، قولاً صادقاً ؛

ولا يقال : سطح أعظم أو أصغر من خط أو مكان أو زمان أو عدد أو قول ، بل من سطح ؛ ولا خط أعظم أو أصغر من مكان ، أو زمان ، أو عدد ، أو قول بل من خط ؛ ولا مكان أعظم أو أصغر من زمان ، أو عدد ، أو قول ، بل من مكان ؛ ولا زمان أعظم أو أصغر من عدد أو قول ، بل من زمان ؛ ولا عدد أعظم أو أصغر من قول ، بل من عدد ؛ ولا قول أعظم أو أصغر من واحد من باقي الأعظام ، بل من قول ؛

(١) في الأصل : فإذا

(٢) في الأصل : إذا أقول ، وفوق الـ قو ، لام الف ، قد ضُربَ عليها . ولعل

المقصود أنه إذا تصورناه بنيانه . (٣) و (٤) في الأصل : فإذا

(٥) زدتها لضرورتها للمعنى

(١) في الأصل : كما ، بحسب طريقة الناسخ .

(٢) زدتها لضرورتها للسياق

(٣) زدتها لضرورتها ، وإن يمكن قراءة : مركب جواهر ، الخ

(٤) في الأصل : إذا .

وكذلك لا يقال قولاً صادقاً : جسمٌ أطول أو أقصر من سطح ، أو خط ، أو مكان ، أو زمان ، أو عدد ، أو قول ؛

وإن ظنَّ أن جرمًا أطول أو أقصر من سطح أو خط أو مكان فإن ذلك ظنٌّ كاذب ؛ لأنه إن ظنَّ أن طول جرم أطول أو أقصر من طول سطح أو خط أو مكان ، فإن طول كل واحد منها هو بُعدٌ واحد من أبعاد ما نسبت إليه ، والبعد الواحد خط ؛ فاذن إنما نذهب من أن جرمًا أطول وأقصر ، أو سطحًا ^(١) أو خطًا أو مكانًا ^(٢) ، إلى أن خط ^(٣) هذا أطول من خط هذا ؛ فإن هذه جماعات من الكمية المتصلة ؛

والزمان أيضا من الكمية المتصلة ، فلأنه لا خط للزمان يظهر ظهوراً تاماً ، فانه ^(٤) لا يقال : جرم أطول وأقصر من زمان . فبين أن لا يقال الطول والقصر لما ^(٥) يقال له الطول والقصر إلا لما كان ^(٦) في جنس واحد ، أى في جرم فقط ، أو سطح فقط ، أو مكان فقط ، أو زمان فقط ؛ فأما عددٌ أو قول ، فلا يقع عليه طول ولا قصر بذاته ؛ بل يقال ذلك عليه من جهة الزمان الذى هو فيه ؛ فانه يقال : عددٌ طويل — أى في زمان طويل ؛ وكذلك يقال : قولٌ طويل — أى في زمان طويل ، لا ^(٧) أن القول والعدد يحتمل كل واحد منهما اسم الطول واسم القصر بذاته .

وكذلك الكثير والقليل لا يقالان فيما يقالان عليه إلا في جنس واحد ، أعنى فيما يقال عليه العدد والقول ، فانه لا يقال قولاً صادقاً : قولٌ أكثر أو أقل من عدد ، ولا عددٌ أكثر أو أقل من قول ، بل : عدد أكثر أو أقل من عدد ، وقول أكثر أو أقل من قول .

(١) هذه الكلمة مكررة

(٢) فى الأصل : أو سطح أو خط أو مكان ؛ ولكن يجب تصحيحها ، لأنها فى أغلب الظن معطوفة على قوله : جرمًا

(٣) ربما يقصد من الخط البعد ، وكذلك فيما يلى

(٤) فى الأصل : انه

(٥) يمكن بحسب رسم الكلمة أن تقرأ : بما (٦) فى الأصل : لمكان .

(٧) فى الأصل : لا

فاذ قد تبين ما قدّمنا فليس إذن الواحد بالحقيقة قابلاً للإضافة إلى مجانسه ، وإن كان له جنس قبل أن يضاف إلى مجانسه ، فاذن لاجنس للواحد الحق بته . وقد قدّمنا أن ماله جنس فليس بأزلى وأن الأزلى لاجنس له ، فاذن ^(١) الواحد الحق أزلى ^(٢) ؛ ولا يتكثر بته بنوع من الأنواع أبداً ؛ ولا يقال : واحد ، بالإضافة إلى غيره ؛ فاذن ^(٣) هو الذى لا هوى له ينقسم بها ، ولا صورة مؤتلفة من جنس وأنواع ؛ فإن الذى هو كذلك يتكثر بما ألف منه ؛ ولا هو كمية بته ، ولا له كمية ؛ لأن الذى هو كذلك أيضا ينقسم ، لأن كل كمية أو ذى كمية يقبل الزيادة والنقص ، وما قبل النقص منقسم ، والمنقسم متكثر بنوع ما ؛ وقد قيل إن الكثرة تكون فى كل واحد من المقولات وفيما يلحقها من الجنس والنوع والشخص والفصل والخاصة والعرض العام والكل والجزء والجميع ؛ وكذلك الواحد يقال على كل واحد من بعده ^(٤) ؛ فاذن ^(٥) الواحد الحق ليس هو واحداً ^(٦) من هذه .

والحركة فيما هو من هذه ، أعنى الجسم الذى [هو] هوى مصورة ، إذ الحركة إنما هى نقلة من مكان إلى مكان ، أو ربو أو نقص ، أو كون أو فساد ، أو استحالة ؛

والحركة متكثرة ، لأن المكان كمية ، فهو منقسم ؛ فالموجود فى أقسام منقسم بأقسام المكان ، فهو متكثر ؛ فالحركة المكانية متكثرة ؛ وكذلك الربوية والنقصية متكثرة ، فإن حركة نهايات الرابى الناقص منقسمة لوجودها فى أقسام المكان الذى ما بين نهاية الجرم قبل الربو إلى نهاية الجرم فى نهاية الربو ؛ وكذلك ما بين نهاية الجرم قبل النقص إلى نهايته فى نهاية النقص ؛

(١) فى الأصل : فاذا (٢) يمكن قراءتها : أولى

(٣) فى الأصل : فاذ (٤) غير منقولة فى الأصل

(٥) فى الأصل : فاذا

(٦) فى الأصل : واحد ؛ وهو غير صحيح .

وكذلك الكون والفساد ، فإن من بدؤوا^(١) الكون والفساد إلى نهاية الكون والفساد منقسما بقسم [لعلها : بأقسام ، كما يلي] الزمان الذي فيه الكون والفساد ؛

فحركة الربو والنقص والكون والفساد منقسمة جميعاً ، وكذلك الاستحالة للصد^(٢) والاستحالة إلى التمام منقسمة بأقسام زمان الاستحالة ؛ فجميع الحركات منقسمة وهي أيضاً متوحدة ، لأن كل حركة فكليةتها واحدة ، إذ الوحدة تُقال على الكل المطلق ، وجزؤها^(٣) واحد ، إذ الواحد يُقال على الجزء^(٤) المطلق ؛

فإذن^(٥) إذ الكثرة موجودة في الحركة ، فالواحد الحق لا حركة ؛

وإذ كل مدرك بالحس أو العقل إما أن يكون موجوداً في عينه أو في فكرنا وجوداً طبيعياً ، وإما في لفظنا أو خطوطنا وجوداً عرضياً ، فإن الحركة موجودة في النفس ، أعني أن الفكر ينتقل من بعض صور الأشياء إلى بعض ومن أخلاق لازمة للنفس شتى وآلام كالغضب والفرق والفرح والحزن وما كان كذلك ؛ فالفكر متكثرة ومتوحدة ، إذ لكل كثرة كل جزء ، إذ هي معدودة ؛ وهذه أعراض النفس ، فهي متكثرة أيضاً ومتوحدة بهذا النوع ، فالواحد الحق لا نفس . ولأن نهاية الفكر إذا سلكت على سبل مستقيمة إلى العقل ، وهو أنواع الأشياء — إذ النوع معقول — وما فوقها^(٦) ، والأشخاص محسوسة ، أعني بالأشخاص جزئيات^(٧) الأشياء التي لا تعطى الأشياء^(٨) أساميها ولا حدودها ،

(١) هكذا في الأصل ، وقد احتفظت بها ، لأنها غير خفية المعنى

(٢) في الأصل : شديد ، وهي غير ظاهرة المعنى في السياق

(٣) في الأصل : وحرها

(٤) في الأصل : الحر

(٥) في الأصل : فإذا

(٦) في الأصل : فوقه ، وقد آثرت هذا التصحيح ليكون الضمير راجعاً إلى أنواع ، ولأن

هذا ينطبق مع ما نجد في رسالة العقل للكندي

(٧) في الأصل جزويات

(٨) في الأصل : شيا

فإذا اتحدت بالنفس فهي معقولة ، والنفس عاقلة بالفعل عند اتحاد الأنواع بها ؛ وقبل اتحادها بها كانت عاقلة بالقوة ؛ وكل شيء هو شيء بالقوة وإنما يُخْرِجُه إلى الفعل شيء آخر ، هو ذلك المخرج من القوة إلى الفعل ، بالفعل ؛ والذي أخرج النفس التي هي عاقلة بالقوة إلى أن صارت عاقلة بالفعل ، أعني متحدة بها أنواع الأشياء وأجناسها ، أعني كلياتها ، هي الكلّيات أعيانها ؛ فإنها باتحادها بالنفس صارت النفس عاقلة ، أي لها عقل ما ، أي بها كلّيات الأشياء ؛ فكلّيات الأشياء ، إذ هي في النفس خارجة من القوة إلى الفعل ، هي عقل النفس المستفاد الذي كان لها بالقوة ، فهي العقل الذي بالفعل الذي أخرج النفس من القوة إلى الفعل^(١) ؛ والكلّيات متكثرة ، كما قدمنا ، فالعقل متكثر^(٢) .

وقد يُظن أنه أول متكثر ، وهو متوحد بنوع ما ، إذ هو كل كما قدمنا ، وأن الوحدة تقال على الكل ، والوحدة بحق لا عقل ؛

وإذ في ألفاظنا الأسماء المترادفة كالشفرة والمدينة المترادفة [على] حديدة الذبح ، فقد يقال : واحد ، للمترادفة ، وإنه يقال المدينة والشفرة واحد ؛ وهذا الواحد متكثر أيضاً ، لأن عنصره وما يقال على عنصره متكثر ؛ فإن حديدة الذبح التي هي عنصر المترادفة ، التي هي المدينة والشفرة والسكين ، متجزئة متكثرة ؛ وأيضاً الأسماء المقولة عليها متكثرة ؛ فالواحد الحق لا أسماء مترادفة .

وأيضاً إذ في ألفاظنا المشتبهة بالاسم ، كالسبع المسمى كلباً والكوكب المسمى كلباً ، فإنه يقال إنهما واحد بالاسم ، أي كلب ؛ وعنصر هذا الكلب متكثر ، أعني السبع والكوكب ؛ وهذه المشتبهة بالاسم ليس منها شيء علة لشيء ، لأن الكوكب ليس علة السبع ولا السبع علة الكوكب . وقد توجد متشابهة بالاسم بعضها علة لبعض كالمخطوط ، والمففوظ ، والمفكر فيه ، والعين القائمة ؛ فإن الخط الذي هو جوهر منبئ عن اللفظ الذي هو جوهر ، واللفظ الذي هو جوهر منبئ عن المفكر فيه الذي هو جوهر ، والمفكر فيه الذي هو جوهر منبئ عن العين

(١) إن كلام الكندي هنا عن العقل يتفق مع ما نجد في رسالته في العقل

(٢) لعل قوله : العقل متكثر ، يوضح تعريفه للعقل في رسالة الحدود

الذى هو جوهر ؛ وقد يقال لهذه جميعا : واحد^(١) — أعني العين في ذاتها ، وفي
الفكرة^(٢) ، وفي اللفظ ، وفي الخط ؛ والعين في ذاتها علة العين في الفكر ، والعين
في الفكر علة العين في اللفظ ، والعين في اللفظ علة العين في الخط ؛
وهذا النوع من الواحد متكرر أيضا ، إذ هو مقول على كثير ؛ فليس
الواحد الحق واحدا^(٣) بنوع اشتباه الاسم .

وإذ قد يقال : واحد ، لاتي عنصرها واحد ، إلا أنها تتغير بغيرية ما ، إما فعل
أو انفعال ، أو إضافة ، أو غير ذلك من التغير ، كالباب والسرير التي عنصرها
واحد ، أعني خشباً أو أى عنصر صنع منه أشياء مختلفة المثل^(٤) ، فإنه يقال : الباب
والسرير واحد^(٥) بالعنصر ، وهذه أيضا كثير من جهة عنصرها ، [إذ] أن عنصرها^(٥)
متكرر ، متجزئ ، ومن جهة مثلها ؛ وأيضا اللاتي هي واحدة بالعنصر الأول ،
أعني بالإمكان ، متكررة من جهة العنصر ، إذ هو موجود لمثل كثيرة ؛
وأیضا قد يقال : واحد بالعنصر ، الأشياء التي تقال على شيء ، فيلحقها شيء ؛
آخر اضطراراً ، كالفساد المقول على الفاسد ، فإنه يلحقه الكون ، إذ فساد الفاسد
كون لآخر ، فإنه يقال إن الكائن هو الفاسد بالعنصر ، وهذا بالفعل ؛
وقد يتكرر هذا أيضا إذ العنصر لعدة مثل ؛

وقد يقال هذا النوع من الواحد بالقوة ، أعني الواحد بالعنصر ، الأشياء التي
تقال على شيء ، فيلحقها شيء آخر ، كالرُبُوبُ المقول على الرابي ، فإنه يلحقه
الضمر ، فإن الذى له رُبُوبٌ له ضمير بالقوة ، فيقال : واحد ، الرابي الضامر ، أى
أن الرابي هو الضامر ؛ وهذا متكرر أيضاً من جهة العنصر ، إذ العنصر لعدة من
جهة المثل ، أعني الربو والضمر ؛ فالواحد الحق لا يقال بنوع العنصر بته ، فليس
يقال : واحد^(٦) ، من أنواع الواحد الذى بالعنصر ؛

(١) في الأصل : واحدا (٢) يعنى في الفكر أو في الذهن .

(٣) في الأصل : واحد (٤) لعله يقصد مختلفة في الصورة .

(٥) يظهر أن في هذه العبارة التي صححتها بحسب إشارة في هامش الأصل ، تكراراً ،
والعنى ظاهر بعد الإضافة الإيضاحية التي يمكن الاستغناء عنها وتصحيح أن بلفظ إذ

(٦) في الأصل يمكن أن تقرأ : بواحد

وقد يقال الواحد الذى^(١) لا ينقسم كما قدمنا ؛ والذى لا ينقسم إما لا ينقسم
بالفعل ، وإما بالقوة ؛ أما الذى لا ينقسم بالفعل فكالذى لا ينقسم لصلابته كحجر
الماس ، أعني أنه عسر الانقسام ؛ وهذا هو ذو أجزاء اضطراراً ، إذ هو جسم ،
فهو متكرر ؛ أو كالذى يصغر جداً عن الآلة القاسمة ، فإن ذلك يقال له : لا ينقسم ،
إذ ليس [ثم] آلة تقسمه ، وهو ذو أجزاء ، لأنه عظم ما ، إذ لحقه الصغر ،
فهو متكرر ؛

ويقال لا ينقسم بالفعل أيضا ، وإن فصل تفصيلا دائما لم يخرج عن طباعه
إلى غيره ، بل كل مفصول منه يحتمل حده واسمه ، كجميع الأعظام المتصلة ،
أعني الجرم والسطح والخط والمسكان والزمان ؛ فإن مفصول الجرم جرم ،
ومفصول السطح سطح ، ومفصول الخط خط ، ومفصول المسكان مكان ،
ومفصول الزمان زمان ؛ فهذه جميعا لا تنقسم بالفعل ولا بالقوة إلى غير نوعها ،
وكل واحد منها قابل للتفصيل والتكثير قبولا دائما إلى نوعه .

وأیضا فإن الجرم يتكرر بأبعاده الثلاثة ونهاياته الست ، والسطح ببعديه
ونهاياته الأربع ، والخط ببعده ونهايته ،
وكذلك المسكان يتكرر بقدر أبعاد الممكن ونهاياته .
وكذلك الزمان يتكرر بنهاياته التي هي آتات^(٢) الزمان الحادثة لنهاياته ،
كحدّ العلامات لنهايات الخط .

كذلك كل مشتبه الأجزاء يقال له : واحد ، لأنه لا ينقسم ، أى كل مفصول
منه محتمل حده^(٣) واسمه ؛ وهذا أيضا يتكرر ، لأنه لا ينقسم ، أى كل قابل
[للانقسام] قبولا دائما^(٤) .

ويقال أيضا : لا ينقسم بالفعل ولا بالقوة ، الذى إن قسم بطلت ذاته ،
كالإنسان الواحد ، كمحمد وسعيد وكالفرس الواحد ، كالراند وذى العقال ،

(١) في الأصل للواحد الذى .

(٢) في الأصل : الآتات ، وهو خطأ في النسخ (٣) في الأصل حدا

(٤) في الأصل ، كل قابلا قبولا دائما -- وقد صححت العبارة . ويجوز أيضا أن يكون

تصحيحها : أى كل ما كان قابلا للقسمه . . . إلخ

وما كان كذلك من كل شخص طبيعي ذى مثال أو عرضي كذلك أو نوع أو جنس أو فصل أو خاصة أو عرض عام ، فإنه إن قُسم لم يكن هو ما هو ؛ وهو متكرر بما ركب منه وبالتفصيل دائماً أيضاً ؛ وهذه جميعاً من المقول : واحد ^(١) ، لاتصاله أيضاً ؛

ويقال : واحد ، لأنه لا ينقسم بنوع آخر ، ما كان لا ينقسم ، لأنه ليس متصلاً ؛ وما كان كذلك فإنه يقال على نوعين : أحدهما ، لأنه ليس بمتصل ، ولا وضع له ، ولا مشترك ، كالواحد العددي ، فإنه ليس شيئاً متصلاً ^(٢) ، أعني أن له أبعاداً ونهايات ، فهو شيء متصل ، بل هو لا منقسم ولا منفصل ؛ وهذا متكرر أيضاً من جهة موضوعاته التي نعدّها ^(٣) ؛ وهذا هو الواحد العددي مكيال كل [الأشياء] ؛ والآخرون الأصوات ، فإنها ليست بمتصلة ؛ ولا وضع للعلل التي بها الواحد العددي لا منقسم ، وهو مكيال للألفاظ فقط ؛

ويقال : واحد ، لأنه لا ينقسم بنوع آخر ، وهو ما كان كذلك ، لأنه لاجزء له مثله ، ولا مثل غيره .

وأيضاً وهو مشترك ؛ وما كان كذلك فإنه يقال على نوعين : أحدهما له وضع ، كعلامة الخط التي هي نهايته ؛ فإنه لاجزء لها ، لأنها نهاية بُعد واحد ، ونهاية البعد لا بعد ؛ وهي متكررة بحاملاتها ، أعني الزمان الماضي والزمان الآتي ، التي ^(٤) هي مشتركة لهما .

ويقال : واحد ، أيضاً الذي لا ينقسم من جهة الكمية ، فإنه يقال : رطل واحد لأنه إن انفصل من كمية الرطل شيء بطل الرطل ، فلم يك كلاً لرطل واحد ؛ ولذلك ما يقال إن خط الدائرة أشد استحقاقاً للواحد من غيره من الخطوط ، إذ هو كل الحد ، لأنه لا نقص فيه ولا زيادة ؛ بل كل كامل ؛ وما كان كذلك

فهو متكرر بتفصله أيضاً ؛ وآخر ^(١) بأن يكون الذي لا ينقسم أشد التي يقال : واحد ، استحقاقاً للوحدة من باقي أنواع الواحد وأشدّها توحّداً .

فقد تبين مما قلنا أن الواحد يقال إما بالذات ، وإما بالعرض ؛ أما بالعرض فكنوع المقول بالاسم المشترك ، وإما بالأسماء المترادفة أو جامع أعراض كثيرة كقولنا : الكاتب والخطيب واحد ، إذا كانا يُقالان على رجل واحد ، أو على الإنسان ، أو : الإنسان والكاتب واحد ، وما كان كذلك ؛ وأما بالذات فبأن ما يقال عليه الواحد مما ذكرنا أنه يقال : واحد ؛ وهي جميعاً ما جوهرها واحد ، وينقسم قسمة أولى : إما بالاتصال ، وهو من حيز العنصر ؛ وإما بالصورة ، وهو من حيز النوع ؛ وإما بالاسم ، وهو من حيزها جميعاً ؛ وإما بالجنس ، وهو من حيز الأول ؛

فالواحد بالاتصال هو الواحد بالعنصر أو بالرباط ، وهو الذي يقال له : واحد بالعدد ، أو بالشكل ؛ والواحد بالصورة هي ^(٢) التي حدّها واحد ؛ والواحد بالجنس ^(٣) هي التي حدّها مجموعها واحد ؛ والتي بالاسم ، أعني بها ما هي بالمساواة ، واحد ؛ والواحد بالمساواة هي التي نسبتها ^(٤) واحد ، كالأشياء الطيبة المنسوبة جميعاً إلى الطب .

وجميع هذه الأنواع التي ذكرنا ، أعني الواحد بالعدد ، ثم الواحد بالصورة ، ثم الواحد بالجنس ، ثم الواحد بالمساواة ، يتبع أواخرها أوائلها ولا يتبع أوائلها أواخرها ؛ أعني أن ما كان واحداً بالعدد ، فهو واحد بالصورة ؛ وما كان واحداً بالصورة فهو واحد بالجنس ، وما كان واحداً بالجنس فهو واحد بالنسبة ؛ وليس ما كان واحداً بالنسبة فهو واحد بالجنس ، ولا ما كان واحداً بالجنس فهو واحد بالصورة ، ولا ما كان واحداً بالصورة فهو واحد بالعدد .

(١) الكلمة غير منقولة في الأصل ، وليس على الألف شيء .

(٢) هكذا العبارة في الأصل ؛ ولعله يقصد الأشياء التي حدّها واحد

(٣) في الأصل : بالجنس

(٤) الكلمة غير منقولة في الأصل

(١) في الأصل : واحده

(٢) في الأصل : شيء متصل

(٣) الكلمة غير منقولة في الأصل

(٤) هكذا في الأصل

فبين أن مقابل الوحدة الكثرة : فالكثرة إذن تُقال بكل نوع من هذه ، فيقال : كثير^(١) ، إما لأنه لا متصل ، فهي منفصلة ، ولأن عنصرها ينقسم للصورة ، أو صورها للجنس ، أو إلى ما ينسب إليه .
وبين أن الهوية تُقال على كل ما علته الواحد ؛ فلهوية تُقال لما تعدد^(٢) أنواع الواحد .

فقد تبين أن الواحد الحق ليس هو شيء من المعقولات^(٣) ، ولا [هو] عنصر ، ولا جنس ، ولا نوع ، ولا شخص ، ولا فصل ، ولا خاصة ، ولا عرض عام ، ولا حركة ، ولا نفس ، ولا عقل ، ولا كل ، ولا جزء ، ولا جميع ، ولا بعض ، ولا واحد بالإضافة إلى غيره ، بل واحد مُرسل ، ولا يقبل التكثير ولا [هو] المركب ، [ولا] كثير^(٤) ، ولا واحد مما ذكرنا أنه موجود فيه أنواع جميع أنواع الواحد التي ذكرنا ، ولا يلحقه ما يلحق أساميها^(٥) ؛ وإذ هذه التي ذكرنا أبسط ما هي له ، أعني ما تُقال عليه ، فما تُقال عليه أشد تكثيراً ، فالواحد الحق إذن^(٦) لا ذو هيولى ، ولا ذو صورة ، ولا ذو كمية ، ولا ذو كيفية ، ولا ذو إضافة ، ولا موصوف بشيء من باقى المعقولات^(٧) ، ولا ذو جنس ، ولا ذو فصل ، ولا ذو شخص ، ولا ذو خاصة ، ولا ذو عرض عام ، ولا متحرك ، ولا موصوف بشيء مما نفى أن يكون واحداً بالحقيقة ؛ فهو إذن وحدة فقط محض ، أعني لا شيء غير وحدة ؛ وكل واحد غيره فمتكثير ؛ فإذن^(٨) الوحدة ، إذ هي

(١) في الأصل : كثير

(٢) الكلمة غير منقوطة في الأصل

(٣) في الأصل : المفوعات

(٤) إن عبارة : ولا المركب كثير ؛ غير ظاهرة المعنى ولا هى منسجمة مع الكلام ، فلعلها

زائدة أو لعل النص ناقص

(٥) الكلمة غير واضحة في الأصل

(٦) في الأصل : إذا

(٧) في الأصل : المفوعات

(٨) في الأصل : فإذا

عرض في جميع الأشياء ، فهى غير الواحد الحق ، كما قدمنا ؛ والواحد الحق هو الواحد بالذات الذى لا يتكثر بته من الجهات ، ولا ينقسم بنوع من الأنواع ، لا من جهة ذاته ، ولا من جهة غيره ، ولا [هو] زمان ، ولا مكان ، ولا حامل ، ولا محمول ، ولا كل ، ولا جزء ، ولا جوهر ولا عرض^(١) ، ولا [ينقسم]

بنوع من أنواع القسمة أو التكثير بته ؛ فأما الواحد بجميع الأنواع غيره ، فإذا كان فيما هو فيه بالعرض ، فكل ما كان فى شيء بعرض فمُعرضه فيه غيره ، إما ما ذاك^(٢) الشيء فيه بعرض وإما بالذات ؛ وليس يمكن أن تكون الأشياء بلا نهاية بالفعل ؛ فأول علّة للوحدة فى الموحّدات هو الواحد الحق الذى لم يفد الوحدة من غيره ، لأنه لا يمكن أن تكون المفيدات بعضها لبعض بلا نهاية فى البدو ؛ فعلة الوحدة فى الموحّدات هو الواحد الحق الأول ، وكل قابل للوحدة فهو مغلول ، فكل واحد غير الواحد بالحقيقة فهو الواحد بالجواز لا بالحقيقة ، فكل واحد من العلولات للوحدة إنما يذهب من وحدته إلى غير هويته ، أعنى أنه لا يتكثر من حيث يوجد ، وهو كثير لا واحد مرسل ، أعنى مرسلأ واحداً^(٣) لا يتكثر بته وليس وحدته شيئاً غير هويته .

فإذا كان كل واحد من المحسوسات وما يلحق المحسوسات ، فيها الوحدة والكثرة معاً ، وكانت الوحدة فيها جميعاً أثراً من مؤثر ، عارضاً فيه ، لا بالطبع ، وكانت^(٤) الكثرة جماعة وحدانيات اضطراباً ، فباطراب إن لم تكن وحدة لم تكن كثرة بته^(٥) ، فإذا تهبوى^(٦) كل كثير هو بالوحدة ؛ فإن لم يكن

(١) فى الأصل : ولا للجوهر ولا للعرض

(٢) هكذا فى الأصل : والمعنى الإجمالى فى كل هذا النص ظاهر ، على ما فيه من اضطراب .

وقد زدت بعض الكلمات بين قوسين مضلعين رغبة فى الإيضاح

(٣) فى الأصل : مرسل واحد

(٤) فى الأصل : ولا كانت — وليس لها وجه

(٥) فى الأصل : فإذا .

(٦) هكذا رسم الكلمة فى الأصل — وهى غير منقوطة ، وقد بشكتها وقطعتها اجتهداً

رسالة الكندي

في حدود الأشياء ورسومها

هذه الرسالة تشتمل على تعريفات كثيرة لأشياء أو مفاهيم متنوعة أما خفوة من مبادئ علوم شتى ؛ وهي تذكر دوزن مبدأ في ترتيبها ودون مراعاة قاعدة معينة في التصنيف . وقد يكون فيها تكرار أو غموض ؛ يرجعه إلى عدم الدقة من جانب الناسخ أحياناً .

ولم يرد ذكر هذه الرسالة باسمها هذا عند أحد من ترجم الكندي وأصحى مصنفاته ؛ ولكن الاختلاف المتأصل في رواية أسماء الرسائل وذكر بعضها دون بعض فيما لدينا من إحصاءات لها ، عند مختلف المؤرخين ، قد يبرر افتراض أن اسمها سقط — كغيرها — من النسخ الأولى الذي اعتمد عليه المؤرخون ، أو أنها لم تكن في متناول أحد منهم ، أو أنها — أخيراً — مذكورة بعنوان آخر ، لعله الذي نجده عند ابن أبي أصيبعة (ج ١ ص ٢١٠) ، وهو : « مسائل كثيرة في المنطق وغيره وحدود الفلسفة » .

وإذا عرفنا أن الكندي — كما يؤخذ مما بين أيدينا من رسائله — كان يكتب أحياناً لبعض من يسأله من تلاميذه ، فلا يبعد أن يكون أحدهم قد جمع رسائله ، كما لا يبعد أن يقع بعض الاختلاف بين التلاميذ أو بين المؤرخين في أسمائها — وهذا هو الواقع في إحصاءاتها .

هذا إلى أن الرسالة بخط يخالف خط بقية الرسائل ؛ فأغلب الظن أنها أضيفت استيفاءً للجموعة . وليس لها دياجة ولا خاتمة — على ما نعهد في رسائل الكندي التي بين أيدينا في هذا المخطوط ، بل في غيرها مما لم يحجره المخطوط . وهذا — وإن كان اعتباراً قليل القيمة ، لأنه لا يتحتم أن يكون لكل رسالة دياجة — فهو قد يشير الشك حول نسبة الرسالة للكندي . غير أنه لا ريب في أن ما فيها له ؛ بدليل التطبيق بين ما نجده فيها من تعريفات وبين التعريفات

وحدة فلا^(١) هوية للكثير بنية ، فإنَّ كلَّ مستو^(٢) إنما هو انفعال يوجد ما لم يكن ، فإنَّ فيفيض الوحدة عن الواحد الحق الأول هو تهوى كل علة التهوى [هي] من الواحد الحق الذي لم يبق للوحدة من مفيد ، بل هو بذاته محسوس وما يلحق المحسوس ، فيوجد كل واحد منها إذا تهوى بهويته إياها ؛ فإنَّ علة التهوى ؛ والذي تهوى ليس هو لم يزل ، والذي هو ليس هو لم يزل مُبتدع ؛ أي تهوى عن علة ، فالذي تهوى بهوى مُبتدع ؛ وإنَّ كانت علة التهوى الواحد الحق الأول ، فعلة الإبداع هو الواحد الحق الأول ، والعلّة التي منها مبدأ الحركة ، أعني الحرك مبدأ الحركة ، أعني الحرك^(٣) ، هي الفاعل . فالواحد الحق الأول ، إن هو علة مبدأ سحر كة التهوى — أي الانفعال — فهو المبتدع لجميع التهويات ؛ فإنَّ لا هوية إلا بما فيها من الوحدة ، وتوحدتها هو تهوى بها ، فبالوحدة قوام الكل ، لو فارقت الوحدة عادت وتكررت ، مع الفراق معاً ، بلا زمان ؛ فالواحد الحق إنَّ هو الأول المبتدع المسك كل ما يبدع ، فالجلاشي من إمساكه وقوته إلا عاد^(٤) ودتر .

فإنَّ قد تبين ما أردنا إيضاحه من تميز الواحدات ، يظهر الواحد الحق المفيد المبتدع ، والقوى المسك ، وما الواحدات بالجزء ، أعني بإفادة الواحد الحق ، جل وتعالى عن صفات المحدثين ، فلنكمل هذا الفن ولنثله بما يتلو ذلك تلوا طبيعياً ، بتأييد ذي القدرة التامة والقوة الكاملة والجود^(٥) القائض .

ثم الجزء الأول^(٦) من كتاب يعقوب بن إسحاق الكندي

ولحمد لله رب العالمين وصلواته على محمد النبي وآله أجمعين .

(١) في الأصل : ولا

(٢) في الأصل : تهوى ، ويحسن أن تكون : تهوى

(٣) لم في هذا النص تكراراً

(٤) في الأصل : إذا

(٥) هذه الكلمة غير مقبولة ، ودالها كلاً ، فهل يمكن قراءتها : غار ، هي والكلمة

الأخرى فيها قليل ، ولعل الحوارب عدم .

(٦) في الأصل : يتلو

(٧) في الأصل : الجواد

(٨) هنا يتبين هذا الكتاب للكندي ، وليس له في المخطوط الذي بين أيدينا البقية التي يشير إليها المؤلف ، وهو يقول في كتاب العلة القربية به تناول موضوعها في كتاب الفلسفة الأولى